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Outline of the problem. The industrial estates sponsor- 
ed by the British government are of interest both as novel 
measures for dealing with unemployment and as tools of econo- 
mic planning. Their object before the Second World War was 
primarily to provide employment in regions which had suffered 
from prolonged unemployment and underemployment . After the 
war, as Jobs were plentiful, the main emphasis was on the 
diversification of industry within the areas. It was hoped 
that future unemployment, which might have arisen from over- 
dependence of the regions on a small number of industries, 
would be minimised. Consequently the industrial estates were 
to play an important role in employment policy and in the 
planning of industrial location. 
The industrial estates were first established in 1936 -7, 
in four regions - South West Scotland, West Cumberland, Dur- 
ham and Tyneside, and South Wales. Each of these areas had 
suffered from heavy and prolonged unemployment and from over - 
depedence on a small number of declining or depressed in- 
dustries. In times of trade recessions, there had been heavy 
unemployment in the-regions. During the 'Great Depression' 
of the inter -war years there arose a danger of a permanent 
unemployment in these problem areas. The situation was 
serious. Although the cyclical unemployment aggravated the 
difficulties of the four regions, their main problem was the 
structural unemployment, which resulted from a permanent de- 
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cline of the few industries on which these areas depended 
for their prosperity. 
The establishment of the industrial estates could not 
have been a cure for the cyclical unemployment in the re- 
gions at that time. It was envisaged partly as a safeguard 
which would minimise the local effects of a future reces- 
sion,but primarily as a measure designed to reduce the ex- 
istin,g structural unemployment.. No steps however could 
have been taken to reduce the structural unemployment so 
long as the economy of the country as a whole remained 
depressed and there was cyclical unemployment on a national 
uneiri l oydien t 
Consequently the attack on the regional problem of 
had to be along two lines. First, general policies were 
needed to restore the level of economic activity and to 
reduce cyclical unemployment in the country as a whole. 
Second, specific measures were required to reduce struct- 
ural unemployment in the regions which were particularly 
affected. 
To aid the economic recovery, fiscal and monetary 
policies were available. To bring about an expansionary 
e -e-e-t th,e effect the pattern of consumption, saving and 
investment could have been altered by varying taxes, na- 
tional insurance contributions and government expenditure 
on the one hand, and the supply of money and interest rates 
on the other. Only when the fall in the economic activity 
had been counteracted, would specific measures for deal- 
ing with regional str'zctzral unemployment become feasible. 
The problem of structural unemployment is complex. 
It has two aspects, that of the declining industries and 
that of the areas dependent on them for their prosperity. 
The government could seek to solve this problem in three 
ways - by transfering surplus labour from the depressed 
areas, by sustaining the declining industries in the areas, 
and by encouragging the immigration of new industries to 
the areas. 
The transfer of workers from the afflicted areas, if 
the labour was mobile, was the accepted method of dealing 
with regional unemployment in the past. It has the advan- 
tage of reducing quickly the number of unemployed, provid- 
ed there are other areas willing and able to absorb the 
surplus labour. There is however the serious disadvant- 
age that the transfer policy deprives the depressed re- 
gion, and when the emigration is abroad it deprives the 
nation., of its younger, more skilled and more enterpris- 
ing workers. It is they who are most likely to leave. 
This policy also creates problems in the receiving areas. 
A sudden influx of population is not an unmixed blessing. 
The advantage of an increased supply of workers to relieve 
such shortage of labour as may exist has to be balanced 
against the disadvantages of overcrowding. From a nation- 
al point of view the duplication of social investment in 
roads, drains, houses etc. is not conductive to the most 
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efficient use of the national resources. There is no pro- 
blem however of duplication of the social investment if 
wor'{ers are tra.nsfered from areas scheduled for slum clear- 
ance. The undesirability of the further growth of large 
industrial centres for strategic, social and economic rea- 
sons has also to be taken into account. The main criticism 
of the transfer policy is that it deals with the symptoms 
and does not eliminate the root cause of the structural 
unemployment. 
The power to reduce structural unemployment and to 
maintain and create employment lies with the industries 
of the area. Therefore,either the declining industries have 
to be maintained or new ones introduced in order to keep 
stable or to increase the level of economic activity of a 
region. The decline of industries may be attributed to a 
fall in purchasing power at home and abroad, to technical 
changes, changes in taste or to growth of foreign compet- 
ition. A government can temporarily sustain failing in- 
dustries and stave off structural unemployment by accor- 
ding them preferential treatment at home and protection 
from foreign competition. Although a case can be made for 
subsidy and tariff policies for strategic reasons, inter- 
ference with and hindrance of the process of economic ad- 
justment cannot be justified as a part of the long term 
employment policy of a government. 
When the policy of intrtducing new industries to 
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the depressed areas was considered two questions had to be 
answered. First, what types of industry were required. 
Second, by what methods were they to be steered there. The 
first question could only be answered after a study of the 
area had been made. The answer, : to the latter would depend 
on whether a coercive or persuasive method would have been 
acceptable,which in turn depended upon the political organ- 
isation of the society. The persuasive method has the ad- 
vantage that it leaves the maximum number of decisions to 
the industrialist. The government simply offers induce - 
ments to off -set any existing economic disadvantages of 
the area and to overcome prejudice an industrial- 
ist may feel against it. These inducements can take dif- 
ferent forms such as : direct subsidies to new firms, the 
encouragement and assistance of private trading estates 
and the establishment of government sponsored industrial 
estates. 
A direct subsidy is unsatisfactory, because there is 
no straightforward basis on which it would be possible to 
determine the length of time over which a subsidy would 
be needed, nor is there a clear criterion of success av- 
ailable. These objecti -Ins would be less applicable to a 
policy of encouraging private trading estates. However fts 
experience has shown this policy to be impracticable be- 
cause of the unwillingness of investors to finance such ven- 
E 
tures -in the depressed areas and in Scotland generally. (1 ) 
There remained the third method. In his report the 
Commissioner for Special Areas wrote, T.. it was justi- 
fiable in the circumstances to recommend the adoption of 
of the novel and unorthodox proposal of establishing Trad- 
ing Estates financed out of Exchequer Funds.., (2) The 
establishment of industrial estates sponsored by the Bri- 
tish government as an integral part of employment policy 
was a bold experiment. It was an attempt to deal with 
structural unemployment. The root cause of unemployment, 
which was the overdependence of certain areas on a small 
number of declining or depressed ixldustries was attacked. 
It was realised that by diversification of the industrial 
structure of the regions their vulnerability to heavy and 
prolonged unemployment could be reduced. New industries 
therefore were encouraged to go to these areas by being 
offered as an inducement the facilities of the industrial 
estates. 
Sine the War (1939-45) , the establishment of in- 
dustrial estates as a part of employment policy was co- 
the 
ordinated withAnationa.l policy fo'the distribution of in- 
dustry. The object of the latter was to secure a balanced 
(1) Evidence presented by the Scottish Economic Council 
to Royal Commission on Distribution of Industrial 
Population.(15th. Day).Cm.d.-6153, (140) Report. 
(2) Cmd. 5090, (1;()) pec.1 
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national and regional structure of industry. Thus the 
industrial estates are fulfilling the dual function of 
creating employment and of serving as a tool of the plan- 
ning of industrial location. Outside Gt. Britain no in- 
dustrial estates had been established with these object- 
ives. When, in 1934, Special Area Commissioners for Scot- 
land and England(including Wales) 'ere appointed to study 
regional conditions and to take steps to reduce unemploy- 
ment the Chancellor of the Exchequer said, 
'We are giving the Commissioners a very wide dis- 
cretion. They must not be afraid of trying to experim- 
ent even if their experiments fail., (1) 
Their most important experiment was the establishment of 
the industrial estates in Scotland, England and Wales. 
Purpose of this study. In this study an attempt is 
made to describe the experiment in Scotland, to asses its 
results and to evaluate, in economic and social terms, 
the costs and gains of the policy of establishing govern- 
ment sponsored industrial estates, on the basis of the 
Scottish experience. A considerable part of this report 
is of a historical character. 'Historians copy from one 
another', wrote Anatole France, 'thus they spare them- 
selves trouble and avoid the appearance of being pre- 
sumptuous'. Unfortunately in this survey no such safe 
practice could have been adopted as there is little 
published material on the Scottish Industrial Estates. 
Information therefore had to be obtained more laborious- 
ly by npproaching directly the S.I.E.htd. , government 
(1) Chamberlain, Hansard, vol.293,(19)3 -34), p.1991. 
departments, industrialists and local authorities. Fur- 
thermore in claiming that an attempt has teen made to 
pre3ent an account of the official and industrial points 
of view, the danger of appera.ring presumptious is difficult 
to avoid. 
The general economic conditions and the fiscal and 
monetary policies which were followed are outlined to ¿ive 
the historical background. In particular the economic 
conditions in Scotland are examined taking into account 
the level pf unemployment and the industrial structure of 
the country. Thus an attempt is made to show how the 
problem of the Special Areas and, in particular, of the 
Scottish Development Area developed. A summary of the 
legislation and the measures adopted to deal with the pro- 
blem follows. The establishment of the Scottish Industrial 
Estates which was one of these methods is the main theme 
of this study. 
The survey of the Scottish Industrial Estates is 
divided into parts dealing in turn with the history, organ- 
isation, powers, finance and functions of the Scottish 
Industrial Estates Ltd., with the Scottish Industrial 
Estates and their development, and with the firms and 
labour on the estates. The effectiveness of the Scottish 
Industrial Estates in reducing unemployment and introduc- 
ing new industries to Scotland is discussed. The advan- 
tages and disadvantages of the industrial estates are ex- 
omined. 
In this report an attempt is made to show trends and 
to draw broad conclusions as information which would have 
permitted a more detaiN4study of the Scottish Industrial 
Estates was not available. The S.I.E.Ltd. and the Trea- 
sury have not been in a position to disclose facts about 
the finance of the company. Such information on this sub- 
ject, as is presented here, has been extracted from the 
public records at the office of the Company Registrar, 
Edinburgh. Data which could be obtained about the firms 
on the estates from the Board of Trade, or on labour from 
the Ministry of have been limited by the Factory 
Statistics Act. 
Information about firms on the estates was also ob- 
tained from such materials as had been published in S.T.E. 
Ltd. pamphlets, in newspapers and magazines and from inter- 
views. Here, too, research was handicapped by the fact 
that a great number of the firms are private companies, 
under no obligation to disclose their financial position. 
Also it was impossible to discover in many cases the 
financial position of branch factories of public compan- 
ies, as they are not shown in the published accounts. 
It has hbwéve.r been possible to obtain a considerable 
amount of general information which is analysed in this 
survey. 
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Chapter 1 . 
The policy of establishing industrial estates in 
Scotland, as a specific method of dealing with regional 
unemployment cannot be studied in isolation. The causes 
of international, national and local unemployment are 
inter -related. Therefore, any employment policy aimed et 
reducing u_nemplovment at one level will affect others. 
Because of the interdependence which exists between direct 
employment policies ar.d general economic policies there is 
a need,before undertaking a study of one aspect of employ- 
ment policy - the establishment of government sponsored 
industrial estates in Scotland- to give an account of the 
econoiLic policies which been pursued in Gt . Britain 
as a whole, and to describe the events which led to these 
policies and which followed them. It is this light that 
an attempt can be made to answer the questions: Why was 
there a need for industrial estates; Why were they not 
established before 1936; What difficulties had to be over- 
come in developing them, and how did their rapid growth 
become possible after the Second World War? 
This study of measures taken to reduce; unemployment 
in Gt.Britain is confined to the inter -war years during 
which heavy and prolonged unemployment was experienced. 
The period began with a feverish boom in 11, when demand 
held back during the war burst on the market. Within 
eighteen months the boom conditions came to an end and 
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after the middle of 1920 the level of economic-. acti- 
vity declined. By 1921 a depression had developed. It 
was, however, short- lived. The turning point came in the 
middle of 1922, followed by a general improvement parti- 
cularly in the industries supplying the home market, The 
export and heaver industries remained depressed. Slow re- 
covery continued. During 1324 sterling appreciated and 
the London on New T orlr exchange rate improved. Gradually 
the way was paved for the return to the gold standard which 
was made in 1925. It was decided to return to the old 
parity, partly for the sake of prestige, with the unfor- 
tunate result that the pound was over- valued. This added 
to the difficulties of the principal British export in- 
to 
dustries and contributed,the trouble in the coal industry 
and the general strike in 1926. By 1927 there were signs 
of recovery and in 1523 a record number of new issues 
was floated on the London market. This boom coincided 
rk 
witht_specula.tive boom on Wall Street which ended with the 
1929 crisis. The consequent slump soon reached Britain 
and affected the whole world. In. Britain the rock bottom 
of depression was reached in 1G31 -2. For this country 
the international crisis had two serious consequences. In 
1;31 the U.K. abandoned the gold standard, and after the 
Ottawa conference of the same year, emerged as a fully 
fledged protectionist country. During the next few years 
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there was slight improvement but it was not until the re- 
armament period that stimuli were given to economic acti- 
vity. From 1 °36 to the outbreak of the war there was an 
inprovement in the economic conditions. 
Looking at the unemployment problem in retrospect, it 
is relatively easy to criticise the governmentsof the day 
for being ineffective. But one has to remember the com- 
plexity of the problem and the high level of unemployment 
which faced them. Cyclical unemployment was particularly 
heavy in 1921 -22 and in 1931 -2, while the export and 
heavy industries experienced structural unemployment 
throughout the period. The government's task of reducing 
unemployment was difficult because the main cause, the 
world wide depression, was outside its control and re- 
quired measures not on a national but on an internation- 
al scale. At rioale the belief in the orthodox theory of 
'sound finance' made it impossible to use fiscal and mo- 
netary policies as a tool for counteracting the cyclical 
movements. 
Budgetary Policy. The orthodox theory of 'sound 
finance', or as it is sometimes called the 'Treasury 
view', dictated a policy of balanced budgets, which meant 
a fall in expenditure as revenue fell and vice versa. 
This limitation reduced greatly the possibilities of de- 
creasing unemployment because it made it impossible for 
1 
the :overn Went to curry out a policy of tax remissions 
and increase exc ndi tare at the time of a decline in the 
level of economic a.otivit:y. . The budrretary policy that was 
folle, -ed was unfortunately the opposite of what was re- 
cuird. In 19_1 it intensifier_ the fall in demand. Sir 
obel.t Lorne balanced the budget and ' aF even able to Fhow 
a surplus of ,L -.) ,J. million. Not only was the panics 
purchasing po er reduced by high taxation which left 
smaller disposable incomes, but the 27overn4ent's own ex- 
perlditure was also reduced. In 122 the eddes Co.ni:ittee 
presented their report urging a retrenchment policy and 
the government applied the 'Geddes Axe' to prune outlays. 
Yr. Churchill's ex_oansionA.r;r budpets which might have 
helped to cure the deficiency in demand came too late. 
Britain was a ready on the way to recover i y. They served 
stimulant when rest should 'nave been prescribed. But 
the position was a.-rain re1T,,,rse.Á when a serious ne' recess- 
ion began. The orthodox policT, came baclr with 1rr. Snow - 
dens return to the Exchequer. In his memoirs be wrote, 
'the miracle of loaves and fishes was a comparatively 
little thing compared with what I was supposed to do.' 
Indeed it would have required a miracle if une aploN ment 
were to be reduced when the recommendations of the ..ay 
Committee were followed. In 191 a Committee on National 
Expenditure, known as the Y.ay Corrc.ittee, foresaw a series 
3 
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of budget deficitsani in their report advocated an eco- 
nomy campaign. In 1 ¡)2 at the r. e i4ht of the slump there 
was a budget sL,rplus. 
Throughout the period when as a result of a lour level 
of economic activity government revenue fell, taxes were 
kept high and expenditure was reduced. In 1921 -22 the stan- 
dard rate of tax was kept at e/- and not reduced until 1923) 
similarly in 1''2E -27 the rate was maintained at 4/- and 
raised. to 4/ in 1 ;;31 and to 5/- in 1932. Expenditure was 
cut in V:21-22,192( 7 , and 1 ; -31 -52 , and there was a budget 
surplus in 121 ,1;2,and 132. 
This, however, waL in accordance with the principles 
of the 'sound finance' theory which was the policy a govern_ 
.Lent was expected to pursue. Even a small deviation from 
it was regarded as dangerous. When the Interim Report of 
the Unemployment Com:üittee revealed. in 15-1 that the un- 
employment fund had been maintained by borrowing, not only 
did. it cause alarm at home but undermined confidence abroad 
in the soundness of the British finance. - 
It is not surprising therefore that during the periods 
of depression ^hen the Treasury was conducting an economy 
campaign it should try to reduce unemployment by favouring 
the passive remedy of paying public as.!istance, rather than 
the active and. more effective one of initiating public 
works, or establishing industrial estates, which were like- 
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Such investment as did tal(e place did not yield the hoped 
for results owing to the unfortunate timing of the raising 
and spending of funds. Local authorities, borrowing took 
place not when interest retes were low and funds easily 
available, but rather when conditions were exactly the op- 
posite. On the other hand, disbursments coincided with 
the 'booms'. It was observed that throughout the inter- 
war period(up to 1)L) 'Jo far as public investment is in- 
fluential in trade cycles its weight has been thrown into 
the balance on the wrong side.T(1) The economic history 
of the period shows that the government's- fiscal policy._ 
failed to counteract the cyclical movements. 
Monetary Policy. Like the fiscal policy, the mone- 
tary policy, until the begi_ning of the tcheap moneyrphase, 
exerted its influence in the wrong directi.dn. The mone- 
tary policy was enforced by the Bank of England through 
variations of the bank rate and by the Treasury through 
its public debt policy. Throughout the inter -war years of 
depression the bank rate was high; in 122t it averaged 64, 
in 15'26 5A, and on ? n st . September 1 9 1 it was 
raised to 6 h .(2) 
The effect of the bank rate was reinforced by the public 
debt policy. Until 1931 the Treasury was preoccupied with 
debt repayment by means of Sinking Funds, and with 
the fund- 
ing of the short term and the floating debt. 
It is possi - 
(1) U .hicks , British Government Finance 
1920-36,(1938) p .1 2 6 
(2) In 1 ?32 the bÇnlr rite rPd 1cad to 2 %. 
t7 
ble that the interest rates were pushed up as a result of 
the Treasury's competition in the money market. Whether 
the Treasury had in fact to compete for funds is by no 
means certain, for in the inter-war years, when a low 
level of economic activity persisted through the greater 
part of the per; n j , the number of private business tor- 
rowers was likely to be small. The question of competition 
may therefore not have arisen. The harm was done in so 
far as the debt repayment was made out of the proceeds of 
taxation. This reduced the purchasing power of the tax- 
payers and accentuated the underconsumption tenuency. The 
debt repayment also reduced the purchasing power of the 
holders of the government securities as they ceased to re- 
ceive income in the form of interest on their gilt- edgeds 
and in view of the economic prospects many were not pre- 
pared to invest in industrials. They held idle balances 
which did not earn income. 
.cart ly 
The Employment Polic-- -T' ter -war Period. L because of 
the failure on the zovern.ment's part in the earlier phases 
of the inter -war period to realise the Potentialities of 
fiscal and monetary policy, cyclical unemployment in the 
country was not reduced. Consequently it was difficult to 
take measures to reduce structural unemployment in certain 
Y 
areas . A prerequisite of a direct emploient policy In 
ru. 
the form of Ltransfer of surplus workers from, and encour- 
tm. 
agement of, movement of new industries to, a depressed area 
is economic revival in the country as a whole. Therefore 
no attempt could nave been made by the government to intro- 
duce new industries to the declining regions until such a 
revival had taken place, and when businesses became pre- 
pared to entertain ideas of starting or expanding product- 
ion, as they .did in 1934. That year marlred the begin ng 
of a direct employment policy embodied in legislation 
which made the establishment of government -.sponsored in- 
dustrial estates possible. 
Yost -war reriod,(145 -52). the economic conditions 
prevailing since the Second World Oar have been in marked 
contrast to those before the war. Whereas the inter -war 
period on the whole was one of 0 prolonged depression,the 
post -war period, apart from minor relapses, has been 'one 
of continuing prosperity. During the inter -war years the 
government was faced with the problem of reducing unem- 
ployment during a depression, after the war it has been 
considering measures to be adopted to prevent unemploy- 
ment from developing, should there be a recession. Thus 
the unemployment policy changed into an employment policy. 
There was also another change. The problem of employment 
ceased to be seen in isolation and as after the war some 
degree of economic planning became acceptable in this 
country, the employment policy was co- ordinated with a 
policy for the balanced distribution of industry. 
The original statement of the British post -war em- 
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uloyment policy is to be found in the "a.mployment White 
Paper. (1) Taught by the sad experience after the First 
''.rorld the government was determined that history 
should not repeat itself, and a year before the Second 
7lorld War -".Tas over it prepared the post-war employment 
policy embodied in the White Paper which was published in 
15,44. 'The Employment Poli cy, is a significant document. 
For the first time in Britain a government pledged itself 
to maintain a hi 7h level of employment . (2) T-The Govern- 
ment accept as one of their primary aims and responsibi- 
lities the maintenance of a high and stable level of em- 
ployment after the warT.(3) The authors of the White 
taper believed this could only be done by maintaining an 
effective .demand. The general policy which the govern- 
ment pledged itself to follow was divided into two parts, 
the long term aim of maintaining the total expenditure on 
a national seal hrough fiscal and monetary policies and 
the measures which would be taken to check the development 
of localised unemployment in particular areas. A promise 
(1)TEmployment Policy', Cmd. 6527, (1914) 
(2) It is of interest to note that throughout the paper 
the phrase thigh levelTof employment and not 'full 
employment, is used. The term 'full employment' has 
meaning only if a qualification is made allowing for 
certain percentage of workers to be unemployed due to 
frictional or seasonal causes. 
()) Cnid.6527, p. 2. 
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'Pas made that rIt will be an object of Government polic,, 
to secure a balanced industrial development in the areas 
which have been unduly dependent on industries specially 
vulnerable to 'u employment' . (1) The section of the »:hite 
raper dealing with the distribution of industry is the 
forerunner of the Distribution of Industry Act 145,which 
sanctioned the various methods of Encouraging the location 
of new init stries in such areas. 
The remar1Ta.ble feature of both the 'Employment Policy' 
and of the i.stribntion of industry policy is that they 
have always been o'tçide party politics. The rEmnloyment 
Policy' .+Vbite paper presented by the Coalition government 
way, a joint pledge of all the parties. Successive Conser- 
vative and Socialist governments steered through tie Par- 
liament and enforced the legislation on the distribution 
of industry. With the open stand taken by the government 
and the change in public opinion towards government in- 
tervention and planning, the rapid growth of industrial 
estates became possible. 
The International Employment Policy. Because of the 
economic interdependence of countries, no domestic employ- 
ment policy pursued by Britain. alone could have met with 
success. But after the Second World War the need for 
government action to maintain a high level of employment 
became internationally accepted, and this conviction ,,as 
(1) Cmd.6527, p.11 
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embodied in the United Nations Charter.(1) As it was real- 
ised that a country may not be able to maintain a hi5;h 
level of employment by its o"Tn efforts, under Article 56 
of the Charter all members pledge themselves to take joint 
and: separate action to prevent unemployment. It was the 
belief of the authors of the United Nations report on 
National and international. measures for Full Employment' 
that the 'full employment pled,e embodied in the United 
Nations Charter marks a historic phase in the evolution 
of the modem conception of the functions and responsibi- 
lities of the democratic state.'(?) 
(1) Article 55. 
(2) United Nations, National and International Measures 
for Full Employment , (1 949) , p .5 . 
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Chapter II, 
Origin of the Scottish 'Problem Area,. 
two 
The success of establishment of the government sponsored 
industrial estates in dealing with the problem of regional unem- 
ployment cannot yet be fully determined. A rough assessment can 
hmwever be attempted. Before, the present measure of success is 
examined in the light of the Scottish experience, the factors 
which led to the problem in Scotland and the steps which had to 
be taken to enable the government to start the experiment of 
establishing of the estates, have to be considered. First a 
brief study of the economic conditions in Scotland must be made. 
Second, the measures which prepared the way and the legislation 
which brought the estates into being have to be considered. 
Industrial estates were set up in the West of Scotland, Durham 
and Tyneside, West Cumberland and South Wales. All these four 
regions had the same basic problem, namely a lack of balance in 
their economic development. The overdependence on a small number 
of industries had resulted in heavy unemployment in the past and 
rendered the regions vulnerable to future unemployment. Although 
the trade depression of the 120's and 153C's affected the whole 
of Gt. Britain it was in these areas that its effects were most 
marked and where conditions failed to improve appreciably when 
recovery began. It was then that the publicsattention was drawn 
to Scotland, Durham and Tyneside, West Cumberland and South Wales 
as the 'Problem Areas'. It was reKised that unemployment there 
pinted a separate although related problem to the employment 
problem in the country as a whole and that specific measures 
were needed to cope with the regional problem which was of a 
structural rather than cyclical nature. The history of the 
'Problem Areas' is told by their successive names. First, they 
were referred to as the distressed areas, later as depressed, 
then they were officially acknowledged as Special Areas and 
finally rechristened Development Areas. 
Government policy in respect to these areas falls into two 
distinct periods- (a) the inter -war period, during which the po- 
licy as laid down in the Special Areas Acts was directed towards 
reducing unemployment and (b) the post -war years, when the policy 
e 
governed by the Development Areas legislation was largely design;ë. 
to provide safeguards against future structural unemployment. 
To achieve these objectives a more balanced regional distribution 
of industry was needed. But although it is easy to see when a 
regional economy is unbalanced, to define a balanced economy is 
difficult. It is impossible to lay down general rules as to the 
nature and number of industries that have to be brought together 
to give a proper industrial structure. (1) The best that can 
be done is to state generally that what is meant by a balanced 
industrial structure is a diversified combination of industries 
without overdependence of the economy on one or a small group of 
industries. 
Parts of Scotland become a problem area because of the lack 
of balance in their general development. Industrial specialisat- 
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ion led to overdependence for prosperity on the heavy industries. 
The light industries were not developed on a sufficient scale to 
provide a counterpoise when the basic industries,- shipbuilding, 
iron and steel, and coalmining - became depressed in the 1920's 
and 1)0's. The demand for the products of these industries 
had fluctma.ted in the past. So lang as the trade went on expand- 
ing the instability of the re >gional structure resulting from 
such one -sided development was not viewed with apprehension. 
The belief in the continued prosperity of Scotland was shaken 
by the 'great depression'. 
The slump of the inter -war period not only Drought unemploy- 
ment on its own account, but aggravated such unemployment as 
already existed in Scotland because of the exhaustion of some 
of its natural resources. Directly, the slump caused unemploy- 
ment by reducing the demand for output of the heavy industries, 
which led to redundancy among workers employed by them. In- 
directly, the slump increased the level of unemployment oy 
accelerating the pace of mechanisation and rationalisation by 
firms. This was necessary in view of the intensified competit- 
ion in the shrunken world markets, but it led to a permanent 
displacement of some labour. Thus Scotland was faced with the 
problem of structural unemployment due to exhaustion of mineral 
resources and to technological progress, intensified by the 
cyclical depression of the 192U'4 and the early 1930's. More- 
over from the middle of the 1 3Cts there was also the problem 
of the failure on the part of Scotland to attract light indus- 
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tries which began to expand rapidly in England. Consequently 
there was not only unemployment but also under -employment, in 
particular of women, because of the dominance of the economy by 
the heavy industries. It is difficult to account for the absence 
of a parallel development of light industries North of the border 
to that which took place in the South. By comparison, reasons 
for the concentration and the development of heavy industries in 
Scotland are fairly obvious. 
The geographical and geological advantages which the south 
West of Scotland possessed made it the natural home of the heavy 
industries. These industries stimulated by the technological 
discoveries of the 1;th century, expanded rapidly and brought 
prosperity to the country. The Clyde was admirably smitecd for 
shipbuilding. Glasgow, its biggest port, became also one of the 
chief ports of the empire. The discovery of deposits of coal 
and iron ore established the mining industry and laid the found- 
ations off the iron and steel industries. The location advantages 
enjoyed by these industries were however partly lost as a result 
of technological progress. Furthermore the iron ore was exhausted 
and some coal mines which became uneconomic, had to oe abandoned. 
It would be incorrect however to give the impression that there 
were no light industries in Scotland. Some of them had disappear- 
ed because of the loss of the supply of raw materials or markets: 
the ttrbacco industry after the American 'War cif Independence, sugar 
industry declined after the Napoleonic war. Others lost in im- 
portance as for example the cotton industry. Scotland had never- 
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theless a considerable variet;; of ihustries. ( ) These in- 
dustries did not however 1)1a T a. sufficiently big part in the 
economic life of the country. Thus they did not provide a 
counterbal^nce to the heavy .industries. 
The lack of balE,nce in the eneral development of the 
country was then reflected first of all, in the overdependence 
of the economy on the snipbuildin , coalminin , and iron and 
steel industries; secondly, in the geographical ma.ldistribut- 
ion of inäustr :: and consequently of the population. The 
bulk of the industry was and still is, concentrated within 
the 'industrial'beltT, some 40 miles in ,width, stretclin; 
from the Arrs lire coast to Fife. Jute was the main industry 
in Dundee, paper,pri.iting and brewing were the chief indus- 
tries of the 3ciinbur h area, while the Border counties spe- 
ialiscd. in tweeds and hosiery. The heavy industries were 
concentrated in the South West part of the belt, with Glas- 
gow as its industrial centre. It is not surprising there- 
fore that, of the population of 4,:412," u (1();51), approxima- 
tely two thirds lived in the industrial belt and of those 
again about two thirds lived in Glasgow or within a 2; mile 
radius of the city. ( ) This concentration of population 
in the South West part of the belt was caused by the do- 
mination of the Scottish econo :J: by the heavy industries. 
(1) ?. . Ch.14. 
(2) Census of Scotland, Preliminary Report of the 15th 
Census of Ccotland.(1)51) 
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A high percentage of this population was thrown out of employ- 
ment as the heavy industries became depressed and contracted. 
As there were no alternative industries within the area which 
could absorb such surplus labour, the result was a widespread 
unemployment. Thus the South West of Scotland changed from 
being a prosperous area to a 'problem area'. 
Shipbuilding. The prosperity of Scotland was largely based on 
its shipbuilding industry. The Clyde has been the shipbuilding 
centre of Gt.Britain not only in the pioneering work but also 
in the volume of output. It was on the Clyde that the combinat- 
ion of turbine and reciprocating engine was originated. There 
the first regular sea -going steamer proppelled by geared turbines 
and the first ocean -going motor vessel to be launched in Gt. 
Britain , were built. In 1913, which was the peak year in the 
development of the industry, approximately a quarter of the 
total number of vessels built in Gt.Britain was launched from 
the Clyde yards. This represented one third of the tonnage 
and half of the mechanical horse power.(1) Then followed a 
reversal of the upward trend. Orders fell and many slips were 
empty. The depression of the Clyde shipbuilding industry which 
followed and the consequent unemployment may be attriouted 
to four main causes. The effects although not confined to the 
South West Scotland, were particularly serious for the shipbuild- 
(1) Shipbuilding in 1913, tonnage and I.H.PWn thousands. 
U.K. Vessels tons I.H.P. 
1 4T4 2 264 2 261 
Clyde 3r0 757 1 111 
Source, Board of Trade, Industrial Survey,(1932) p. 34. 
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ing industry in that area. causes were : - 
(1) increase in naval orders during the war and sub- 
sequent decline, 
(2) fall in demand for merchant ships during the trade 
depression, intensified by growing nationalism and 
attempts to achieve autarcy, 
(3) rationalisation and mechanisation of the shipbuilding 
industry, 
(4) labour demarcation in the shipbuilding industry. 
The Clyde was particularly well suited for war -time pro- 
duction and consequently received a high percentage of admiralty 
contracts. Berth facilities were extended and more labour was 
taken on. Almost every yard contributed to the war effort . 
eke 
As admiralty pressed orders in 1914 and 1915 naval construction 
increased and obtained priority over merchant shipbuilding.(1) 
When in 1916 defence policy was reversed and naval orders fell, 
the Clyde yards were faced with the problem of getting work and 
turned to private owners for orders. But after the war the demand 
for merchant vessels did not expand sufficiently to satisfy the 
increased productive capacity of the yards; it fell below the 
pre -war level. Thus wheras in 1913 the Clyde produced 757,000 
(1) Naval output on the Clyde, 
year vessels tons I.H.P. 
1913 17 
war period 
64 195 462 200 
1;14 32 83 074 653 287 
1915 167 92 155 1023 627 
1916 -4-918 2a8 641 755 4285 516 
1914-1918 naval 467 
output. 
816c; ' . 4 5 6 2 430 
Source, Board of Trade, industrial Survey, (1i52) p. 
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tons, daring the inter -war period only in 1920 an output of 
672, tons was reached.(1) This wa:3 the peak year for the 
shipbuilding industry in the South lest of Scotland, until 
naval construction began again in the late 1930's with the 
launching of the rearmament programme. 
This fall in the demand for merchant vessels was due to 
a. contraction of international trade caused by the general 
trade depression and by the growth of nationalism. The de- 
cline in international trade resulted in laying up of ships.(2) 
Consequently the amount of repair work in the yards decreased. 
What was more important for the Clyde, where few repairs were 
done at any time, was that the orders for new ships both for 
and foreign owners fell sharply. The 
ion for foreign owners was particularly marked.( ) 
(1) The Glasgow Herald, Shipbuilding and Engineering Supplement, 
1530. 
(2) Idle shipping in U.K. 
1st Jan.1 929 166 ships 329,770 net tonnage 
167 552,65 , , If 
2 1 1531 541 2 1 ,551 ,147 
Source, Reports of the Chamber of Shipping of the U.K. 
( 3 ) Number and tonnage of merchant vessels launched at 
Ports in the U.K_. during each year 1930 o to 1 9,;3 . 
- - . - _.... 
!LUilt for Gt .B o.ine rs i_>r forei n o ners Total 
_ .-°---- -- _ . ` 1. E Year Number óf± Tönn;é i?üm`ber of Tonnage !Number-of Tóiiñge 
_ - - _.---- vessels vessels vessels 
1,,;G 
776 5455Lif ,? 17U . ,4 ,46 ;r . 34u 1 5 
2,1' 
, - . -,- 
::61 
I 
.. .:. ;- 41 ,. -ï =iO3i1 




1 2 i74 
l 
4E, ! 40 i)¡ )i I , __.._ . .__.. .._ . _...._-. ......__..- _..__._.__._.-.._ ._. _1 
Source, Board of Trade, rfans.,vol.252,p.155,(13)-J4). 
Some of the countries which had been BritairL customers as a 
result of the autarkic policies followed by their governments 
began to build their own ships. 
Faced with contracted markets and meeting with fiercer com- 
petition for such orders as there were, British shipyards were 
forced to accelerate rationalisation and mechanisation of the 
industry in order to be able to quote competitive prices. Thus 
a rapid evolution took place in technical methods, the layout of 
the yards and the methods of building were changed, ship design 
and specifications were altered, and mechanisation was introduced 
on a grater scale. Although it was difficult to assess the long 
run effect of those changes on the employment capacity of the 
shipbuilding industry, the short terra effect was increased un- 
employment.Teaisplacement of labour due to the technical progress 
has been estimated to amount in certain sections of the industry 
to as much as 36-4C,ß of the total labour force. 
In view of the increased unemployment in the industry, the 
natural reaction of organised labour was to adhere all the more 
strongly to the principles of labour demarcation. Traditionally 
the shipbuilding industry had been organised on 
a 
:craft basis with 
strict demarcation between different crafts. Mechanisation, with 
the consequent displacement of labour by machines increased the 
inter -changeability of labour,struck at the very root of the de- 
mard:ation principle. 
For employers labour demarcation had two main disadvantages. 
First, difficulties in demarcation led to frequent disputes and 
stoppages. Second, even when satisfactory arrangements had been 
worked out there was a waste of time when a craftsman or a group 
stopped work and waited for members of another craft to be called . 
in to do some job traditionally assigned to them. This was par- 
ticularly serious in repair work, where it was more difficult than 
in new ships construction to plan ahead and to make the necessary 
arrangements to minimise the waste of time. As the insistance 
on labour demarcation in Britain increased, some orders were 
lost to foreign yards. In those yards there was less danger 
of delay due to demarcation troubles and the more economic use 
of the labour force made it easier to quote lower prices. Thus, 
work for British yards was further reduced, and unemployment 
increased. 
The combined effect of all these factors- fall in naval 
orders, smaller demand for merchant vessels, rationalisation 
and mechanisation\of the industry, and labour demarcation, -was 
to create wa4 to crew o an employment problem in the shipbuil- 
ding industry it Britain generally and in the Clyde area in 
particular. (1) The fall in employment capacity of the ship- 
building industry was probably greater than the figures for 
the insured workers who were unemployed suggest. A number of 
workers left the industry . They were therefore no longer shown 
on the Ministry of Labour register as unemployed under the head- 
ing of 'shipbuilding. Furthermore the working week was some 
7 to 8 hours shorter than before the war. Output statistics 
( î ¡ F. 22>-. 
therefore , seem to indicate more reliably than the figures 
for unemployed labour the extent of_the depression of the in- 
dustry. NJ The fall in output of the Scottish yards not only 
led to unemployment in the shipbuilding industry, but was also 
a contributory factor to unemployment in other related industries 
T(ue Aron and steel industries were particularly affected sinLe the 
shipyards were their largest local customers. 
Iron and Steel industries. The same causes,- trade depression, 
rationalisation and modernisation, which led to unemployment in 
shipbuilding, also created a labour surplus in the iron and 
steel industries in Scotland. There was also an additional 
cause, the loss by those industries or location advantages. The 
two reasons for this were, first, the exhaustion of the local 
supplies of iron ore and splint coal, second, the more economic 
use of caa;l. This reduced the importance for the heavy indust- 
ries of location near the coalfields. 
Both the iron and steel industries were raw material 
orientated. They were located in proximity to each other 
because of the close link between them. Since the raw materials 
industry 
of the ironLwere iron ofe and coal, the sites originally chosen 
for the industry were in the neighbourhood of coalmines in the 
area of Glasgow, Coatbridge, Shotts, Motherwell and Wishaw. 
Blast furnaces used at first the hard splint coal mined in. 
Lanarkshire and the local black band and clay iron Mora'. 
With the gradual exhaustion of local iron ore and the increased 
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th,e 
need to import it from England and Spain,Lhandicaps of locat- 
ions at some distance from the sea began to be felt. So long 
however, as the weight of coal required for production of pig 
iron was high, there was still a comparative advantage for the 
industry to be near the coalfields, rather than near the port 
of entry for the iron ore. ,..With the improvements in the design 
of blast furnaces the consumption of coal per ton of iron pre - 
duced fell. Thus the main original advantages of the location 
were lost. Costs increased. A contributory factor was the heavy 
transport charge for the raw materials since the cost of land 
carriage from the ports to the furnaces had to be added to freighi. 
charges. The plants built to meet a situation which ceased to 
exist, were no longer suitable. To readapt them to the changed 
conditions required a heavy capital outlay. At the time of uncer- 
tain economic prospects, there was little incentive to under- 
take expenditure on a large scale. The heavy costs of production 
made the marketing of the current output progressively more 
difficult. With the begining of the depression there was a 
decline in the demand for iron generally and in particular for 
the highly priced Scottish iron. This fall in demand is reflect- 
ed in the figures of output.(1) To be able to compete with the 
(1) Output of Pig -Iron by Scottish Furnaces. 
1920 502,500 tons 1525 430,000 tons 1930 466,300 tons 
1921 289200 1926 183,500 1931 153,900 
1922 361,000 1927 692,100 1i32 1 44 ,100 , , 
1923 768,500 1928 550,306 1933 218,700 ,, 
1924 667,80.0 1929 607,100 
3oi,_rc e . 4 7 , l9 O mA ú .. 
,4 
the foreign producers who were able to ot_: lower prices, 
modernisation of the iron industry in Scotland had to be under- 
taken despite the initial costs and the immediate increase in 
unemployment. 
The cost of production abroad was lower because the countries 
where the iron industry was new, had an advantage over Scotland, 
where it had been established for a considerable length of time. 
They, starting from scratch, were able to adopt the tri , aut 
and improved methods of production and to build modern blast 
furnaces which were more economical, using coke, instead of raw 
coal and which were designed for higher capacity than the Scottish 
furnaces. Furthermore continental manufacturers benefited from 
horizontal and vertical integration, while in Scotland there was 
a lack of a close organisation between the iron industry and 
others with which it was connected. The one most closly related 
to it was the steel industry. 
During the first world war, the productive capacity of the 
steel industry was expanded because of the increased demand for 
shell steel and the stoppage of supplies from Belgium and Ger- 
many in 1514 and from America in 1915. By December 1917 the capa- 
city of the Scottish steel mills was 55,E above its pre -war level. 
After the war the output began to fall rapidly and did not again 
reach the high level to which it had climbed in 1°20. (1) 
(1) 1520 2,074,400tons 1924 1,074,600 tons 1928 1,581,600 tons 
1921 - 1925 425,700 1929 1 212,900 
1922 1,252,900 1926 1587 ,500 1950 676,200 
1925 1 241,400 ,, 1527 1 425,100 ,, 1951 552,700 ,, 
Source, Crad. 4720. 
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ßeasons for this decline were similar to those which caused 
difficulties in the iron industry. 
The basis for successful production of steel was a plenti- 
ful supply of cheap pig -iron. Scottish pig -iron was not cheap 
nor was it plentiful. The steel ihdustry was not located near 
docks, having settled next to the iron industry and consequent- 
ly was badly placed for importing its raw materials. 
Even when the demand for steel was fairly firm, the Scott- 
ish industry was faced with severe competition abroad and fail- 
ed to keep pace with foreign manufacturers. The rate of ex- 
pansion in Scotland was lower than in the U.S.A.,France or 
Japan. This is shown by a comparison of the production figures 
of ingots and castings in these countries in 1913 and 1928.(1) 
For the Scottish steel industry 1928 was a good year. When 
the depression came, demand for steel declined sharply all round. 
The fall in output of both the iron and steel industry in 
Scotland contributed to the increase in unemployment. It was 
further intensified by the displacement of labour by machines 
which followed the accelerated modernisation of plants. As a 
result, there was little hope that a revival of demand for 
iron and steel would bring anything like a corresponding increase 
(1 ) 




U.S.A. 31,300 55,000 76 
France 4,687 9,470 102 
Japan 796 1,728 1 1 4 
Scotland 1,430 1 ,581 14 
Source, Board of Trade Survey,1932,p.58. 
 J 
in the demand for labour. On the contrary experience had shown 
that with the improved methods of production a higher output 
was obtained with the same number of workers or even with a 
reduced labour force. (1) Thus a permanent surplus of workers 
was likely. Although it is difficult to estimate the number 
of unemployed workers in the iron and steel industries separ -ately 
since they are classified in the Ministry of Labour register 
under one heading, it can be assumed that the problem of unem- 
ployment was more serious in the former. Demand for iron de- 
clined more sharbly than for steel. There was also a greater 
OIL 
need for modernisation which resulted in displacement of labour. 
The steel industry was more up to date. 
Coal Industry. As the output of the iron and steel industry 
fell, so too did its demand for coal. This particulary affected 
the Scottish industry since a high proportion of output was sold 
locally. The percentage was high in the South ',West of Scotland 
where only of the production was exported. Thus this area 
depended more on the home markets, where the iron and steel in- 
dustries were the chief customers, than the other coalfields in 
he country. 
The Scottish coalfields are situated in a narrow belt of 
some 2,400sq. miles stretching from the Clyde to the Forth. They 
are divided into four distinct fields,: 
(1) Cmd. 4728, p. 205. - Steel melting furnaces belonging to a 
certain firm produced 500 tons each in 191i. After modernisation 
in 15'34 putput of 1100 -1200 tons was obtained from the open hearth 
steel furnaces without any increase in the number of men employed. 
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(1) Ayr (including Dumfriesshire) , 
(2) Lanark (Sterling, Linlithgow, Dunbarton and Renfrew) 
(3) Fife and Clackmannan, 
(4) The Lothians. 
The two principal coalfields in the South West region were 
those of Ayr and Lanark. In the past, the latter had yielded 
about two thirds of the total output of the area.(ï) 
The output and employment in the industry depend on the 
th¢ 
demand for coal and on the mining conditions. InLSouth ;rest of 
Scotland the difficulties of cutting coal progressively increased 
while the demand steadily decreased. The result was that both 
output and employment in the Scottish coal industry fell. It 
was brought about partly by natural difficulties, partly by 
scientific advances in ire fuel economy and chiefly by a general 
fall in demand both at home and abroad.Nkli,oss of certain tradit- 
ional Scottish markets for political reasons and the intensified 
(1) Quantity of coal raised in the West of Scotland and Gt.Britain 
(in tons) 1:; 4 1530 
Ayrshire 4,513,790 3,581 ,720 
Dunbarton 453,186 586,292 
Lanark 13,902,126 10,016,556 
Renfrew 1 21 ,868 
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competition abroad were the other contributory factors. 
Difficulties in mining in the South rest of Scotland on account 
Ck& ClA t 
of the thiness of seams and uneconomic depth resulted in high 
L 
extraction costs. These were reflected in the high prices of 
the Scottish coal. 
Prices of coal which were increasing up to 1520 provided 
a powerful incentive to experimental work with the object of 
discovering more economical ways of using coal and of finding 
other sources of power. (1) With the progressive economies in 
steam raising, the increasing use of fuel oil and'the use of 
water power for generation of electricity, the demand for coal 
contracted. The exhaustion of the mineral resources and techno- 
logical progress created a permanent surplus of labour in the 
coal mining industry in the South West of Scotland. 
Im addition to this structural unemployment there was also 
unemployment owing to what it was hoped were temporary causes 
associtated with the trade depression. The contraction of home 
markets-particularly affected the Lanarkshire coalfield which 
sold largely to local users. Iaoreover with the decline in the 
international trade fewer ships called at the Glasgow port, con- 
sequently the demand for the bunker coal declined. Direct ex- 
(1) Consumption of coal equivalent per ton of pig -iron was 2.55 
tons in 187 .2i 2.2 tons in 1884, and 1.75 tons in 1527. Ex- 
periments by the Fuel Research Department of the Iron and 
Steel Industries resulted in fuel economy, coal consumption 
was reduced and £4, over a period of 8 years,(1926 -)4) 
Source, Hansard vol.5G7 p. 576 (157)5-56) 
ports. of coal also contracted for several reasons. During the 
war, when it was difficult to obtain supplies from abroad 
countries began to sink their own shafts and to expand their 
mining industry. When exports were resumed, the demand of these 
countries was considerably smaller. Foreign suppliers were able 
to compete successfully against Britain by c:_,ating lower prices. 
This they could do because coal in the new mines could be mined 
more cheaply. In Europe high grades of coal were found. Oper- 
ating costs in relation to value were therefore low. Seams were 
often thick which permitted a high degree of mechanisation, :-:chile 
a close association between the mines resulted in economies in 
marketing of coal. The coal Germany supplied as reparations 
arising out of the war intensified normal competition with the 
result that the British coal was squeezed out of the continental 
markets. The cessation of German exports in 1523 when Francs 
occupied the Ruhr gave the British coal industry the last good 
inter -war year. 
Besides the general causes which affected the whole of the 
coal industry in Gt. ritain, Scotland had its own special toubles. 
In 1913, the main forei gn markets for coal from the South West 
coalfields which was exported were in the West Mediterranean area 
and in the_orth Sea and Baltic region. After the first world 
war Russia stopped importing coal from Scotland. Scandinavian 
markets were lost and. on the continental markets the relatively 
expensive Scottish coal.was at a disadvantage. In the South 
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-.,pest of Scotland introduction of machinery was difficult on 
account of the thiriess of the coal seams. Mining was carried 
on by a large number of separate units. The 1930 output was 
produced by 161 undertakings from 573 separate mines. This 
was cónducítive neither to economies in production nor_in market- 
ing. There was a need for reorganisation of the industry. 
a 
Thus the movement began towards elimination of small units and 
concentration of production where coal was more plentiful and 
more easily accessible. In spite of the natural difficulties 
machinery was eventually introduced on a large scale. The increar 
se in mechanisation was particularly high in the coalfields 
around Glasgow, Hamilton, Airdrie and Wishaw in Lanarkshire. (1) 
By 1936 the use of machinery in all the Scottish coalfields was 
well over the average for Gt.Britain. (2) 
There were two aspects of the problem of the permanent sur- 
(1) Total output of 
coal in tons 
A cut by 
machines 
Average number of 
persons employed. 
1927 Lanark- 12860511 66.2 41963 
shire, 
1933 8607283 77.0 25132 
1927 Ayrshire 3784888 33.8 12722 
1933 ,, 3283017 60.2 10504 
Source, Cmd.4728. 
(2) Quantity and * of coal cut by machinery in each mining dis- 
trict in Scotland compared with the total for Gt.Britain. 
Coalfields Quantity cut by ,'proportion of coal cut 
machinery, by machinery to total 
saleable coal raised. 
Fife, Clackmannan,Kinross 
and Sutherland 7678454 







Quantity out by ,proportion of coal cut 
machinery by machinery to total sale- 
able coal raised. 
Ayrshire,Dumfries 
Argyll 3071123 






Staffordshire North had the highest percentage in Britain of 
1. Fife and _orthumberland coalfields came next with ëc,». 
Source, Hansard vol.3?2(19 6 -37) p.45 
plus created by the closures of mines and displacement of labour69 
machinery. First, there was the general unemployment in the 
industry. Second, there was particularly heavy unemployment 
among the older men in the groups of forty five and over. It 
was more difficult for them, than for the uolInger men to adjust 
themselves and to keep pace with the machines. The problem of 
the structural unemployment was further intensified by cyclical 
unemployment. The fall in employment was higher than the fall 
in output.(1) Towards the end of the inter -war period the pace 
of mechanisation slowed down. Older men dropped out of the in- 
dustry. Recruitment of younger men decreased because of res- 
triction of entry into the industry. Nevertheless, hopes for 
a substantial improvement in employment did not materialise. 
(1) Hansard vol.322, (1 X36 - 7) p.1470 
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Summary of reasons why South :Jest Scotland became a 'problem areal 
Scotland in the past depended mainly for its prosperity on 
heavy industries, which were established originally in the South 
West region because of the natural advantages of the area. As 
these industries expanded, they attracted people from other 
parts of the country to their sites. Eventually heavy industry 
and industrial population concentrated in this area. There 
was no parallel growth of light industries. The result was a 
lack of general balance in the development of Scotland. 
The basic industries were shipbuilding, iron and steel and 
coal. They were interdependent. The shipbuilding created demand 
for iron and steel, iron and steel industry created a demand for 
coal. The price of coal influenced the price of iron and steel, 
which in turn had an effect on the cost of shipbuilding, and the 
price of ships influenced the demand for them. Therefore, any 
changes in the demand, cost or prices in one industry had reper- 
cussions on the output and employment of others. The effects 
tended to be cumulative, once the snow -ball movement was set 
in motion. 
Besides their own particular troubles, such as the exhaustion 
of raw materials supplied locally and the loss of locational 
advantages, there was a number of general causes from which the 
heavy industries in Scotland suffered in common. The combined 
effect of the various factors was a fall in output and employment 
in shipbuilding, iron and steel, and coal industries in Scotland. 
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The nemployment position was more serious in Scotland as a 
whole than in England. There was a greater concentration of 
heavy industries in Scotland and greater relative expansion 
during the war. The Scottish heavy industries were less modern - 
ised) there was therefore greater need for rationalisation and 
mechanisation. Furthermore the tariff policy which was eventually 
adopted failed to help Scotland. Protection was given to con- 
sumer goods rather than to the capital goods which were the 
principal products of the country. (1) The former were mainly 
manufactured by the light industries which were located around 
London and in the Midlands. Finally , restrictions imposed on 
immigration by the Dominions and foreign countries during the 
inter -war period affected Scotland more than England. In the 
past the percentage of Scots emigrating was particularly high. 
It was however not the size of the unemployment , some of 
which was of a temporary nature, but trimarily the surplus of 
labour which threatened to be permanent, that turned the South 
West Scotland into a 'problem area'. 
(1) Tariff policy, -Otla wa Conference, V;)2. 
44 
Chapter 7. 
The recognition of the 'Problem Areas' by the government - 
First I easures . 
From the time that the Lo1rernment realised that unemploy- 
ment in south West Scotland, Durham and Tyneside, West Cum- 
berland and South Wales was of a special character until the 
time when the Special Areas legislation was passed, two main 
policies were followed. First, measures were introduced to 
facilitate the transfer and training of workers from the areas 
where unemployment was at its heaviest. Second, steps were 
taken to alleviate the hardships resulting from unemployment. 
For these purposes the Industrial Transference Board was estab- 
lished and the Unemployment Insurance Acts were amended.Attempts 
were also made to discover the reasons why unemployment in 
certain regions was above the national average and information 
was collected to enable the government to formulate long term 
policies for the four 'problem areas'. With that object in 
view two industrial surveys were carried out. 
(a) The Industrial Transference Board. The South West Scotland, 
Durham and Tyneside, West Cumberland and South Wales were first 
officially recognised as 'problem areas' when the Industrial 
Transference Board was established by the government on 6th 
January 1928. Its purpose was to facilitate the transfer of 
workers, in particular miners, for whom opportunities of em- 
ployment in their own districts or occupations were no longer 
available. 
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In the report published six months later, the difference 
between the problems of regional and national unemployment was 
pointed out.(1) The authors agreed that some unemployment was 
specially persistent. It was concentrated in areas where almost 
the whole community depended for its livelihood on one or two 
heavy industries.(2) When these industries became depressed, 
unemployment developed on a large scale. Previously, national 
policy was based on the assumption that industries and areas 
would return, broadly speaking, to the position that they held 
before the first world war. Consequently the unemployment 
policy was rues to provide assistance to the workers who were 
regarded as temporarily unemployed. It was the opinion of the 
Board that the idea of the depression as cyclical and transient 
was no longer tenable.() It was estimated that over 200,C00 
workers of all ages, of whom many were miners, could not be 
expected to earn their living in the industries which had 
previously employed them. Only for a small percentage was there 
a real prospect of regular employment. The Board stressedithere- 
fore, the need for a new policy of removing as many workers as 
possible away from the depressed industries to areas where the 
prospects of employment were more favourable. 
The success of a transfer policy, whether internal or in- 
volving emigration, depends on psychological, physical and 
financial factors. First, the unemployed workers and their 
families have to be willing to move and to take the risk. 
(1) Industrial Transference Board, Report, Cmd.516,(192d). 
(2) Cmd. 3516,p.54. 
(5) ibid. p.17 
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Second, the industries in the other areas must not only 
be willing to take the new workers but also able to absorb 
the transferees. Finally, besides willingness on both sides 
financial resources must be available. 
The Industrial Transference Board was not as successful 
as had been hoped. The psychological barrier was strong. 
Many believed that the local unemployment was temporary 
and this weakened the incentive to look out for work else- 
where. In the depressed communities there was a strong 
sense of hope and local ties, which made people disinclined 
to leave. (1) Furthermore employers in other parts of the 
country were unwilling to take on workers from the depressed 
areas. There was an impression,erroneous in the opinion of 
the Board, that the unemployed workers from the heavy in- 
dustries were not adaptable to the requirements of other 
occupations and that they were likely to import into the 
areas to which they were transfered contagious elements 
of unrest and disturbance. (2) Only if there had been a 
strong demand for labour would these apprehensions have been 
overlooked. The psychological factor itself was determined 
by physical considerations. There were more persons look- 
ing for work than jobs being offered. Employers therefore 
could afford to be selective. It was more the inability 




tressed areas that was the stumbling block to the transfer 
policy. Industries in all parts of the country- contracted 
during the depression. Those that had expanded their pro- 
duction did so by the improved manufacturing techniques 
and were able to obtain increased output without employing 
more operatives. 
Finally, financial considerations made it difficult 
for the unemployed and their families to transfer. The de- 
parture of one person reduced the total income from public 
funds received by the family, while to move all the members 
was often impossible, The cost of movement was high and 
the uncertainty of employment in other areas discouraging. 
Even if there had been jobs awaiting them, the unemployed 
workers often had insufficient savings to make the move. 
For those who were prepared to emigrate the cost of pass- 
age was often prohibitive.(1) Government assisted pass- 
ages helped to overcome this difficulty, but the acceptance 
of immigrants by Dominions began to decline as they them- 
selves became affected by the trade depression.(2) 
(1) Annual Report of the Overseas Settlement Committee.Cmd.3088 
(2) Number of immigrant arrivals from U.K. 
Year Canada Australia x New Zealand 
1913 15 0 , 5 42 122,445 44 , 21 4 
1927 52,940 93,382 10,885 
x tourists included. Source, Cmd. 3516,p,51. 
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The other measures taken by the government to facilitate 
EhQ. 
transfer were,, establishment of employment agencies all over 
the country and of training centres for adults and juveniles. 
(b) Industrial Survey. The transfer policy carried out by 
the industrial Transference Board failed to reduce regional 
surpluses of labour. By 1931 unemployment figures reached 
new peak levels. The inadequacy of the old measures was 
obvious. The 'problem areas, had to be studied before new 
policies could be formulated. In March 1931 the Board of 
Trade approached the Universities of Glasgow, Durham (Arm- 
strong College), Manchester, and the University College of 
South Wales asking them to undertake industrial surveys of 
South -Nest Scotland, the North -East coast area, Cumberland 
and South Wales and Monmouthshire, respectively. 
The Scottish report was submitted on 14th December 1931. 
(1) The enquiry on behalf of the Board of Trade had three 
objectives,- 
(a) to make a survey of the industrial position of the 
South West of Scotland, 
(b) to study the prospects of early expansion and new 
development, 
(c) to assess the prospective employment capacity of the 
various industries in the area, as a basis of an es- 
timate of the volume of labour likely to be surplus 
to the requirements of individual industries. 
The area covered by the survey comprised the counties of - 
(1) Board of Trade, An Industrial Survey of the South West of 
Scotland, made for the Board of Trade by the staff of the 
Political Economy Department, of the University of Glasgow, 
W.R.Scott, J.Cunnison, J.A.Buyers, J.W.Nisbet, A.L.Macfie, 
and D.I.Jack of St. Andrews University. 1;32. 
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Lanark, Dunbarton, Renfrew, and that part of the county of 
Ayr lying North of the line between Irvine, Kilmarnock and 
Darvel and consisting of the civil parishes of Ardrssan,Beith 
Dairy, Dreghorn, Dunlop, Fenwick, Irvine, Kilbrinie, Kilmarnock, 
hilmaurs, Kilwinning, Largs, Loudoun, Stevenston, Stewarton, 
and West hilbride. 
The city of Glasgow was included in the survey although it 
was later excluded from the Special Areas. 
Statistics showed that heavy industries dominated the 
regional economy. (1) The Board of Trade Census of Production 
(1924) listed 13 groups of industries. The industry with the 
greatest output in the South West of Scotland was the iron 
and steel group which included shipbuilding. The total net 
output of this group was worth £27m in 1924. This represented 
approximately one third of the total net output of all the 
industries in the area. Next in importance on the basis of 
output was the mining industry. As the output of these in- 
dustries fell, their ability to support the population in the 
area, which depended on them for their livelihood, decreased 
steadily. Between July 1924 and June 1930 there was an over- 
all 
decline in the number of workers insured in the West of 
Scotland. There was also a relative decrease in comparisoh 
with the country as a whole. In the survey industries in 
which empl°rment capacity declined were listed together. They 
included, - mining, brick and tile, 
metal manufacturers, sawmiling, 
engineering, clothing, 
shipbuilding, leather, 
construction of gas, water and electricity, 
vehicles, banking and insurance, 
textiles, chemicals. 
(1) Board of Trade Census of Production,1924.The area covered 
by the Survey coincided roughly with that of the census Which 
covered 'productive industries' only,whereas the Survey 
covered all industries which gave insurable employment. 
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The industries which increased their employment capacity were 
mainly those which produced final consumer goods particularly 
for the home market and which benefited from the protectionist 
policies. The other industries in this group were the service 
industries and as might have been expected, public works. This 
group as a whole comprised,- 
metal trades, 
building and public works, 
construction, 
pottery, 
paper and printing, 
non -metal mining products, 
food, drink and tabacco, 
other manufacturing industries, 
transport, 
distributive trades, 
glass trades. (1) 
The future expansion of these industries and new industrial 
developments were discussed in very broad terms. The authors 
of the survey pointed out that the increase in employment 
depended on general causes, such as the revival of world 
demand, foreign exchange rates, and on specific conditions 
which affect either a group of,industries or a single in- 
dustry. It was argued that to foresee a future industrial 
pattern would have been difficult, since crisis of except- 
ional severity had invariably been followed by developments 
in new directions and a change of emphasis in local structure. 
The writers of the report were not optimistic about the 
future expansion of the heavy industries. Shipbuilders whom 
they consulted generally refused to forecast the size of the 
required labour force for future construction. Only a few 
hazarded guesses and their estimates differed widely. 
(1) Board of Trade, Survey,p.24. 
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There was no doubt, however, that any improvement in the 
heavy industries would have benefited others in the area. This ;;as 
particularly true of the auxiliary industries which were linked 
with the shipbuilding industry. 
The committee predicted in general terms the prospects of 
some of the other industries. It envisaged expansion of the 
production of commercial vehicles but not that of private cars. 
In the opinion of the members 'there did not appear to be much 
likelihood of a substantial recovery of cotton, woollens and 
lace. Prospects for hosiery and carpets were considered to 
be brighter. The position of the clothing industry was ex- 
pected to deteriorate with the fall in the purchasing power. 
The demand for paints and explosives was expected to improve. 
It was estimated that employment in the gas, water and elect - 
ricity industries, and in banking and insurance would remain 
fairly stable. 
It was further assumed that the industries which in the 
survey had been classified as having increased their employ- 
ment capacity, would continue to expand. Since they produced 
mainly for the home markets or were service industries, their 
expansion was limited. They were unlikely to be able to ab- 
sorb the whole of the surplus labour. Their expansion however, 
since they employed mostly female labour was expected to re- 
duce unemployment among women. In the survey it was hopefully 
assumed that there would be no problem of surplus femal.lab 
in the area.(1) Although no accurate figures have been 
(1) Board of Trade , An Industrial Survey,p. 184. 
a large surplus of [lien was estimated.(1) In 1929 76,000 men 
were unemployed in the area. No forecast was possible of the 
rate at which they would be absorbed by industries when re- 
were 
covery began. Such estimates asmade were shown to have been 
correct in the light of the future experience. 
The assessment of the industrial position and estimates 
of future trends were to serve as a basis for a new government 
policy, but no action followed the publication of the report. 
In the meantime things went from bad to worse and 1932 when 
the report was published was the worst year on record. Un- 
employment increased sharply and reached unprecedented levels. 
In the absence of a more constructive policy, the government 
continued measures of temporary relief. 
The Unemployment Insurance Act 1934. In 1934 the Unemploy- 
ment Insurance Act was passed to amend the Unemployment Acts 
1920 and 193. Its object was to offer greater relief to 
the unemployed by extending the period during which unemploy- 
ment benefit was payable and to authorise grants out of the 
Unemployment Fund to the Ministry of Education for the pro- 
vision of instruction and training for young people. Under 
the act assistance was also to be given to persons to enable 
them to re- establish themselves and to help them to become 
fit for work again. 
In effect the new act was a measure to provide relief. 
Such policies as were followed, failed to offer a permanent 
(1) Board of Trade, An Industrial Survey,p.186 :7 
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solution to the problem of the depressed areas. They did 
not provide work locally. 
Investigations. Public opinion was awakened as conditions in 
the depressed areas showed no signs of improvement, The Times 
started a camaign, publishing a series of articles entitled, 
'Places without Future', in which attention was drawn to the 
»forgotten' areas. Members of Parliament took up the subject 
in the House and criticised the government for doing nothing.(1) 
Answering for the government the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
argued that neither was the problem of the depressed areas 
new to them, nor was the government unaware that certain dis- 
tricts were particularly hard hit. So long as there was no 
general recovery, these areas were merely the blackest spots 
in a generally gloomy picture. He further maintained that 
one government after another, while recognising these con- 
ditions was able to do little more than offer palliatives 
by the way of relief works and some financial aid to local 
authorities.(2) 
The Minister of Labour pointed out that although un- 
employment in the depressed areas was not greatly reduced, 
the government's activity had not been wasted. Conditions 
were created which prepared the way for a more constructive 
policy at a later date.(31 
(1) Hansard, vol .292 (1933-34) p.183. 
(2) N.Chamberlain, Hans.,vol.293 (1933 -34) p.15ô 
(3) O .Stanley, Hans .vol .292 .p .1 L31 . 
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In all fairness it has to be admitted that in the period 
15)32 -34 a more constructive policy could hardly have been 
followed. Few new industrial undertakings were established; 
it was impossible therefore to steer them to the depressed areas_ 
It was equally difficult to transfer the surplus labour from 
these areas elsewhere. Industries in the whole of the country 
either contracted or were at a standstill. Furthermore, there 
was a prevalent belief that to increase assistance to people 
in the depressed areas would have imposed such burden on the 
inhabitants of other districts as to turn them into derelict 
areas also. 
In 1934 there was an improvement in the economic con- 
ditions in the country as a whole, but the distressed areas 
did not participate in the trade revival. The government 
therefore, decided to send investigators there to survey the 
conditions of the existing industries and to study the pro - 
spects of new developments. It was hoped that on the basis 
of their reports a policy could be formulated which would 
lead to a solution of the problem of the depressed areas. 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer, referring to the proposed 
enquiry, pointed out t'at the time was particularly appropri- 
ate for such an investigation. The rapid improvement in the 
general industrial situation in other parts of the country 
seemed to the government to offer possibilities in connection 
with transfer and possibly also fresh opportunities for either 
the extension of old industries or the establishment of new 
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ones in the afflicted areas.(1) 
Investigators were appointed in April, 19:4. Sir 
Arthur Rose, Capt. Euan Wallace, the Rt.Hon.J.C.C.Davidson 
and Sir Wyndham Portal were respectively sent to Scotland, 
Durham and Tyneside, West Cumberland and Haltwhistle, and 
South Wales and ivionmouthshire. By July their reports were 
still not made public. The members of Parliament were be- 
coming impatient and pressed the government for publication.(2) 
At first it was refused on the grounds that when the inves- 
tigators were appointed it was explicitly stated that their 
reports would be treated as confidential. It was feared that 
the investigators might have been hampered in obtaining in- 
formation if those whom they interviewed anticipated that 
what they said would be made public.(3) But in November 1934 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced in the House that 
the government had after all decided to publish the reports 
as it was found that the investigators could without such 
difficulty and without distorting the whole take out such 
passages as might have betrayed confidences or proved em- 
barrassing.(4) The reports were published in November 134.(5) 
(1)N. Chamberlain, Hans.vol.293,p.19e8 -89. 
(2)Hans. vo1.2924.1796. 
(3)ibid. p.1836. 
(4)Hans. vol.295 (1934- 55)p.1991 
(5)Ministry of Labour, Reports of Investigations into the 
Industrial Conditions in Certain Depressed Areas of- 
7G est° Cumberland and Haltwhistle, 
II Durham and Tyneside, 




They met with a favourable reception although the inves- 
tigators did not find a short cut to prosperity.(1) 
Scottish Report. The terms of reference of the enquiry made 
by Sir Arthur Rose under the auspices of the Ministry of Labour, 
resembled those of the Industrial Survey prepared in 1932 
by the University of Glasgow on behalf of the Board of Trade. 
The area that was to be investigated coincided roughly with 
the area defined in the Survey.(2) The counties of Lanark, 
Renfrew, Dunbarton and the 16 nobthermost parishes of Ayrshire 
represented a fairly composite area which could have been re- 
garded as a single unit. Sir Arthur Rose emphasised that 
Glasgow was included in this area. He justified the inclusion 
on the grounds that its burden of unemployment was increased by 
the extent to which it attracted labour from other districts,in 
spite of the depression of its own industries.(3) Sir Arthur 
Rose pointed out that it was impossible to escape the conclu- 
sion that Glasgow and West Lanark (with parts of Renfrew and 
Dunbarton) was one industrial unit. Because of the interde- 
pendence of its principal industries, no part could have been 
affected favourably or adversly without repercussions on the 
whole. 
Sir Arthur Rose did not propose to carry out a detailed study 
of the economic position of the various industries in the area 
because that had already been done in the Industrial Survey 




only two years previously. Little had changed since then. 
There was little need therefore to bring the facts up to date. 
His object was to present a report which would be an addition 
to the 1532 Survey, amplifying in particular the social side 
which had not been dealt with before. Consequently in the 19 4 
report only á. general picture was was presented of the indust- 
rial structure in the South West of Scotland. 
The new investigation confirmed th the view expressed 
previously that the local industrial situation depended on the 
fate of the heavy industries. Since the basic industries in 
the Lanark and Clyde area were particularly closely linked, 
the employment capacity of all was affected by the same two 
main factors, the reduction in output caused by depression and 
the reorganisation necessitated by foreign competition. 
The examination of the basic industries showed that the 
normal labour force was steadily contracting, consequently 
the number of those who might have been classified as per- 
manently unemployed increased. (i) The estimate of the size 
of the surplus was regarded as useful in so far as it in- 
dicated whether there was a likelihood that problems created 
by unemployment would solve themselves naturally within the 
ordinary trade cycle,or whether special remedies were needed. 
Sir Arthur Rose presented only a rough estimate , since accu- 
rate calculation was neither possible, nor, in his opinion, 
necessary. Like the authors of the Industrial Survey, he did 
(1) Cmd. 4728,p.216. 
58 
not believe that the problem of unemployment among women was 
serious. (1) The surplus of men Sir Arthur considered to be 
so large as to necessitate special action.(2) In April 1934 
there were approximately 166,000 unemployed men over 18 years 
of age of whom 124,000 claimed unemployment benefit. About 
half the claimants had been unemployed for a year or more. Sir 
Arthur estimated that permanently surplus labour numbered about 
60,000 men and boys. About 40;0 of them represented a potent- 
ial labour force, which after training could have been employed 
in any part of the country. The other 40A consisted of the less 
adaptable and mobile men for whom the hope of employment de- 
pended on the revival of the industries which had previously 
employed them. The remaining 20A mainly because of their higher 
age, were re- garded as nearly unemployable.(3) 
The investigations disclosed that those who were unemployed 
maintained their self- respect and found some form of activity 
to occupy their time during the enforced leisure. Loafing was 
comparatively rare. Gardiing was popular and use was ruade Q.f 
the allotment schemes encouraged by the Society of Friends and 
the Scottish National Union of Allotment holders. Advantage 
was also taken of the various social services provided and co- 
ordinated by the Scottish Council for Community Service during 
Unemployment, the Glasgow Council for Community Service in Un- 




employment and other Regional Councils.(1) Although as a 
result of prolonged unemployment there was no marked deterio- 
ration in health and morale, hardship was severe.(2) There was 
no doubt that quick action was required to deal with unemploy- 
ment. 
The solution proposed by Sir Arthur Rose was not novel. 
He recommended that such remedial measures as had already been 
adopted should be continued and their scope extended. In view 
of the contraction in the employment capacity of the existing 
industries, steps were to be taken to introduce new industries. 
Sir Arthur believed that the job of attracting firms to the 
depressed areas should be left to local agencies and local 
authorities. Direction of industry by the government was dis- 
carded since in his opinion, it would have resulted in too 
drastic a change and involved state responsibility on a large 
scale.(3) It was also recommended in the report that transfer 
schemes should be further developed and financially strengthen- 
ed. The surplus of more permanently unemployed was partly 
attributed to the fact that the younger workers had no in- 
(1) Type of Scheme 
Voluntary Labour Scheme 
Reading, Recreation & Amusement 
Outdoor Sports 
Physical Training Centres(exclu- 
ding iiinistry of Labour Demon- 
stration Centres) 
Special Cultural & Technical 
Classes 
Occupational Centres 
Other schemes not catering spe- 
cially for the unemployed 












dustrial experience and the older lost some of their skill, 
because of the length of time during which they were unem- 
ployed. It was not surprising that Sir Arthur placed em- 
phasis on training and reconditioning schemes. He recommended 
that employment should be provided by land reclamation, im- 
p;rovement and utilisation schemes, for those who could not 
find work in industry. 
It would appear that the Industrial Surveys presented 
by the universities in 1952 were only read. Action quickly 
followed presentation of the four reports on the 194 inquiry. 
In the same month as they were published, the Depressed Areas 
Development and Improvement Bill embodying many of the re- 




Special Areas Legislation. 
(a) The Depressed .areas (Development and Improvement) Bill. On 
26th November 1934 the Depressed Areas (Development and Improvement) 
'Bill was introduced by the Minister of Labour in thé HIouse of Com- 
mons. (1) This bill was the first attempt by the government to 
differentiate between types of unemployment and to act on the prin- 
ciple that there was no such thing as general unemployment present- 
ing a uniform problem. The object of the bill was,- 
'To provide for the initiation, organisation, prosecution and 
assistance of measures designed to facilitate the economie 
development and social improvement of the depressed areas; 
for the appointment of the Comziissioners for these puposes 
connected with the matters aforesaid.' (2) 
The bill was drafted by the national government headed by ear. Ramsay 
MacDonald. It was therefore the result of a joint effort of all 
the political parties. 
The Prime ,Ainister referring to the proposals in the bill 
stated, - 
The government are taking an area; they are going to take an 
experimental area, and not begin and and there, out just as a 
scientist takes his test tube into his laboratory, works out 
his results and their reactions, so we begin with that area 
for the purpose of discovering from the experiments cures, 
methods of handling, ways of spending public and, private 
money, approaches to unemployment and having got these things 
out for a limited area which nevertheless is representative 
in its problem of the whole country, we are going to extend 
the results of our working, the moment that these results 
have been established. (3) 
The bill was crticised. It was argued that the proposals 
should have applied to a wider area from the beginning. Selection 
(1) O.Stanley. .
(2) Dans., vol. 295,(14-5) p. 502. 
(3) ibid. p.2. 
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of the areas for Special Assistance was condemned as aroitrary. It 
was made without apparent reference to general principles. The 
basis of the choice was supposed to have been the homog era ty of the 
areas. The Scottish depressed area as defined for the purpose of 
the bill was not considered as homogeneous. (1) The problem was 
regarded as tooserious for experiment. Fears were expressed that 
the government had no clear policy in mind, and that the sinister of 
Labour who introduced the bill was not certain -hat it was going 
to do and what were going to be its effects. The government was 
also criticised for failing to recognise the pressing need for a 
national system of economic planning to meet the far reaching in- 
dustrial and social changes which reduced employment and created 
derelict areas. (2) Finally, it was argued that the proposals in 
bill were insufficient to reduce unemployment and to bring back- 
prosperity to the depressed areas. 
Criticism levied against the Depressed Areas (Development 
and Improvement) .Lill can perhaps be best summarised by saying that 
there was a strong belief in the House that the only true thing 
about the title of the bill was the first two words 'Depressed 
AreasT. It was feared that it would prove to be neither a develop- 
ment nor improvement bill. Credit, however, was given to the govern- 
ment for having recognised to a greater extent than previously, 
that the depressed areas presented a separate problem and required 
special remedies. 
The reception of the bill in the House of Lords was more 
(1) Hans., vo.L ß;5,p. 1>41 
(2) Hans., vol.25,p. 12îj 
favorable. The Lords found fault not so much with the policy pre- 
sented in the bill as with the name of the bill itself. It was 
sugested that the name'depressed areas' was unfortunate because 
of the picture it conjured in the public mind. The term 'distressed 
areas' was proposed in its place. There was almost unanimous 
concurrence of opinion in the House that the word 'depressed' 
should be altered. It was finally agreed that an amendment be 
put in the names of Lords from each party, that the word 'depressed 
should be left out and 'special' substituted in its place. (1) 
The Leader of the house of Commons, the sinister of Labour and 
the Prime l;.inister were consulted and accepted the amendment pro- 
visionally on the condition that the consent of the whole govern- 
ment would be obtained. Loyal assent was given to the Special 
Areas (Development and Improvement) Bill on 21st. December 
(b) Special Areas (Development and Improvement) Act i`; 4. The 
Special Areas as defined in the act were Cumberland, Durham and 
Tyneside, South ; ?ales, and South West Scotland. The Scottish 
area comprised the counties of Dunbarton, Lanark , Renfrew, and 
within the county of Ayr the parishes of - Ardrossan, Beith, Dairy 
Dreghorn, Dunlop, Fenwick, Galston, Irvine, hilbrine, Kilmarnock, 
Kilnaurs, Kilwinning, Loudoun, Riccarton, Stevenson and Stewarton; 
the parishes of Falkirk, Grangemouth, iduiravonside, and. Slamannan 
within the county of Stirling ao far as situated south of the 
(1) Hansard, House of Lords, vol. 5)5. p. 647. (i 4 -5) . 
Lord Danesfort, Lord Gainford, Lord Ponsonby, Lord Strabolgi. 
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the London and North Easter Railway line from Castlecary to lin- 
lithgow the parishes of Bathgate, Ecclesmachen, Kirkliston, 
Livingston, Linlithgow, Torphichen, Uphall and 1hitburn within the 
county of West Lothian so far as situated south of the London and 
North eastern Railway line from Linlithgow to Ratho; the parishes 
of Kirknewton, Mid Calder and West Calder within the county of 
Midlothian. ( 1 ) 
The provisions of the act can be grouped under three main 
headings, - the appointment of commissioners, the functions of the 
commissioners and finance. 
(a) Two Commissioners were to be appointed with the consent of the 
Treasury, one for Scotland by the Secretary of State, and one for 
England and Wales by the Minister of Labour. No member of the 
House of Commons was eligible for the appointment. The two Janis - 
tors : í.were: - authorised to appoint Deputy Commissioners on the re- 
quest of the commissioners. The commissioners themselves were 
authorised to appoint such staff as was required to aid them in 
the performance of their duties. 
(b) The functions of the commissioners were both of advisory and 
of an executive nature. It was to be their duty to make suggest- 
ions and to co- operate with government departments, local author- 
ities, voluntary organisations and other bodies. The commissioners 
were empowered to purchase land for the purpose of their functions' 
and to dispose of it with the consent of the Treasury. They could 
also transfer it to local authorities or other bodies for the 
purpose of economic development or social improvement. Land could 
(1) Special Areas (Development and Improvement)Act 1934 1st sched. 
have been aquired compulsorily after 14 days notice, on payment of 
compensation if sections 1 , -105 of the Housing Act 1;25 were 
applicable. Furthermore the Commissioners were authorised to 
provide small holdings and allotments. Such local authorities 
as had powers under the Small Holdings and Allotments Acts 1908 
to 19)1 were permitted to act as their agents. 
The commissioners' scope of activity was extended to such 
places outside the scheduled areas where assistance was likely 
to create employment for people from these special areas. Their 
powers however were restricted in so far as the commissioners were 
precluded from offering financial assistance to any undertaking 
carried on for the pupose of gain òr to local authorities. This 
provision did not prevent financial assistance being given to under- 
takings whose primary object was to provide means of livelihood for 
the persons engaged in them. Also it did not disallow contributions 
to local authorities towards the cost of any works for which no 
specific grant was payable from the Exchequer funds. 
(c) A Special Areas Fund of f2,,,was to be established to finance 
the commissioners activities. Into that fund was also to be paid 
any money received by them. 
Upon expiry of the act provision was made to transfer the 
functions of the commissioners which related to the promotion 
of the welfare of persons to whom the Unemployment Assistance Act 
1;54 applied, to the Unemployment Assistance Board. The Special 
Areas (Development and Improvement) Act 1934 was to continue until 
)1st. March 1937. 
Economic conditions in the Special Areas improved slightly 
after the passing of the act. The rearmament programme benefited 
the heavy industries. The revival of economic activity in the 
country as a whole facilitated the policies of transferring sur- 
plus workers from the Special Areas on the one hand, and on the 
other, improved prospects of attracting new industries there. 
Prima/lily the act led to social improvement in the areas. This 
prepared the way but did not result in appreciable economic de- 
velopment. The economy of the regions remained unbalanced and 
unemployment continued to be above the national average. There 
was need not only to extend the period of operation of the 134 
Act, but also its provisions. 
The Special Areas (Amendment) Bill. 137. 
In the King's Speech on 3rd. November 1536 the Houses of 
Parliament were asked to prolong the Special Areas (Improvement 
and Development) Act 1934. A new bill was to be introduced for 
this purpose. The public attached much importance to the pro- 
posed bill. The general feeling was reflected in the leading 
article in the'Times', where it was argued that, 
'It would be fatal if the Government's Bill were to embody a 
compromise between the general view that new drastic action 
is necessary and the particular view expressed in some quarters 
that these areas should be considered as economic aminities, 
the character of which may be made more pleasant by planting 
a few flowers and straightening up a few tombstones and employ- 
ing a new sexton of two, but cannot be radically changed.. The 
condition of the Special Areas is a challenge to the efficiency 
of the Government and of the democratic system itself.(1) 
(1) The 'Times', 15.1.1,3 
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The Special Areas (Amendment) Bill was introduced on 1jth 
March 1;37. (1) The object of the bill was - 
(s.) to continue the Special Areas (Improvement and Development) 
Act 134 until March 19-:),), 
(b) to rive the com::issioners additional powers to offer finan- 
cial inducements to firms to move to the Special Areas. 
(c) to enable the Treasury to give financial assistance both 
directly and indirectly to certain new undertakings in the 
Special Areas, and in some cases to those outside. 
There was no proposal in the bill to extend the bound,y of 
the Special Areas in spite of the requests that Glasgow be added 
to the areas scheduled in the 1;-34 Act, on account of the heavy 
unemployment there. It was argued that the city was excluded pre- 
viously for the sake of prestige, as the government was reluctant 
to label one of the chief ports of the Empire a distressed area.(2) 
The passage of the Amendment Bill through the House of Commons 
was much less stormy than that of the main bill in 134. The 
ground had already been broken. Such complaints as were voiced 
were that the proposals should have been brought forward earlier 
and that they were not sufficiently comprehensive. Otherwise there 
was little criticism. The Special Areas (Amendment) Dill received 
Royal assent on 6th May, 1;37. 
The Special Areas (Amendment) Act 17. 
The Special Areas (Amendment) Act 137 was perhaps more im- 
portant than its predecessor. Whereas the 1;34 Act led mainly 
to improvement in social conditions, the 1;37 Act gave a stimulus 
to economic development in the Special Areas by providing positive, 
financial help to industry. It not only extended the period of 
(1) Introduced by :.E.Brown, pans. ,vol.321 (1;36 -3 7 )p.25 1 
(2) Hans.,vo1.322(136- 37)p.146. 
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operation of the Special Areas (Development and Improvement) Act, 
1934, but also gave the government new powers. The additional 
provisions, relating to the powers of the Commissioners for the 
Special Areas and of the Treasury, are of particular interest 
because of the industrial developments which resulted from them. 
Two important changes were made in the powers of the Commiss- 
ioners. They were enabled to offer assistance to firms, although 
these firms operated for profit. The Commissioners were to let 
factories, to induce industries to move to the Special Areas, 
at a rent which corresponded to a sum yielded by a reasonable 
rate of interest on the capital spent in providing the factories. 
Furthermore, such firms as moved to areas approved by the Com- 
missioners could obtain financial assistance from them in the 
form of contributions towards the payment of rent, income tax 
or rates. Previously help had been restricted to non- profit- 
making undertakings . Secondly, the Commissioners were permitted 
to make grants to local authorities towards the payment for the 
repair and improvement of streets. 
The powers of the Treasury were likewise extended. On the 
recommendation of an advisory committee, the Treasure was em- 
powered to offer financial assistance to site companies. These 
were to be undertakings incorporated for the purpose of provid- 
ing factories as an inducement to industries to move to parti- 
cular areas. The Treasury could also give financial assistance 
by Way of loans to new undertakings in the Special Areas and in 
some cases to those outside. 
The provisions of the Special Areas (Amendment) Act 1937 were 
a welcome addition to those of the Special Areas (Development and 
Improvement) Act 15f4. The two acts together laid the foundations 




The Special Areas Legislation in Practice. 
In the 1934 and 1937 Acts there was no precise definition of the 
duties of the Commissioners for the Special Areas. It was felt that 
as theircwaxk was of an experimental nature it was impracticable to 
lay down rules of conduct. They were however, expected to enlibt 
local effort and to make use of voluntary associations in carrying 
out schemes which would lead to social improvement and economic de- 
velopment. The schemes envisaged were of two broad types; ameliorat- 
ive schemes which brought some immediate relief to the unemployed, (a 
number of social welfare services could be classified under this head- 
ing) and the constructive schemes, which were long term projects lead- 
ing to industrial development. 
Although the Commissioner for Special Aireas in Scotland and the 
Commissioner for Special Areas in England and Wales were responsible 
to the Secretary of State for Scotland and the Minister of Laoour, in 
carrying put their duties they were not subjected to the same control 
that is exercised over departmental activities. It was felt that the 
ordinary procedure of referring each proposed action to an appropriate 
government department for scrutiny was inappropriate in the case of 
c 
the Commissioners. They had to tale special problems; speedy action 
e 
was necessary; unorthodox methods had to be tried.; r iinimum of delay 
and the maximum of freedom of action was necessary. 
This need was appreciated by the government. The Prime Minister 
announced in the House of Commons, ' We are giving the Commissioners a 
very wide discretion. They must not be afraid of trying experiments 
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even if these experiments fail.'(1) The Commissioners accepted 
the chanllenge. In his first report the Commissioner for the 
Special Areas in Scotland re- emphasised that a Commissioner should 
be regarded as an 'explorer and experimentalist ... to proceed by 
trial and error, to discover the effect of selected schemes upon 
the various problems involved in industrial depression.'(2) He 
considered his work as an experiment and in the nature of research 
into the practical ways and means of bringing about a greater 
measure of industrial prosperity and social welfare.(3). 
The Activities of the Commissioner for Special Areas in Scotland. 
In Scotland economic development and social improvement 
under the Special Areas legislation advanced by two stages. 
During the first,stage, which roughly coincided with the period 
during which the Special Areas (Development and Improvement) Act 
1934 was in force, emphasis was placed on social improvement 
rather than on industrial development. During the second stage, 
which may be taken to have begun with the Special Areas (Amend- 
ment) Act 1937 and which lasted until the outbreak of the war, 
stimuli were given to industrial development by encouraging the 
existing industries and by attracting new ones to the area. In- 
dustrial development was made possible by the economic recovery 
in the country as a whole and facilitated by such social and 
economic improvement as was achieved in Scotland. 
Sir Arthur Rose was the first Commissioner for Special Areas 
in Scotland; he held office during the first stage. Mis policy wasto 
(i) Hans .vol 293,p.1997. 
(2) Cmd.4958,p6. 
()) Cmd.5245,p.4. 
concentrate his efforts on social and economic improvement in order 
to prepare the way for industrial development. When conditions made 
the development possible, it was undertaken by his successord, Sir 
David Allen Hay and Lord Douglas -Hamilton. (1) 
The Commissioners were faced with a two -fold task. They had 
to provide relief and work for the unemployed, and to initiate long 
term policies which would lay the foundations for industrial develop- 
ment. They were, however, not charged directly with the duty of 
relieving unemployment, which was the function of the Unemployment 
s) 
Grants Committee. The Commissioners therefore did not consider scheme 
whose sole purpose was to provide immediate employment. The schemes 
which promised greatest social and economic improvement produced 
little or no immediate effect on the level of employment. The value 
of the work of the Commissioners was therefore not so much that it 
reduced unemployment as that it paved the way for long term industrial 
development. 
(1) Sir h.Arthur Rose appointed December 1934. 
(a)Commissioner for Special Areas in Scotland, Report for the 
period 21st. Dee.1934 to 30th June 1935. Cmd.4958.(July193. 
(b) Report for the period 1xt July 1;35 to 31st Dec.1 935 . 
Cmd.5089. (J1.ly1936 ) 
(c) Final Report. Cmd.5 245. (Fen .1936 ) 
Sir David Allen Hay appointed July 1;36. 
Report of the Commissioner for the Special Areas in Scotland 
for the period 7th Julyto 31st August 1937. Cmd.5604.(1vov. 
19)7) 1936 
Lord G.N.Douglas- Hamilton appointed September 1937. 
Report of the Commissioner for the Special Areas in Scot- 
land. Report for the period lst.Sept.1937 to 30th.: ept.1938. 
Cmd.5905 (Dec .1938 ) 
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The aims of the Commissioners were : - 
(i) to improve the economic and social conditions of the region, 
(2) to maintain and improve the quality of the labour, 
(3) to bring to the public's notice the existing Scottish 
industries, to publicise the social and economic advantages 
. of Scotland, 
(4) to offer additional positive inducements to new industries. 
T. The Improvement of the Economic and Social Conditions. 
(a) ;public Works. Public works programmes were undertaken by the 
Commissioners in conjunction with the local authorities to improve 
the social and economic conditions. Throughout the 'Special Areas 
period' expenditure on public works represented the highest percen- 
age of the total spent by the Commissioners. (1) Public works had 
the double advantage of creating immediate employment and of being 
conductive to industrial development. Roughly they could be divided 
into three main groups - public utilities, amenity schemes and 
direct public health services. 
(i) Public Utilities. 1iiost of the public works financed by the 
Commissioners, which fell into this category, were in connect- 
ion with sewage and water supply. The provision of modern 
services of this type was regarded as the first essential to 
industrial development and as highly desirable from the point 
of view of social welfare. 
(ii ),Amenity Schemes. Amenity sñhemes were advocated on similar 
grounds, but their effect on the industrial development was 
more indirect. It was hoped that by removal of waste binge, 
derelict buildings and the aftermath of the industrial de- 
pression generally, the reluctance of industrialists on psycho- 
logical grounds to move to the Special Areas would be overcome. 
('1 ) Table 1 , p. 82. 
That there was such reluctance was made clear during a debate in the 
House of Commons when it was argued that - 
(It was impossihle\¢o ) expect the birth of new industries in the 
rather unkept graveyards of the old. There is no prospective em- 
ployer looking for a site for a factory, who, when taken first to 
the Great West Road with all the signs of growth and progress, and 
then to one of the derelict areas with relics of the past industries 
all round, would not be influenced in favour of the first against 
the second. It is that bias, a real bias, which exists in the minds 
of prospective employers. (1) 
The cost of improving the landscape'was found, however, to be 
too high toe be met out of the Special Areas Fund:..(2) The Com,uissioners 
therefore confined themselves to assisting local authorities in the 
provision of recreational grounds. 
(iii) Direct Public Health Services. The third type of public works 
programme aided by the Commissioners was the provision of hospitals 
and maternity and child welfare centres which fitted into the broader 
social welfare plans encouraged by them. 
(b) Regional Development Schemes. To foster regional development the 
Coar.issioners offered grants to improve the navigability of the river 
Leven and the river Clyde. These shhemes were really public works, 
although they were classified in the reports under the heading of 
industrial development. (5) Secondly, the Commissioners bore the cost 
of two research projects; one into the properties of certain mineral 
resources in connection with pli.n.s for utilising them in production 
of oil, was carried by Edinburgh and Glasgow universities. It was 
hoped that a new industry might thus be introduced to Scotland. 
(1) ft d. Hans. vol . 295 , (1934 -35) p. 61. 
(2) Cmd. 5245,p.13 
(>) Cmd. 5604,p.58, Cmd.590 ,p.62 
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The second project was an investigation undertaken to study the possi- 
bilities of dewatering flooded coal mines in North 'West Lanarkshire, 
with the object of restoring the old industry to the area. 
All these measures adopted to improve the economic and social 
conditions in the Scottish Special Areas were conducive to industrial 
development, but it was slow in coming. This however was not sur- 
prising in view of the nature of the measures taken. They created 
some employment ,but there remained a high percentage of the insured 
workers unemployed. (1 ) 
II duality of Labour. 
The second task of the Commissioners was to maintain and to im- 
prove the duality of labour. There was need,- 
(9) to prevent deterioration of morale and loss of manual dexterity 
of workers during unemployment, 
(b) to provide training for new occupations. 
Social Welfare Schemes. The Commissioners offered financial assistanee 
to the local authorities and various voluntary organisations to en- 
able them to undertake social welfare schemes with the object of re- 
lieving the tediousness of unwanted leisure and to maintain workers 
mentally and physically fit during the period of enforced idleness. 
Plots and allotments were given to the unemployed. (2) Holiday camps 
Community Service Clubs and physical culture centres were established 
(1) The number of persons directly employed on the various schemes in 
men -years was only given in the two reports, Crud. 5039 and Cmd. 
5245 at 3,23 and 4,626 respectively. 
(2) Plots and allotments were classified in the reports under the head- 
ing of Land Development. A considerable amount was also spent On 
land reclamation and improvement. 
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which ^sere,'designed solely to maintain sound body and alert mind'. 
These proved successful and encouraged the opening of Carlin hall 
at New Stevenstone as a centre for recreational and cultural, as well 
as occupational puposes. 1) It enjoyed great popularity. Support 
,liven by the local comunit'ties to the purely occupational centres 
was regarded by the Com ":,issioners as disappointing. (2) Fifteen 
model occupational centres were established by the Scottish Council 
for the Community Service during Unemployment. One of the reasons 
for the relative failure of this scheme was perhaps partly the fact 
that they provided neither recreation nor paid employment, and partly 
the prejudice against similar t,¡pesof centre in the pre -Special Area 
days, when as Sir Arthur Rose reported -it - 
Considerable publicity of an undesirable kind was given to the 
effort at rehabilitainn bg organisations whose interests are 
entirely subversive of the present orders of society and who in 
order to achieve their purpose adopt the suggestion that the 
schemes perform essential work under 'slave' conditions. ( ¡) 
Training Schemes. The Commissioners themselves did not carry out 
training programmes, but kept in touch with the Minister of Labour 
who established government training centres and instructional Centres. 
The object of the former was to provide E. months training in skilled 
occupations for the younger men. The latter were residential centres 
for men who were out of employment for some time and who were un- 
likely to qualify for skilled employment. They were given a shorter 
(1) Financial support was offered by the Commissioners and voluntary 
personal services were given by the Special Areas Auxiliary Ser- 
vice formed by the Joint Comittee of the Edinburgh Branch of the 
the National Council of Women and the Edinburgh Women Citizen's 
Association and by the students of Edinburgh and Glasgow Univer- 
sities. 
(2) Cmd. 5>C5,p.2C. 
(5} Cmd. 4723,p.225 -7. The centres reffrred to were run at that time 
by the kLinistry of Labour. 
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course of 12 weeks to restore their physical fitness and manual de- 
xterity. There were no industrial training facilities for women 
apart from domestic service courses. 
III. Publicity. To attract new industries, it would not have been 
enough to improve the conditions and the quality of labour, these 
nad to be brought to the public notice. Consequently the Comission- 
ers embarked on an intensive publicity campaign with the object of 
acquainting industrialists outside Scotland with the advantages of 
the area and of helping the existing Scottish industries by adver- 
tising their products.. The publicity took several forms. 
(1) Exhibitions. Exhibitions were staged to demonstrate the variety 
of products and the potentialities of Scotland. With the col - 
laboration of the Scottish Development Council and the Commissioners, 
the Special Areas Exhibition was organised at Olympia in 1235 and 
tt.e 
arrangements were glade for ,\display of Scottish products at the Bri- 
tish Industries Fair in 1236. There was a special Scottish section at 
the British Industries House, London, between July 1 36 and April 1237 
Products were also exhibited at the 'Daily Mil' Ideal Homes Exhibit- 
ion and the Health Exhibition in Glasgow. Scotland was represented 
at the Marine Engineering Exhibition at Olympia in 1g37 and at the 
British Industries Fair in 1g8. 
(2) Information. With the financial assistance from the Commissioner 
the Special Areas Industrial Information Department was set up in 
Jcottish 
Glasgow to keep a register of vacant factory sites in the,Special 
Areas and to answer industrial enquiries, many of which came through 
an Information Bureau established in London. 
l8 
()) Advertisments. To publicise the industrial potentialities, 
amenities and the products of existing industries in Scotland, 
posters were displayed and advertisments inserted in various te- 
chnical and trade journals. 
(4) Literature. A considerable amount of literature on the suo- 
ject of the Scottish Special Areas was published and circulated. 
The quarterly magazine 'Scotland' carried 'Special Areas' supplements 
and Lord Douglas Hamilton helped in bringing out a brochure of the 
Scottish Special Areas entitled 'Opportunity and New Fields for 
Industry.' A letter describing conditions and openings was sent to 
the members of the London Chamber of Commerce and the secretary 
circulated it among the members of associated Chambers. 
(5) yilm s and,7ireless Talas. A contribution was made out of the 
Special Areas Fund towards the cost of producing 6 documentary films 
dealing with the various social and economic aspects of life in 
Scotland.. Arrangements were also made for talks on the radio. 
It is difficult to assess the effect of these various activities, 
but the Commissioners believed that the publicity campaign aimed at 
attracting industry to the Special Areas was productive. It was 
expected to assist the industrial development of Scotland in the 
long run. 
IV. Inducements to New Industries. 
Positive inducements in the form of financial aid and the fa- 
cilities of the industrial estates were offered to attract new in- 
dustries to Scotland. 
(I) Financial Aid. Financial aid was available to firms in the 
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Special Areas from government, semi -official and private sources. 
Under the Special Areas Amendment Act 1557 the Commissioners were 
empowered to give financial assistance to firms moving to the Special 
Areas. There was no general formula. The form and amount of such 
aid was left to the discretion of the Coi;i.,_issioners. Two factors 
were considered in granting the assistance, the value of the industry 
to the area and the degree of unemployment in the district in which 
the industry was to be located. Altogether assistance in the form 
of contributions to rents, rates and in some cases income tax was 
¿iven to 35 firms. Twenty five were of Scottish origin, 5 from 
England and one from abroad. (1) All represented new developments. 
The sum spent by the Commissioners on Tinducements, was £.46,074. (2) 
The other two sources of aid, the Special Areas Re- 
construction Association and the Nuffield Trust fall outside the 
scope of this report and will therefore be treated briefly. The 
S.A.R.A. was a semi- official body. It was established as a public 
limited company under the Special Areas Reconstruction (Agreement) 
Act 1256. The capital was subscribed by the City, but the govern - 
ment gave certain guarantees and agreed to meet the administrative 
expenses up to a pre -determined maximum. The object of the company 
was to offer financial assistance by way of loans to small firms 
in the Special Areas. It was stipulated that the amount should not 
exceed £10 , vC or be advanced for a period of over 5 .ears . Loans, 
or more often contributions to the share capital, were also available 
(1) Cmd. 5905,p.16 -17. 
(2) Cmd. 5905,p. 74. No sub- classification is available. 
3o 
to industries in the Special Areas from the Nuffield Trust. L,2,C00 
&CO was donated by Lord Nuffield for the benefit of the Special Areas. 
(2) The Scottish Industrial Estates. The more important form of 
inducement, because of its far -reaching effects and experimental 
nature, was the setting up of the Scottish Industrial Estates. The 
history of their establishment and development is outlined in the 
following chapters. The Commissioners however were not alone re- 
sponsible for the creation of the estates and reference has to be 
made to the Scottish Development Council and its Economic Committee. 
Co- operation of the Commissioners with other organisations. 
The Commissioners for the Special Areas in Scotland, in carrying 
out their duties, collaborated with government departments, local 
authorities and various voluntary organisations. Among the last, 
the Scottish Development Council was of particular importance in 
connection with the industrial development of Scotland. Referring 
to it, the Commissioner stated, - 
I cannot emphasis too strongly the value of a representative 
body of this kind as a co- ordinating link and means of pro- 
moting or assisting schemes for the benefit of all industries, 
for undertaking general industrial investigations and dis- 
tributing information. (1) 
The Scottish Development Council. The Scottish Development Council 
was established in 1931,before the Special Areas legislation,as a 
voluntary organisation having as its members representatives of 
employers and labour in Scotland. It was of importance not only 
because of the valuble work which it performed, but also because 
it manifested the determination of the inhabitants of Scotland to 
(1 ) Cmd.5089,p6 
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restore prosperity to their country through their own efforts. The 
problems were too great to be solved locally. Since 1534 the joint 
efforts of the Council and the Commissioner for the Special Areas 
in Scotland went a long way towards overcoming the difficulties in 
the way of industrial development. The co- operation became still 
closer when the Economic Committee was formed. 
The Economic Committee. A suggestion that 'something in the nature 
of a planning, co- ordinating and advisory committee for Scotland' 
was needed in connection with industrial development was put forward 
by Sir Arthur Rose to the Scottish Development Council. (1) In 
March 1936 the Economic Committee of the Scottish Development Council 
was formed. It was representative of Scottish industries, labour 
and financial institutions. Sir James Lithgow became the first 
chairman but under the pressure of outtside duties was forced to 
resign. He was succeeded by Sir Steven Bilsland, who hab continued 
to offer his services to the Committee up to the present time.(2) 
The functions of the Economic Committee were to examine the 
possibilities of improving economic conditions in Scotland and to 
consider and advise on schemes which would lead to the extension 
of the existing industries and the attraction of new ones. The 
most important of these schemes was the proposal for the establish- 
ment of the Scottish Industrial Estates. The Economic Committee 
collaborated with the Special Areas Commissioner in the preliminary 
investigations and negotiations for the first Scottish industrial 
estates. 
(1) Cmd.4958,p.10, amd.5245,p.8. 
(2) Sir Steven Bilsland ( now lord Bilsland) became the first chair- 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Chapter E . 
Establishment of the Scottish Industrial Estates - 
the begining of the experiment. 
In the 130's the concept of the industrial estates was not 
new , but the proposal for government sponsored industrial estates 
was a novelty. There were industrial estates,under the name of 
trading estates,established at Trafford Park, Manchester, and at 
Slough. These however were private ventures. (1) 
The idea that an industrial estate should be established in 
Scotland began to be discussed by the Scottish Development Council 
towards the end of 193. Although the idea commended itself to 
Sir James Lithgow and his colleagues on the executive of the 
council there remained the fundamental difficulty of finding the 
(2) 
necessary capital, of at least a1,000,000 to finance the project. 
The amount involved was too great to be financed out ofnprivate 
resources and nothing could have been done at the time. 
(1) Trafford Park Estates Ltd. acquirer_, _ ±n, 169E , some 1200 acres 
for development as an industrial estate. Although the com- 
pany lets a number of small Thivet factories, the normal 
practice is for the tenant firms to build factories for them- 
selves and to purchase the freehold of the site either for 
an outright payment or subject to an annual chief rent. 
Slough Estates Ltd. acquired,in 1920 , some 641 acres and 
began developing the site as an industrial estate in 1924. 
'Bijou' type of factories are available on rental basis. 
Unlike the Trafford Park Estates, all property is owned by 
the Slough Estates Ltd. 
(2) Sir James Lithgux was at that time chairman of the Scottish 
Development Council. 
An official sugjestion that an industrial estate on the lines 
of Trafford Park or the Slough Trading Estate might be worthy of 
the government's support, as it might create employment in a 
distressed area, was first made -so far as it can be ascertained -, 
by Capt. E. Wallace. (1) The proposal was put forward cautiously. 
In his report on the distressed areas he pointed out that, - 
'This proposal is made with considerable reserve since it is 
recognised that the whole problem of the most effective use 
of our natióAal credit and the largely increased savings of 
our people, for the provision of employment is outside the 
scope of the present investigations. (2) 
The proposal was accepted by the government. The Special 
Areas (Improvement and Development) Act 1934 rendered the estab- 
lishment of the industrial estates possible by making provisions 
for the finance of such projects out of the Treasury funds. 
In 1 935 the Prime LAnioier announced that steps had been 
taken to establish Trading Companies. The difficult legal pre- 
liminaries were being cleared away and the government had every 
intention of proceeding with the plans to form a Trading Company 
at an early date. () The members of the House of Commons were 
not however, satisfied with general statements and pressed for 
more information about the proposed estate company. The general 
feeling is reflected in the following statement by one of the 
members. 
'What it (the estate company) is we do not know; it is an 
absolute mystery. I have a sort of feeling that it will 
look like a bazaar, where petaple may go and buy, if they 
(1) Capt. E Wallace was one of the four investigators appointed 
by the iviinistry of Labour in 15'34. Clap. p. 55 
(2) Cmd. 4728, p. 85. 
(3) S. Baldwin. Hans. vol. 307.,(1135 -36), p. 678. 
like, a sort of open air Woolworth, nobody told us what 
this estate is.'(1) 
Answerain, for the government the Minister of Labour ex- 
plained that what was meant by a trading estate was a 'public 
utility society' which would acquire land and on it build factor- 
ies which were to be available on lease. (2) These factories 
were to be let at what was regarded as a ' reasonable ' rent. 
What was a 'reasonable' rent was not specified. The proposed 
Trading Estate was regarded as an experiment designed to attract 
new industries to the areas where,employment capacity of the old 
industries had contracted. (3) The experiment was to be started 
in the North Masternregion. (4) 
With the economic recovery, new light industries were spring- 
ing up in the South, particularly around London, but there was no 
similar development in the Special Areas.(5) This was attributed 
(1 ):. _;.orrison, Hans. vol. 307(1935 -36) p. 678. 
(2) E. Brown, ibid. p. 1034 -4, 
(3) ibid. 
(4) North -Eastern Trading Estates Ltd. (formed)i36) established 
its first estate, -the Team Valley Trading Estate -, near Gate- 
shead. By May 1939, 109 factories were completed. It is of 
interest to note that it was the Durham and Tyneside Area 
which was investigated by Capt. E.Wallace. 
South Wales and Monmouthshire Trading Estate Co. Ltd.(fored 
1i36) developed the Treforest Trading Estate near Cardiff. 
Byv:ay 1939, 55 factories were occupied. 
West Cumberland Industrial Development Co. was formed in 1937, 
Solway Estate was established at Maryport. By May 1939, 7 
factories were available. 
(5) Table 2 p. 89, and table 3 p. 90 . 
86 
to the lack of factories available on lease. (1) In Scotland 
such empty factories as were available were mostly old buildings, 
often unsuitable for modern production processes. It was hoped 
that provision of suitable premises on a rental basis would help 
to attract the new industries which Scotland needed, out of which 
relatively few were established. (2) 
A proposal for a Scottish industrial estate had already peen 
put to the government by Sir Arthur Rose. In his last report as 
the Canni:asianer for Special Areas in Scotland, he anticipatedthe 
formation,at an early date, of a public utility which would be 
0.41 
responsible for the creation and administration ofAindustrial 
estate in Scotland. (J) At his request the Scottish Economic 
Committee undertook to investigate the suggestion and to carry 
out a preliminary survey. A sub -committee was appointed for that 
purpose. It recommended the establishment of an industrial 
estate on a site at Hillington. The recomendation was accepted 
by Sir Arthur's successor , Sir David Hay. The commissioner 
made arrangements for the formation of a company with the co- 
operation of the Economic Committee. (4) The Scottish Indus- 
trial Estates Ltd. was incorporated in January 1937. A site 
of 320 acres was acquired for development as an industrial 
estate, but entry to the site was not obtained until the end 
of June 1937. Construction proceeded and within a year some 
80 acres were under development. By the end of September 1938 
(1) Sir malcom Stewart, Commissioner for Special Areas in 
England and Wales, Cmd. 5090, p.13. 
(2) Sir David Hay Commissioner for Special Areas in Scotland 
(3) Cmd. 5245, p.b. Cmd.5Eu4 p.19 
(4) Cmd. 5604,p. 1 -20. It was estimated that when fully develop- 
ed estates would provide employment for some 15,000 workers. 
there were 67 tenants in occupation and 36 factories had been 
allocated. Encouraged by the success at Hillington the Commission, 
er decided to start three other estates in the North of Lanark- 
shire where there was heavy and prolonged unemployment. He pro- 
ceeded to purchase sites at Carfin (27 acres), Chapelhall (18acrez3 
and Larlhall (110reas). The pool of labour on which the new 
estates were to draw was considerably smaller than in the neigbour 
hood of Millington. The three Lanarkshire estates were to be 
developed and administered by a new company formed for that pur- 
pose. The Lanarkshire Industrial Estates Ltd. was incorporated 
on 30th July 1938. The initial work of erecting the factory 
buildings was started in August 1938. 
To ensure uniformity of treatment of the firms applying for 
factories on the estates in all the Special Areas, arrangements 
were made by the Commissioner for the Special Areas in Scotland 
and the Commuissioner in England and Wales for consultation and 
co- ordination of their policies. Lord Portal agreed to act as 
the chief industrial adviser with the help of a consultive com- 
mittee. To assist the advisers the Commissioners appointed two 
industrial officers who had both business experience and technical 
qualifications. Their duty was to carry out negotiations with 
industrialists wishing to expand, and to canvass new industries 
on behalf of the Commissioners. These purely voluntary attempts 
at co- ordination of their policies were the first steps towards 
the economic planning of the distribution of industry on a national 
33 
basis which was undertaken after the war. 
The effectiviess of the experiment of establishing the in - 
dustrial estates with the object of providing employment and of 
diversifying the industrial structure in the Special Areas has 
to be studied in the post -war period, since the estates were in 
existence for too short a time before the war to make an impact 
on the regional economies. 
Table 2. 






West Cuciberland South Wales 
a b e a b c a b c a b c 
7 7 2 1 
1933 3 _ 5 6 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 
1934 6 7 5 3 11 2 - 2 - - 2 
1935 2 2 _ 2 5 3 1 î 1 
1936 6 2 3 5 3 6 1 _ 1 - - - 
1937 4 1 14 `+ 4 5 1 
193b 14 _ 2 26 6 6 2 1¡ _ 5 
42 E. 28 65 26 34 6 2 6 26 lo 
a , factories opened, 
b , factories extended, 
c, factories closed, 
Source, Board of 'Made Survey of Industrial 
Development 1938, (1939) 
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Chapter 7 . 
Post -war , :.easures. 
After the 1;39 -45 war the government policy in respect of 
the Special Areas was altered. It was not so much a change in 
the basic policy as in the emphasis and in the methods of im- 
plementing it. The important issue was still 'employments. The 
problem, however, was rather how to maintain it, than how to create 
it. The mobilisation of all the human and material resources dur- 
ing the war reduced unemployment and underemployment, particularly 
of women. The government policy, therefore, after the war was 
directed towards arresting a decline from the high level of employ- 
ment which had been reached. Thus,the policy in regard to unemploy- 
ment was to be preventive rather than corrective as it had been 
hitherto. In addition to the change in the economic conditions 
which caused a shift in emphasis of the employment policy, the war 
brought also a psychological reorientation. Restrictions and con - 
trols enforced during the war prepared the climate of public opinion 
for a greater degree of economic planning by the state, than would 
either have been deemed desirable or acceptable before September 
1959. This permitted alterations in the methods of carrying out 
the employment policy. The change both in the emphasis and methods 
is reflected in the rechristening of the Special Areas as the De- 
velopment Areas and in the replacement of the Special Areas Acts 
the Distribution of Industry Acts 1945 and 1950 and the Town 
and Country Planning Act 1947. 
liatecedents of the Development Area Legislation. 
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The Development Areas legislation was influenced by two 
publications, the report of the Royal Commission on the Distri- 
bution of the Industrial Population and the Employment Policy 
White Paper. It embodied some of the principal recommendations 
of the former and the pledges of the latter. 
(a) Report of the Royal _gommission on the Distribution of the 
Industrial Population. (1) In spite of the efforts made by 
the Special Areas Commissioners to diversify the industrial struc- 
ture of the areas progress was slow. New industries tended to 
gravitate south particularly towards the London area. (2) Sir 
Lalcolm Stewart, the commissioner for the Special Areas in England 
and Wales drew the government's attention to this tendency. ,l- 
though not in favour of compulsory location of industry, he suggest- 
ed that the government might consider proscribing certain areas 
where no further industrial development should take place. ()) 
In addition to this negative control he further recommended that 
positive inducements of a financial nature in the form of relief 
from income tax and local rates, and long term loans should be 
offered to industrialists moving to the Special Areas. The im- 
portance of this report was recognised by the government. The 
Chancellor of the Exchequer announced in the House of Commons 
that the government intended to examine carefully the various 
proposals which it contained. (4) As their acceptance would 
(1) Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Po- 
pulation Report, Cmd. 6153. This report is sometimes called 
the Barlow Report after Lord Montague Barlow who was the chair- 
man of the Royal Commission. (1940) 
(2) Ch. 6 p.35. 
(3) Third Report of the Commissioner for the Special Areas(England 
and Wales) Cmd.5303,p.6 and seq. 
(4) N.Chamberlain, Hans.vol3r) D.1595.(193`-3-1) 
raise many issues of an economic, social and strategic nature, 
it was felt that a comprehensive study of the problems involved 
was needed before any steps could have been taken. On 9th March, 
L 7, the government annonced its intention to appoint a Royal 
Commission for this purpose. (1 ) When the Prime Minister announces 
the constitution of the commission he emphasised that it was not 
to be restricted to an investigation of the problems of the Special 
Areas, but was to be concerned with wider issues, including the 
eneral questions of industrial location. (2) 
The Royal Commissions ternis of reference were; 
the 
I. To study,causes of the existing distribution of the industrial 
population and the future trend. 
2. To examine the social, economic and strategic disadvantages of 
concentration. 
5. To suggest remedial measures, if any, to be taken in the 
national interest. 
The appointment of a Royal Commission with these terms of 
reference was a first step towards a policy of distribution of 
industry on a national basis. 
Scottish Evidence. (3) For the purpose of this report the Scottish 
evidence to the Royal Commission is of particular interest, es- 
pecially the memorandum submitted by Sir Steven Bilsiand, .Duthie 
(1) Harm. vol. 321 p.1026 ( (c13`-3í) 
(2) Hans. vol. 31c. p.547,-) (034-3,) 
(3) Minutes of evidence taken before the Royal Commission. 
2nd.Day(6.10.1937) W.S.Douglas,Secretary,Dept. of Health for 
Scotland. 
9th Day(15.12.1937) The Association of County Councils in Scot- 
land and the Association of Counties of 
Cities in Scotland. 
15th Day(3.3.1'36) The Scottish Economic Committee and the 
Convention of the Royal Burghs of Scotland. 
29th Day(29.11.193c)J.G.Kyd, Registrar General for Scotland 
and P.Taylor of the 'Department of Health for Scotland. 
and Sir William Goodchild of the Scottish Economic Committee. 
All the witnesses agreed that there was a maldistribution of 
industry in Scotland and a lack of balance in the economic 
development of the country generally. 
In examination of the Scottish evidence in connection with 
the level of employment and the industrial structure, three 
main points emerged as requiring special consideration and 
corrective measures. 
1. The position of Glasgow. 
2. The overdependence of Scotland on shipbuilding, coal, iron 
and steel industries. 
3. The underemployment of women. 
In the evidence submitted by Lord Bilsland and his 
colleagues, attention was drawn to the anomalous position of 
Glasgow.(1) The city was excluded from the Special Area. On 
account of its economic and social integration with the re- 
gion and on the basis of the high level of unemployment with- 
in its boundries, it would qualified for inclusion. All the 
more so, as it was already classified as a distressed area 
for the purpose of the awarding of government contracts. 
The distress of the Glasgow area and the South West of 
Scotland was due to overdependence for prosperity on the heavy 
industries. This view which had been expressed several years 
ago was again confirmed in the evidence. The question of the 
underemployment of women,however, had not been raised before. 
Women represented a lower percentage of the insured population 
in Scotland than in the U.K. The textile centre of Dundee 
(1) 1,th Day of evidence, Memo. of the Scottish Econ. Com.p.446 
9.5 
and Hawick were exceptional in that the employment of women 
was unusually high . (1 ) 
This lower percentage of female workers in Scotland as 
compared with the U.K. can perhaps be explained by the futi- 
lity of registering for work in view of the lack of employment 
opportunities for women in Scotland in the inter -war period.(2) 
The absence of a sufficient number of suitable Sobs for women 
willing to work was an aspect of the main problem of the do- 
minance of the Scottish economy by the heavy industries. 
A remedy lay in the diversification of the industrial struc- 
ture by introducing new industries to Scotland. But although 
the Special Areas legislation at the time of the hearings by 
the commissioners, had already been in force for some time, 
little progress was made in attracting new industries. This 
was shown by the Scottish evidence to the Commission and the 
Board of Trade reports.(3) 
It was suggested that the facilities of trading estates 
such as had been offered at Trafford and Slough were instru- 
mental in encouraging the growth of new industries in England. 
There were no similar private trading estates in Scotland. 
There was also no response to the government offer of finan- 
cial assistance to private site companies which would have 
build factories for renting. 
(1) Table 4, p. 1L.C. 
(2) The percentage was also lower in the post -war years.Statis- 
tics compiled by C.E.V.Leser showed that Scotswomen (age 25- 
55) showed smaller tendency to follow a gainful occupatiol 
than their counterparts in England.It was suggested that larg- 
er families in Scotland may be one of the reasons. C.E.V. 
Leser, Manpower,Ch.4 in Scottish Economy,ed.A.K.Cairncross. 
(3) Evidence 15th Day,p.446,B.of T.Survey of Ind.Devel. annual. 
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was 
None Iftitte formed. (1) Most of the firms moving t:o,',th of the border 
located themselves on the only government sponsored industrial es- 
tate at that time in Scotland.. This indicated the lines on which 
the future policy of attracting new industries to Scotland had to 
be pursued. 
Recommendations of the Royal Commission. 2) 
Evidence from all sources suggested that industrial concentrat- 
ion was undesirable on social, economic and strategic grounds. The 
question of the distribution of industry was important from the point 
of view of preventing further growth or development of new depressed 
areas. Members of the Commission agreed that the problem of locat- 
ion of industry was not of a local character but that its solution 
had to be sought on a national basis. It was therefore recommended 
that national action should be taken to decentralise both industries 
and population, to encourage a reasonable balance of industry in 
Britain as a whole, and to di &ersify industry within the various 
regions. 
The members of the Royal Commission pointed out in their report 
that in respect of the regional diversification of industry the work 
of the Special Areas Commissioners which, although so far it had been 
of an experimental nature, held out promise of success in achieving 
the aims enumerated above. They therefore, recommended that the 
powers vested in the Special Areas Commissioners should be transferr- 
ed to a central body. This body would become responsible for a 
(1) Special Areas(Amendment) Act 1937. Unwillingness to form site 
companies may have been due to the risk involved in such a ven- 
ture and to the fact that the government was prepared to advance 
only 25îi of the capital. 
(2) Recommendations of majority report,p.201 -207, minority p.22. 
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national policy of distribution of industry. There was no agree- 
ment as to the status of this central body or the precise powers 
it should exercise. It was generally accepted however, that 
loction 
control over industrialAshould be exercised. There was need for 
powers to prohibit further growth of industries in London and other 
areas where congestion already existed. Development of garden 
cities, satellite towns, and trading estates was to be encouraged, 
with the view of securing a more balanced distribution of industry. 
It was further suggested, that for this purpose, financial assis- 
tance from government funds might be given in the form of loans 
and grants. 
The recommendationd of both the majority and minority reports 
led to the conclusion that it was impossible to separate the pro - 
blem of unbalanced location of industry from that of structural 
unemployment within .regions. One was the cause, the other the 
effect. Solution lay in a national policy for the distribution 
of industry. When the reports were published in 1940, they could 
not be given the attention they deserved. \Var overshadowed all 
social and economic considerations. 
(b) The Employment White Paper. Four years later when -et the end 
of the war was in sight and the preparations were made for a change 
from the war- to peace -time economy, the Employment White Paper 
was published. (1) In the proposed programme the distribution of 
industry policy was to become an integral part of the employment 
policy to be followed after the war. This fusion created a two - 
tier policy. On the national level employment was to be maintained 
(1) Cmd. 6h27 M44) 
by the interplay of fiscal and monetary policy. On the regional 
level, the regulation of purchasing power could not have solved 
the problem of structural unemployment. In order to reduce pockets 
of structural unemployment and to safeguard against any future 
increase which might have resulted in new depressed areas, the 
government proposed ; - 
1. to influence the location of new enterprises so as to diver- 
sify the industrial composition of areas likely to be vul- 
nerable to unemployment, 
2. to remove obstacles to the transfer of workers from one area 
to another and from one occupation to another, 
. to provide facilities to fit workers from declining industries 
for jobs in expanding industries. 
The avowed object of the government policy , as a safeguard 
against regional unemployment,was to secure a balanced industrial 
development by influencing the location of undertakings r.long 
the lines suggested by the Barlow Report. The pattern of the 
distribution of industry was to be based on economic, social 
and strategic considerations. In steering firms to areas which 
required further diversification the government was to exercise 
negative control and to offer positive inducements. For this 
purpose it was necessary that the government should know before- 
hand of any proposed industrial development. Industrialists 
therefore, were required to notify of their plans to establish 
new undertakings or to transfer to another area. The governiuent 
was to have power to prohibit location in areas where further 
industrial development was undesirable. While positive induce- 
ments were to be extended to industrialists willing to move where 
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further diversification was required. Factory construction in 
ttie 
these areas was to be given priority by ,,issue of building licences. 
Converted munitions factories were to be made available to private 
enterprise. The _:overnment policy of building new factories for 
renting was to be continued. In addition the promise was made 
of government contracts and financial aid in the form of loans 
or share capital. Financial assistance was also to be given to 
workers transferred under approved schemes to the new areas. 
It was felt that Decause of its implications, the formu- 
lation and administration of the distribution of industry policy 
was the responsibility of the government as a whole. The channel 
through which the policy was to be ejtpr.etsedrwds to be the Board 
of Trade, working in conjunction with the Ministry of Labour and 
National Service, the Ministry of Town and Country Planning and 
the Scottish Office. It was the President of the Board of Trade 
however, who was to be answerable in Parliament for all the ge- 
neral aspects o.f the policy. 
It was hoped that,with the introduction of the policy de- 
signed to achieve a balanced distribution of industry the depressed 
areas would in time disappear entirely. The distressed areas of 
the past became theTDevelopment Tareas of the future. 
Table 
Employment p.nd Unemployment in certain Towns. 
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Male and female 
insured persons 
as a ió of total 
Town insured populat- 
ion(16 -64)at Jul;; 
137. 
male Female Total 
Male and female Male and female 
workers unemployed insured workers 
(16 -64) as a ,b of in employment as 
insured males and ó of total insured 
females rtispecively in employment(1 6 -É 4) 
at June 19 1. at June 1:7. 






































Source, Memorandum (Scottish Economic 
Council), Evidence to Royal 
Commission On the Distribution 
of Industrial Population, 
15th Day, p.447. 
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Chapter d. 
Development Areas Legislation. 
The war was not yet over when the government took steps to 
carry out the pledges of the Employment White Paper. On 21st 
February, the President of the Board of Trade introduced the 
Distribution of Industry Bill,'to provide for the development of 
certain areas (and) for controlling the provision of industrial 
premises withooview to securing the proper distribution of in- 
dustry.'(1) he pointed out that :- 
'This bill is based upon the Government White Paper on 
Employment Policy... This measure is the first instalment 
of legislation to promote employment after the war... 
This is a bill to abolish the distressed areas and also 
to make a begining with the carrying out of the promises 
of the Barlow Report . (2 ) 
The Distribution of Industry Bill which was to repeal and 
replace the Special Areas legislation aroused little controversy. 
It was not so much a pioneering and experimental measure as the 
Special Areas(Development and Improvement)Act 1554 had been. The 
Distribution of Industry Bill as rather a step in the process of 
evolution of the employment policy and of the economic planning 
which unobtrusively and in a somewhat disguised manner began in 
the 1930's. The value of the government's powers to encourage 
the creation of employment,in the formerly depressed areas, which 
the new bill sought to extend had already been shown by the work 
of the Special Areas Commissioners. The usefulness of some eco- 
nomic planning had been demonstrated by the Location Planning Room 
(1) H.Dalton, Hans. vol.408 (1544 -45) p.ö1C. 
(2) Hans. vol.40¡ (1;44 -45) p. °_,37. 
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established during the war at the Ministry of Production. The 
aim of the bill, which was to safeguard against regional unemploy- 
ment was generally approved. The methods of achieving this object- 
ive through planning of the distribution of industry became accept- 
able. The Distribution of Industry Bill was therefore welcomed. 
In the House of Codtmons it was regarded as representing T... the 
largest measure of agkreernent on an urgent problem in an all -party 
government.T(1) In the press, the Distribution of Industry Bill 
was acclaimed as a triumph of the principles of the Barlow Report.(2, 
The chairman of the Royal Commission which produced this report 
described the bill as Ta hopeful step in the right directionT( 
Royal assent to the Distribution of Industry Bill was given on 
15th June,195(4) 
Distribution of Indurtrr Act. 1545. 
Under the Distribution of Industry Act the government was 
empowered to influence the location of industry by offering in- 
ducements. In theory it had no direct control over the distri- 
bution of industry. 
The 1945 Act repealed the Special Areas (Develop ent and 
Improvement) Act,19 >4,and the Special Areas (Amendment) Act,1i57. 
All the interests vested in the Special Areas Commissioners were 
transferred to the Board of Trade which became responsible for 
the administration of the former Special Areas designated in the 
new aet as the Development Areas. Although these areas, with 
(1) Hams. vol. 409(1,44- 45)p.E54. 
(2) Leading article, The Times, 25rd.Feb.,1945. 
(5) Sir Montague B slow, letter to The Times, 8th March, 1945. 
(4) Hans. vol . 41 1 (L 44 -45) p .1 04 . 
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small exceptions were very much the same as those scheduled by 
the Special Areas 194 Act, the procedure for varying their 
boundaries was different. Under the old legislation the Special 
Areas were fixed and could only have been varied by further le- 
gislation. Under the new act, if in the opinion of the govern- 
ment the economic conditions justified the step, areas could be 
added or removed from the schedule at any time 3 years after the 
passing of the act.(1) In Scotland the additional areas sche- 
duled by the 1945 Act as the Development Areas, were Glasgow and 
Dundee. Arguments for the inclusion of the former on account of 
the unemployment within its boundries has already been put for- 
ward before the war.(2) In scheduling Dundee, the government was 
was taking a step to safeguard against anemployment should the 
jute industry, on which the town was mainly dependent for pro- 
sperity, become depressed. The government offered increased 
inducements under the 1945 Act, to encourage firms to move to 
a Development Area. The Board of Trade is authorised to provide 
industrial premises for firms in the Development Areas and to give 
financial assistance to trading or industrial estate companies. The 
latter term is used in Scotland. Furthermore, provision was made 
for improving the basic services.The Treasury was empowered to make 
(1) The Development Areas were subsequently extended by (a) Dis- 
tribution of Industry(Development Areas) Order 1946(dated 16.2. 
1946) the two new areas were South Lancashire and Wrexham) , (b ) 
Distribution of Industry (Development Areas) Order 1949(dated 
4.3.1949) thd new areas were ïuierseyside and in Scotland,part 
of the Highlands bordering on the Firth of Cromarty and Beau - 
ley parts of Irvine and Linlithgow. 
(2) Ch.3.p.56. 
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:rants to undertakins in the Development Areas towards the cost 
of payments of interest on the borrowed capital and to grunt loans. 
These powers did not differ basically from those of the Special 
Areas Acts. There was, however, one important difference. The 
Distribution of Industry Act U4.5 containedggeneral provisions as 
to the distribution of industry. Thus a step was made towards nat 
Tonal planning of industrial location. It was enacted that any- 
body wishing to erect an industrial building with a floor space 
area exeeeding 10,CCusq.ft. had to notify the Board of Trade (:0 
days before entering into contract or begin ng construction. The 
Board of Trade might require further information as to the proposed 
situation of the factory, industrial processes which were to be 
carried out and the estimated number of male and female employees. 
Failure to comply with these requirements was a punishable offence. 
These powers conferred on the Board of Trade, did not however e_- 
tend beyond the collection of information and, in theory, it had 
no direct control over the location of industry. Clause 9 of the 
Distribution of Industry Bill which would have provided for such 
a control had been dropped during the bill's passage through t-I-e 
parliament because of a strong opposition to it. 
Town and Country PlafInin <<° Act 147. 
Clause ¡ of the Distribution of Industry Bill eventually found 
its way to the Statute book mn the guise of clause 14 of the Town 
and Country Planning Act 1547, which gave the Board of Trade direct 
control over the location of industry in an unobtrusive way. (1) 
(1) The corresponding clause in the Town and Country Planning Act 
15'47 (Scotland) is clause 13. 
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Under clause 15 of the act, the erection, extension or alteration 
of a building had to have the approval of the local planning 
authority. But under clause 14, the application to the local plann- 
ing authority for permission to develop land by erection of indus- 
trial buildings with floor space over 5,000sq.ft. could not have 
been considered unless it was certified by the Board of Trade that 
such development could be carried out consistently with the proper 
distribution of industry. There was no precise definition of 
what was meant by the proper distribution of industry. 
The combined effect of the Distribution of Industry Act 1945 
and the Town and Country Planning Act 1947 was to give the Board 
of Trade power to influence the location of industry by means of 
positive inducements and direct control. The Dower to offer indu- 
cements was further extended by the Distribution of Industry Act 
1950. 
Distribution of Industry Act 1;'50. 
Like the Distribution of Industry Act 1945, which in its 
provisions resembled the Special Areas (Development and Improvement) 
Act 193 , the Distribution of Industry Act 1950 resembled the 
Special Areas (Amendment) Act 1;37 in so far as both extended the 
provisions of the two principal, acts. The Distribution of Indus- 
try Bill was introduced on 22nd March 1;50 by the President of the 
Board of Trade. (1) 
The object of the bill was;- 
1. To make further provision for the aquisition of land 
and creation of easements. 
(1) J.i- .Wilson, Hans. vol 472 (1950)p1966. 
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. To authorise the Board of Trade, to make grants in except- 
ional cases in con_lection with the establishment in, or 
a transfer to the Development Areas, of undertakings, and 
to make loans and grants to housing associations which 
would provide dwellings for workers to be employed in the 
Development Areas. 
To extend section 5 of the Employment and Training Act 
1 4E in relation to persons transferred for employment 
in undertakings established in, or transferred to the 
Development Areas. 
The bill was passed smoothly through both Houses. It con- 
tained no cotro.versial issues. It was merely an extension of the 
parent act, which as was pointed out during a debate, was an 
'effective measure' judged on the/ basis of the Scottish experience. 
(1) The bill was accepted with mutual unanimity on the grounds 
t)iat it was a humane and not a political measure. (2) The Dis- 
tribution of Industry Bill was passed in its entirety and received 
Royal assent on 12th July, 1i5C. 
Co:o;nitments under the Distribution of Industry Acts. Analysts 
of the co Aitments in the Development Areas under the Distri- 
bution of Industry Acts could not be obtained. The only indi- 
cation of the extent to which the Board of Trade exercises its 
powers in respect of granting financial inducements was obtained 
from the Civil Estimates. From the analsis of estih.ated expen- 
A 
diture it appef:.rs that the main inducement offered was the pro- 
vision\of industrial premises on the industrial estates. 
Administrative i, achinery of the Development Areas . The origin 
of the administrative Machinery in the Development Areas can be 
traced to two sources, the Royal Commission on the Distribution 
(1) Lord Bilsland, House of Lords,vol.167 Pp.? (1 5C),p5` 7 
(2) Lord Adams, ibid. p.60. 
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of Industrial Population and the warti.__e experience in planning 
Placing of the responsibility for the administration of the De- 
velopment Areas with the Board of Trade was a compromise between 
the office of the Special Areas Commissioners and the _ational 
Industrial Board or a new ministry recommended respectively by 
the majority and the minority reports of the Royal Commission. 
',chile the location unit of the Board of Trade and the Regional 
Boards for Industry were modelled-- on the Linistry of Production 
Location Room and the regional Boards established during the war. 
-oard of Trade,- the Executive Body. The Jepartment of the Board 
of Trade responsible for the administration of the ;`;eneral policy 
affecting the distribution of industry was the Distribution of 
Industry and Regional Division. Two of its sub -divisions were of 
particular interest, the Research and Planning Branch and the 
Location Branch. The former was concerned with research into 
industrial location and information was collected on physical 
features, natural resources, the supply of raw materials, labour 
statistics, housing, transport facilities and basic services. The 
importance of research on these lines as a prerequisite of in- 
dustrial distribution had been emphasised by the Royal Commission. 
rw& 
The Location branch offered advice to industrialists on selection 
of sites for their new undertakings or those to be transferred. 
As their names sugest the Research and Planning Branch and 
the Location Branch of the Board of Trade were avowedly concerned 
with the planning of ihdustrial distribution. This centralisation 
of research and Planning on a national basis was a new develop- 
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ment and in contrast to the pre -war practice. 
Decentralisation of administration. Much of the work of the Board 
of Trade was decentralised. When dealing with local issues, the 
authority was delegated to the Board of TradesRegional Controllers 
the 
in charge ofAregions which lie within the Development Areas.(1) 
Advisory functions and, maintenance of contact between government 
departments and industries on the local levelw.ere the responsibi- 
lity of the Board of Trade Regional Boards for Industry. They 
were a continuation of the Regional Boards set up by the iiiinistry 
of Production, but the Board of Trade boards were reconstituted 
in October 1¡45. Their scope was extended to include the whole 
range of productive industry . Their functions were :- 
1. To advise ..inisters and their Departments on industrial 
conditions within their regiond . 
2. To keep in touch with all regional organisations whose work 
affects industry and to represent the needs of industry to 
local authorities. 
5. To keep local industry gati sed on policy and to represent 
their views to government departments. 
4. To deal with any questions of production referred to them 
for local treatment. 
The Regional Boards for Industry consisted of a Chairman and 
generally six members, three of whom represented employers and the 
other three represented the Trade Unions. All appointments to 
the Boards were made by the President of the Board of Trade after 
(1) C.A.Oakley who during the war was the Regional Controller for 
Scotland of the Ministry of Aircraft Production was appointed 
in 1946 the Board of Trade Regional Controller for Scotland 
and held that °ffilie untill September 152 when he was succeed- 
ed by A.Young. 
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the 
consultation with the Federation of British Industries, British 
Employers' Confederation and the Trade Union Congress. Repre- 
sentatives of government departments attended- meetings of the 
Boards when matters affecting their departments were discussed. 
Their meetings were held in the regions but chairmen attended con- 
ferences in London for consultation. The members of the Regional 
Boards of Industry were kept in touch with the national industral 
policy by their membership also of the National Production Advisory 
Council for Industry. 
Co- ordination. It was the function of the Panel 'A' of the Board 
of Trade to co- ordinate the work of all the government departments 
concerned with the distribution of industry policy. This panel 
under chairmanship secretary of in 
of the Distribution of Industry and Regional Division, considered 
all the general questions related to industrial location. Cor- 
responding Regional Distribution of Industry Panels have been 
established in the regions under the chairmanship of the Board of 
Trade Regional Controller. Sub -committees which were attached to 
these Regional Boards were concerned with the study of the ge- 
neral needs of the areas and with plans for their long term de- 
velopment. 
the In striai st.tes omanies. In carrying 
out its policy of industrial diversification in the Development 
Areas the Board of Trade co- operated with the government sponsored 
industrial estates companies. The demarcation of functions was not 
clear but broadly speaking the Board of Trade was concerned with 
110 
the general policy of industrial location. The industrial estates 
companies were responsible for the building and mamagement of the 
industrial premises. The Board of Trade nevertheless exercised 
general direction over all the estate companies through the Director. 
of Industrial Estates Companies, attached to the Distribution of 
Industry and Rep;ional Division. He was responsible for the pur- 
chase of land, the clearance of sites, the planning of advance 
factory programmes and for arranging the provision of houses for 
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Chapter 1 . 
Scottish Industrial Estates Ltd. 
The growth of the Scottish Industrial Estates occuz ed in 
two phases. The formative phase was governed by the Special 
rite 
Areas legislation with the emphasis on ,,creation of employment. 
The expansive post -war period was governed by the Development 
Areas legislation with the stress on the distribution of in 
dustry. The repeal of the Special Areas Acts by the Distribut- 
ion of Industry Act had a pronounced effect on the organisation, 
finance, functions and the tenancy of the industrial estates. 
The Scottish Commissioner for the Special Areas started the 
first industrial estate in Scotland at Hillington. A company 
in name Scottish Industrial Estates 
Ltd. A certificate of incorporation was issued dated 14th 
January 1537. The industrial estate grew rapidly. On 3rd lay, 
153., Queen Elizabeth opened the Queen Elizabeth Avenue, which 
is today the central throughfare of the estate. (1) By the time 
the war broke out 103 factories had been built. The development 
of the three other pre -war estates in Scotland was started on 
t#-e behalf of the Special Areas Commissioner by a new company. 
The industrial estates at Carfin, Chapelhall and Larkhall were 
to be managed by the Lanarkshire Industrial Estates Ltd. which 
was incorporated on 30th July 1938. It shared the same 
address as the Scottish Industrial Estates Ltd. The 
(1) The second world war had a considerable effect on the lay- 
out of the estate. The building of the Rolls -Royce Ltd. 
factory altered the architectes conception of the estate. 
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two coáu ^nies developed side by side. After the war the Scottish 
Industrial Estates Ltd. became the Hillington Industrial Estates 
Ltd., while the Lanarkshire Industrial Estates Ltd. assumed the 
discarded name of the Scottish Industrial Estates Ltd.(1) A dis- 
tinction was drawn and maintained between the two companies 
until April 1951 because it was thought to be convenient for 
the organisation of the financial matters.(2) 
The two companies shared the same offices. They were run 
by the same administrative staff, managed by the same board of 
directors, under the same articles and memoranda of association. 
To all intents and purposes the old and the new Scottish In- 
dustrial Estates Ltd. can be regarded as the same organisation 
and from now on will be referred to as the S.I.E.Ltd. except 
on the matters of finance where the distinction is required. 
The S.I.E.Ltd. being a non- profitmaking enterprise is 
registered as a company having no share capital, limited by a 
guarantee. The members of the company are liable up to the 
amount of £1 in the event of its winding up, but they are not 
entitled to any share in the company's assets or income. The 
articles of association provide that the number of members is 
(1) Resolutions were passed to effect these changes on 12th Feb. 
1946. They were approved by the Board of Trade on 26th Feb. 
1946. Certificated were issued in the new names on 5th 
March 1946. Ref. Records, Office of the Registrar of Com- 
panies, Edinburgh. 
(2) Ref. Records, Office of the Registrar of Companies, Edinburgh 
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to be no more than 25, alterable at the discretion of the 
directors who may ask any member to withdraw. Any member is. 
eligible for the directorship but so long as the company owes 
money to the Treasury, the Treasury's solicitor may appoint a 
person, whether he is a member or not, to act as a director. 
There are to be no less than three directors and not more than 
seven. Under the articles of association, one third of the 
directors is due to retire annually, becoming eligible for re- 
election. The directors are empowered to appoint a salaried 
staff consisting of a general manager, his assistants and such 
other persons as he may require to carry out the objectives of 
the company. These objectives are set out at a considerable 
length in the memorandum of association. It confers wide powers 
on the company to provide not only for the needs of industries, 
but also for the workers and animals. S.I.E.Ltd. is empowered 
to build hotels, restaurants, canteens and reading rooms far 
for the workers, and stables for horses. Its primary object 
however is to construct factory buildings on the estates, to 
administer them, and to provide such services as at required by 
their tenants. The S.I.E.Ltd. is also empowered to buy land 
on which factories are to be erected and to lay out gardens to 
surround them, to supply electricity, gas ,steam and water to 
the premises, and to make them accessible by building private 
roads and to facilitate transport generally by land and water(1) 
(1) Until nationalisation of public utilities it was necessary for 
S.I.E.Ltd. to apply for and obtain orders under the Private Le- 
gislation Acts 1899 and 1i33, Electricity Supply Acts 1882 301933 
and Gas Undertakings Acts 1920 &1934, if it wished to supply these 
services. 
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The memorandum of association Jives the company powers to pur- 
chase, construct, hire and lease, tramways, railways, locomotives, 
canals, boats, docks and wharves. 
To finance its expenditure the company may borrow by mort- 
gaging its assets, issuing, drawing, accepting, endorsing, dis- 
counting, and negotiating perpetual and redeemable debentures 
or debenture stock, and bills of exchange. The provision that 
the rate of interest payable by the company may not exceed 5: 
reflects the spirit of the time when the government's policy 
favoured 'cheap money,. 0 i) Any surplus money not im.._ediately 
required, the company may invest as the directors see fit. The 
change in the status of the company from acting as a principal, 
to being an a_ent of the Board of Trade has narrowed the field 
of activity of the company's directors. 
The first board of directors consisted of men, all of whom 
had been on the Scottish Development Council and had been asso- 
ciated with the advocacy and promotion of the Scottish Industrial 
Estates, with the exception of R.C.Simpson. -He was asked to 
become a member of the board of directors of the company to look 
after the Treasury interests. The first directors who were 
appointed by the Secretary of State for Scotland were Sir Steven 
Bilsland (now Lord Bilsland) who became the chairman and has 
continued in that capacity to the present day, h.B.Spens (vice- 
chairman), h..C.hurray, R.G.Simpson, who were respectively a 
solicitor, a chairman of the Union Bank of Scotland, a director 
of the Scottish Co- operative Tholesale Society, and a chartered 
(1) Ch.1 ,p.1E. 
1 t.8 
accountant. (1) 
Organisation. The organisation of the Scottish Industrial Estate 
has changed with the repeal of the Speacial Areas legislation by 
the Distribution of Industry Act 15'45. In the pre -war days the 
company's status was primarily that of a principal, in the post - 
war period it assumed the role of an agent. 
Until the war the S.I.E.Ltd.. managed an estate of some 320 
acres at Hillington in its own name and three small estates 
covering approximately 20 acres in all on thie behalf of the 
Special Area Commissioner. After 1945 when the interest in land 
and buildinggs acquired under the Special Areas Acts were vested 
in the Board of Trade (who also became responsible for future 
industrial development), the S.I.E.Ltd. was invited to act as an 
agent under the direction of the Board of Trade. It was to be 
responsible for the technical work of developing sites, erecting 
buildings and managing estates and individual government financed_ 
factories, By 1952, the S.I.E.Ltd. was administrating estates 
with an area of 1616 acres. 
Under the Distribution of Industry Act 1945, the directors 
of the S.I.E.Ltd. are appointed by the Board of Trade, who also 
has the power to remove them. Since 1945, the size of the board Df 
directors has been increased. The present board consists of Lord 
Bilsland, H.B.Spels, and A.C.itiurray who have been with the company 
(1) Sir W.Goodchild( Secretary of the General Economic Committee 
of the Scottish Council) joined the board of directors of the 
S.I.E.Ltd. in 1i38, when the directors of this company also 
became directors of the newly incorporated Lanarkshire In- 
dustrial Estates Co. 
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from the beginning, and of .P.Brown, R.A.riaclean, A.Kitchell, 
C.Lurdoch, A.D.MacKeller and J.Mclnnes. (1 ) 
A Change also took place in the method of appointment and 
in the status of the administrative personnel. Before 1945 
the final decision rested with the company, since then their 
appointments have been subject to approval by the Board of 
Trade when the proposed salaries exceed E500 a year. As a 
result, officers of the company are neither civil servants 
nor businessmen in the full sense of the word but are expected 
to possess the attributes of both. 
When the company was started, its staff consisted of 
the general manager and a typist working in one room and using 
a typewriter lent by the Scottish Council. (2) By 1952 the 
general manager was assisted by a deputy general manager, se- 
cretary, senior administrative public relations officer and 
seven estate managers who, between them, look after the twenty 
six 
Scottish Industrial Estates and thirty individual site and 
ex- government factories. (3) Work of more technical and rout- 
ine nature is carried out by five departments, namely -building, 
technical maintenance (including a horticultural superintend- 
ent), accounts, legal and letting department, assisted by con- 
sultant firms of architects, surveyors, civil engineers,heat- 
(1) A special resolution was passed o_n 13th July 1948 
altering the articles of association and fixing the 
maximum number of directors at eleven. 
(2) The first general manager was D.S.May, since 1940 the 
office has been held by W.C.Kirkwood. 
(3) S.I.E.Ltd. booklet (1953) tenants listed,p.62 -93. 
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ing and electrical engineers, auditors and solicitors. 
Finance. The pre-war division of the estates into the old S.I.F. 
Ltd. and the Lanarkshire Industrial Estates Ltd. in matters of 
finance was retained after the war until 1951. The Killington 
Industrial Estate Ltd. was kept separate from the new S.I.E.Ltd. 
This distinction was originally drawn because of the two different 
methods of finance of the expenditure on the estates. 
Capital for the purpose of acquiring land and developing 
the industrial estate at Hillington was supolied to the old S.I.L. 
Ltd. by the Special Areas Commissioner for Scotland out of the 
Special Areas Fund placed at his disposal by the Treasury. This 
money had been advanced as a loan under the terms of an agreement 
between the Commissioner and the company dated 15th July 15,37, 
subject to the Special Areas Act (1534) and the security of a 
bond of cash credit secured over the heritable property of the 
company.(1) The property was however to be vested in the S.I.L. 
Ltd. who was to pay, out of the rents collected from tenants, 
interest on the borrowed capital at the rate to be agreed upon 
by the Commissioner and the company but not exceeding 5). No 
payment was to accrue until five years from the date of the 
agreement. 
A different procedure was adopted to finance expenditure 
on the three smaller estates at Carfin, Chapelhall, and Lark- 
(1) The bond of credit was originally for x532,500. When the 
Board of Trade took over the interests acquired by the Com- 
missioners for the Special Areas,-the company's indebtedness 
amounted to 5,994,1"9 (ie. the velue of fixed as ets less 
all lip bilities)_were transfe_ red by the company to the B.of T 
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hall although the reason for this is not clear. Money was 
again provided out of the Special Areas Fund by the Commissioner, 
but was to be spent on his behalf on the estates. The ownership 
of the estates was to be retained by the Commissioner. Lanark- 
shire Industrial Estates Ltd., merely acted as an agent. 
The company was asked to continue the administration of the 
estates at Carfin, Chapelhall and Larkhall, when under the 
Distribution of Industry Act 1945 the Board of Trade took 
over from the Comrkissioner the interests acquired by him in 
land and buildings. Furthermore the company was asked to manage 
such estates as might be built in the Scottish Development Area, 
acting as an agent of the Board of Trade, under the new name 
of the S.I.E.Ltd. Today, such capital as is required by the 
company for the approved objects is provided as, and when needed 
by the Treasury through the Board of Trade under vote 2 of the 
Civil Estimates. The new S.I.E.Ltd. only holds leases of 
buildings and acts as a manager onn com. <<ission basis, paying 
over to the government the net income from the properties. 
The position at Hillington was different, because the old 
S.I.E.Ltd. did not act as an agent but held the properties in 
its own name. Provision was therefore made for the company to 
continue to hold the property seprlrately under the new name of 
-h Killington Industrial Estate Ltd. The capital which had 
been lent to the company by the Commissioner was vested in the 
Board of Trade. The Hillington Industrial Estate Ltd. was to 
122 
pay interest at the rate of 4 ,h, or such rate as might be agreed 
upon, out of the rents it collected, retaining the balance. 
Subsequently the rate was reduced to 26 because of the high cost 
of management. 
The method of finance of the old S.I..Ltd gave it a greater 
degree of autonomy. After the war although the method had not 
been fundamentally altered the Hillington Industrial Estate Ltd. 
could not any longer be regarded as an independent body. There 
seems therefore to have been little point in maintaining until 
1951 the artificial distinction between the old and the new 
S.I.E.Ltd. based on the difference in method and not in the 
source of finance. Money in both cases was supplied by the 
Treasury. No advantages appear to have been gained by keep- 
ing them apart. There were disadvantages in doing so, since 
this practice resulted in additional costs and administrative 
work. There was a duplication of legal expenses, registration 
fees, stampduties,etc. Costs were also increased by the add - 
keep the 
itional labour required to, separate sets of accounts and pre- 
senting the separate annual reports, balance sheets, and in- 
come and expenditure accounts for two board meetings attended 
by the same directors. 
Together with the annual reports, the accounts presented 
at general meetings should give a general picture of the acti- 
vities and finance of a company. The S.I.E.Ltd. presents a ba- 
lance sheet, income and expenditure accounts and since 1946 
Transactions on Behalf of the Board of Trade account. The stat- 
1 2; 
utory requirements have been met. The accounts however are not 
very meaningful as a basis on which to judge the performance of 
the S.I.E.Ltd. It is impossible to form an opinion as to the 
administrative efficiency of the company on the basis of the 
information presented in the Income and Expenditure Accounts. 
Since the form of the company accounts has been laid down by 
the Board of Trade, the item 'Administrative Expenses'has been 
dropped out. Only the figures for publicity expenditure, audit 
fees and pension scheme contributions are available. One 
might have expected to see what commission the S.I.E.Ltd. 
received for the services rendered. This however is npt shown 
in the account called 'Transactions on Behalf of the Board of 
Trade'. 
The reason for the change in the presentation of the bal- 
ance sheet of the S.I.E.Ltd. after 146 can be understood. 
It is none the less regretable. Since the S.I.E.Ltd. became 
an agent of the Board of Trade, neither fixed assets such as 
land and buildings which have been purchased, nor capital, 
represented by advances from the government are shown in the 
balance sheet. Figures which would indicate the value of 
the ex- government factories that the company acquired at 
a nominal price, are also not available. The balance sheet 
only shows current assets and liabilities. It is difficult 
to estimate the value even of those assets as they are shown 
at cost price less depreciation without stating the amount 
of this provision. 
It is therefore impossible by merely looking at the accounts 
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to estimate what is the value of the property managed by the 
S.I.E.Ltd. or to calculate what yield on the invested capital 
the net income represents. A figure of £25m. to £jCm. has been 
suggested as the amount of capital invested in the Scottish 
Industrial Estates. (1) 
Functions of the S.I.E.Ltd. When the Distribution of Industry 
Act 1545 !iras passed the S.I.E.Ltd. lost not only its greater 
autonomy in financial matters. The functions which might be 
out 
carriedAby the company include the choice of sites, the purchase 
and development of sites, the erection of buildings, the pro- 
vision of services, the management of the estates and of in- 
dividual factories and the choice of tenants. 
In theory neither the old S.I.E.Ltd. not the Lanarkshire 
Industrial Estates Ltd. had the authority to chose a site for 
industrial development. Since however the location of an estate 
at Killington was approved by the Special Areas Commissioner on 
the suggestion made by the Scottish Development Council, whose 
members formed the first board of directors of the company, the 
choice of the site was in fact made by the .I.E.Ltd. The sites 
at Carlin, Chapeihall and Larkhall were selected by the Com- 
missioner. In 1::45 tiffe location of Projects became the respon- 
sibility of the ''regional Officer of the Board of Trade, he also 
secures the requisite clearences, makes arrangements with the 
District Valuer and obtains building licences. The functions 
of S.I.E.Ltd are confined to inspection of the site, advice on 
its suitability and the preperation of plans. On the technical 
(1) Private communication by an official of the S.I.E.Ltd. 
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side, that is in construction of buildings, the scope of the 
activities of the company was extended to cover the whole of 
the Development Area. The S.I.E.Ltd. also became reoonsible for 
the conversion of Royal Ordnance Factories to private industrial 
uses, in addition to the administration of the existing estates, 
and for the development of new industrial projects on behalf of 
the Board of Trade. 
The policy of the S.I.E.Ltd. was to build factories of the 
standard type, as there is a number of advantages to be derived 
from standardisation. There is economy in planning the layout 
of the estates and of factories. Building costs are reduced and 
maintenance work, repairs and the supply of such communal services 
as process steam is facilitated. As the S.I.E.Ltd. caters for 
light e.nineering industries, it is possible to design standard 
factories which would be suitable (without major alterations) 
for most firms in this category. Thus already made, factory 
can be offered with immediate occupation which is a strong in- 
centive to firms to come to the estates. should one firm leave, 
another can move in without expensive alterations being necessary. 
If their cost had to be borne by a firm it would make it more 
difficult to start an undertaking, and would also be a .eterent 
to its establishment in the new location. If the costs were paid 
by the S.I.E.Ltd. the amount would represent a loss to the com- 
-lhe 
pany. Provision of standard factories is therefore in the in- 
terest of both parties. 
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To meet so far aä possible the varying needs of different 
firms, the S.I.E.Ltd. has adopted four types of standard fa- 
ctories. 
(1) The 'Nest type factory of 1400 sq.ft. floor area, is as 
the name suggests, intended for small businesses. 
(2) The 'A' type factory isalarger unit of 5150 sq. ft. 
floor area. 
(3) The ,L, type factory is similar in size to the 'A' 
type but with the north -light roof construction. 
(4) The 'i n ineering Block' is designed for a heavier type 
of production. It is the largest of all the types of 
factories having a floor area of 4: -6ú,0e, sq. ft. 
In all factories there are offices in the front of the building 
and yards at the back. The exceptions are the 'nest' factories 
which have no open air storage facilities. All factories are 
so designed as to enable expansion of the premises to be carried 
out if required. The first three types of factories are usually 
built in blocks of four units and their construction allows.,add- 
ition of further units on each side and of an upper floor over 
the front section of the building. The ?Engineering Blocks' 
are self contained and are usually located on sites with a con- 
siderable free area around them for storage of more bulky ma- 
terials, but which can be utilised for building expansion if 
required. When however, a firm has grown rapidly it may be 
simpler to move to a different factory on the same estate or 
on another estate, than to ervect additional units. 
It has nevertheless been realised that although standard 
factories are genarally suitable, small alterations may be re- 
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quired because of the methods of production or to increase the 
welfare of the personnel. For example, a number of foreign firms 
having come from warmer climates have asked for additional plugs 
o 
for electric heaters. No alterations can be carriedAby tenants 
themselves, but on application the S.I.E.Ltd. may be prepared 
to carry them out. The cost is charged to the tenants who may 
either reimburse the company by immediate payment of a lump sum 
or by instalments. If a prospective tenant can not be convenient- 
ly accomodated in any one of the standard buildings, the S.I.E. 
Ltd. may agree to build a factory according to specifications of 
the client either on an estate or on an individual site. The 
rent charged for such premises 'made to measure', is of course 
higher. Recently the trend was away from the standard factories. 
Premises of the non - standard type have also been offered by the 
company on conversion of Royal Ordenance factories into estates. 
Transference of these factories to the S.I.E.Ltd. has been ad- 
vantageous to the company as almost immediate occupation could 
be offered to prospective tenants. Research has shown that this 
was an important factor in the location of firms in the post -war 
hand 
period. (1) On the otherAthere were some disadvantages. The 
Royal OrdOnance factories were sited for security and not for 
industrial convenience, therefore considerable work and expense 
was involved in conversion to an industrial estate. The rent 
charged for these factories in no way reflected their cost on 
convesion. It is difficult therefore to determine whether the 
(1) Ch.15 p.274 
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transference of the Royal Ordnance factories to the S.I.E.Ltd. 
was economically sound. 
'Services. .Besides the advantages o± low rentals, firms on the 
estates benefit from the communal services provided by the S.I.E. 
Ltd. These services, for a lack of better name, may be labelled 
'industrial' services and 'welfare'services. Tenants both on 
the estates and on the individual sites benefit equally from the 
former. Generally water, gas and electricity are brought to all 
the factories. The S.I.E.Ltd. has secured the supply of these 
services for its tenants by giving a guarantee for minimum 
consumption to the public utilities cmncerned. At Hillington 
process steam is supplied by the S.I.E.Ltd. 
Important as the industrial services are, it is perhaps the 
welfare services that deserve special attention. Because they 
do not yield a direct financial return, they aré less likely to 
be provided by a commercial undertaking than by a non - profit 
making organisation such as the S.I.E.Ltd. 
The policy of the S.I.E.Ltd. has been not only to build 
modern, well designed factories, but also provide them with 
pleasant surroundings which are increasingly appreciated by em- 
ployers. (1) In front of each factory there are flower beds.Lawns 
separate buildings and trees are planted along the avenues. The 
company looks after the gardens and also after the exterior paint 
work of the factories. The fresh green paint blends well with the 
(1) Chem. and Ind. vol. , 17 Sbpt . 1 ¡55 , p. 1 1 ¡6 . 
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almost rural surroundings. 
Catering by the S.I.E.Ltd. is perhaps the most important 
of the welfare services. 1J ,ïeals for workers are provided by 
the catering department of the company which is not run for 
profit. Such surpluses as are made in one period are passed 
on to the workers in lower prices in the next. Because of the 
restrictions on the non - essential post -war building, only three 
permanent cantten buildings were erected at Killington, (::;ueenslie 
and the Vale of Leven estates..On the other estates temporarily 
converted buildings serve as canteens. The cñ.teens are available 
in the evenings for recreational purposes. The S.I.E.Ltd. has 
provided playing fields for outdoor sports whenever possible. 
At illin ,ton the company has equip, r ed a first aid room and a 
full -time nurse is employed. Services of visiting doctors and 
nurses have also been secured. 
The S.I.B.Ltd. does not limit itself to looking after the 
needs of its tenants' employees only when they are on the estates 
during their working hours. It also facilitates travelling by 
making arrangements with local transport authorities. When 
possible it sponsors applications to the Board of Trade for 
both government financed managerial houses and for the local 
authority houses allotted on the recommendation of the Board of 
Trade to key workers. (2) 
Rents. Factories with all these services are mane available 
(1) Ch. 15 p. 2%`'. 
(2) Ch. 11 p.157. 
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at low rentals ranging from 10d. to 1 /5',,_d. per sq. ft. Since 
1945 the company as the agent of the Board of Trade, collects 
rents, but is not responsible for fixing them. The S.I.E.Ltd. 
merely notifies the Valuation Department of the local authorities 
concerned of the prpposed tenancy and supplies, - 
(1) plan of the site, 
(2) rough idea of the cost of construction of the factory, 
(5) general terms of the lease, 
(4) any extras. 
The industrial valuer fixes the rent on the basis of the infor- 
mation received taking into account the locality, the type , and 
the size of the factory. He notifies the Board of Trade of his 
assessment. 
The rentals however did not represent an economic rent as 
they were calculated untili recently on the 19,59 basis. The 
subsidy was further,by a rent rebate. It is still given for 
the first three to five years of tenancy. The rebate is on 
a diminishing scale, in the first year, 20) in the second and 
10 in the third and subsequent years. But the rentals have now 
been revised and represent a more economic rent. 
The contract. The contract stating the terms of the lease 
is drawn between the S.I.E.Ltd. and the tenant. A lease is 
normally for ten years, without a break, or for twenty one years 
with the possibility of a break by either party at the seventh 
and fourteenth year. In exceptional circumstance the company 
will release a tenant before the contract expires provided that 
another tenant is found. 
Choice of tenants. Since 1;-45 the S.I.b.Ltd. has no power 
to chose its tenants. Under the Distribution of Industry Act 
1945 the final decisionselection of tenants rests with the 
Board of Trade who is responsible for the 'proper, distribution 
of industry. The success of an application for a factory de- 
pends on the ability of a firm to satisfy the requirements laid 
laid_ down by the Board of Trade. (1) It may however be question- 
ed whether these requimrents dictated perhaps more by the national 
than by local needs have not, at times, been detrimental to the 
regional interests as emphasis changed from employment potential, 
to export capacity and finally to rearmament contribution. It 
remains to be seen whether firms in the new light engineering 
industry largely depending on foreign orders will not be as vul- 
nerable to unemployment in the event of a recession as the heavy 
industries have been. It is equally difficult to foresee when 
the rearmament contracts come to an end,what will be the employ- 
ment position in the new industries on the estates which have 
been allocated factories on the basis of their contribution to 
the rearmament programme. In addition to the change in priori- 
ties there has also been a change in policy with respect to the 
size of the tenant which may also affect the employment level.(`?) 
VIithin the limits imposed by the national priorities the Board 
of Trade, with the co- operation of the S.I . r ."Ltd. tries to ensure 
(1) Ch. 13p. 188, 
(2) Ch. 1310. 1;ï=,, and p.19E. 
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that the most suitable firms from the point of view of the 
Scottish Development Area will come to the estates. The chòiee 
of a tenant is made on the basis of information which is given 
by an applicant in answer to an elaborate questionnaire. Quest- 
ions can be grouped under five headings, dealing in turn with 
financial resources of the firm, reasons for needing a factory, 
labour requirements,(showing initial and potential employment), 
raw materials needed, products and markets. 
The application together with a copy of the balance sheet, 
in the case of an established firm, or if it is a new one, a 
banker's reference is sent to the Board of Trade or the 
The application is later forwarded to the Regional Distribution 
of Industry Panel. It is examined in the light of the national 
the 
priorities, ̂ regional needs, and the integrity and the requirement 
of the firm. The Panel is under the chairmanship of the Regional 
Controller of the Board of Trade and its members consist of the 
representatives of the Ministries of Labour, Supply, Works, Town 
and Country Planning, Admirality, and inaconsultive capacity, a 
representative of the S.I.E.Ltd. is present at the meetings. 
Regional officers of the Ministries of Agriculture and Fisheries, 
Food, Fuel and Power, and Transport are also .notifird of the 
proceedings and may attend if theywish.(1) The decision of the 
Regional Distribution of Industry Panel is invariably operative 
(1) The membership of the Panel given here is as in 15'52. Sua - 
sequently it has changed with the change in the Ministries. 
but is sent for a formal approval to Panel A at the Board_ of 
Trade headgarters. Once the approval has been given the S.I.E. 
Ltd. proceeds to complete the legal formalities to enable the 
tenant to take im:,- ed_iate possession of a factory if a building 
is vacant, or to start construction. 
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Chapter . 
The Scottish Industrial Estates. 
The outsider can only speculate on the extent to which the 
changing economic conditions have so far dictated the location, 
developLrient and management policy of the government-sponsored 
industrial estates. 
All the areas desi,.nated as the Development Areas are con- 
sidered to be in need of new industries either because of over- 
dependence on a small number of industries or because of lack of 
industrial development generally. Within the areas themselves, 
however, the need for industrial diversification varies with the 
size of unemployment pockets and the degree of vuerability to 
unemployment of particular places because of their exceptionally 
precarious industrial structure. But, since in an economically 
integrated region, such as the Development Areas, a change in the 
employment level in one district will lead to repercussions on 
the whole area, the location of the industrial estates is of 
crucial importance in the p isuit of a policy which has as its 
object the achievement and rnaint finance of a high level of em- 
ployment. There can not, of course, be an all embracing definit- 
ion of a Proper location, but broadly speaking it should fulfil 
two conditions. First, from the point of view of the local com- 
munity, an industrial estate should be located so as to bring 
new industries where unemployment or the danger of it is at its 
greatest. Secoud,twlocation, should be such as to satisfy indus- 
i >5 
tIi`cL1iStST requirementsfor labour, basic services, accessibility 
to markets for raw materials and for finished products, and 
amenities, 
Location of the Scottish Industrial estates. The Scottish 
Development Area, although not officially so divided, falls into 
three distinct areas each with its particular characteristics, 
which for convenience we may label Development Areas I, II and 
III. (1) 
The oldest and the largest in area is the South West Area 
,which originally had been designated as the Special Area because 
of its over -dependence on the heavy industries. Its boundries, 
apart from the inclusion of Glasgow, have been little altered 
since 1i34. This area in its turn can be sub -divided into 
Lanarkshire where the two main industries were coalmining and 
iron and steel, Dunbartonshire West and Renfrewshire whose 
economy was dominated by shipbuilding and ancillary engineering 
industries, and finally, the least industrialised of them all, 
that part of Ayrshire lying in the Development Area. (2) The 
'second' Development Area is of more recent origin. It was 
in 1;45 
designated as suchAand consts only of the jute city of Dundee. 
TherthirdT the Inverness -shire area, is the latest addition, 
which was made in 1949 because of the need for industrial de- 
velopment in the Scottish Highlands. 
(1) a.p 1. p.il. 
(2) In Renfrewshire at Paisley the t` 'ead industry isa\importance. 
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By December 1952 there were 20 industrial estates located 
through out the Scottish Development 'Areas' with the exception 
of the Highland region. (1) 
Location. iiuinber of Estates. Name of Estates. 
I. Ayrshire 2 Kilmarnock, Kilwinning, 
Dumbartonshire 
(West) 1 Vale of Leven, 
Glasgow 5 Carntyne, Craigton , North 
Cardonald, Queenslie, Thorn - 
liebank, 
Lanarkshire 7 Blantyre, Carlin, Chapelhall, 
Coatoridge, East Kilbride, 
Larkhall, Newhouse, 
Renfrewshire j Cairds , Fillington,Fort al 
gow, 
H. Dundee 2 Craigie, Dundee, 
As it has been impossible to obtain from official sources 
the reasons for the siting all the estates, such reasons as 
are suggested here should be regarded merely as conjectures. 
They may not have been historically important reasons for the 
choice of sites. 
Fre -war Industrial Estates. The emphasis place upon the various 
location factors before 1939 differed from those after 1945. 
The primary consideration in the location of the pre -war estates 
-Hillington, Carlin, Chapelhall and Larkhall- was the level of 
unemployment among men who were formerly employed in the coal- 
mining, iron and steel, and shipbuilding industries. 
The first Scottish Industrial Estate was sited at 1-illing- 
ton in the Clyde Valley, where the heavy industries were con- 
centrated and where the unemployment reached the highest levels 
(i) Hap 2.p.151. 
1)Ì 
during the depression of the 1 ;)0,s. (1) The Hillington Estate, 
although lying in Renfrewshire, was only separated by a road 
from Glasgow where a high percentage of the insured population 
was out of work. Industrialists therefore coming to the estate 
could draw labour from a wide area. (2) Carfin, Chapelhall and 
Larkhal.l estates, all of which lay in the Lanarkshire coalfield , 
were located there in order to bring new industries to the area. 
The main local industry began to disappear as coal became gra- 
dually exhausted_ or level were reached which could not be eco- 
nomically exploited_. Pits had to be abandoned, leaving the 
mining communities without alternative means of earning their 
living. A few of the .miners were transferred. Some without 
much success sought employment in the iron and steel industries 
of the, neighbouring towns of Motherwell and Coatbridge. 
remained and continued to be unemployed until the new industries 
coming to the industrial estates began to create employment. 
Change in economic conditions and the emphasis of the employment 
policy. The changed economic conditions after the second world 
war altered the nature of the employment problem. The employ- 
ment capacity of the heavy industries which expanded during the 
war continued to be maintained at a high level. It was higher 
than the mere figures of employed workers suggest because pro- 
duction after the war was curtailed both by manpower and raw 
(1) Table 14p. 22) . 
(2) Glasgow was not included in the Special Area. Government 
financed factories could not have been built within the city 




The manpower shortage was the máin problem of the coalmining 
industry. Although the demand for coal expanded, the number of 
wage earners on the colliery books in 1946 was only 79,100 comp- 
ared with 89,940 in 1938. There was a number of reasons for this 
decrease in the labour force. Some miners emigrated and some 
managed to find work in other industries because in the 1920Ts 
and 1930's the prospects of re- employment in the coalmining in- 
dustry were small. There was also a natural decrease caused by 
retirement. At the same time the number of new entrants into 
the industry fell. With the increased number of jobs available, 
there was little incentive for the younger men to follow a hard 
and dangerous occupation which had proved unrewarding to the 
older generation. The large pre -war surplus of miners disappear- 
ed. Instead, it was necessary to seek additional manpower for 
the industry by means of special deferment and releases from the 
armed forces, improved conditions of employment, better training 
facilities, and priority in the housing programme. Even workers 
from abroad were brought in to relieve the local shortage of 
labour, as the demand for coal continued to outstrip the supply. 
Similarly the iron and steel industries prospered. The out- 
put of steel was maintained at a high level although it fluctuat- 
ed because of shortages of raw materials, in particular of scrap. 
The demand continued to exeed the supply to such an extent that 
a statutory iron and steel distribution scheme which had been 
operated after the war until 1950 had to be reintroduced in 1;52 
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both for alloy and non -alloy iron and steel. There was a par- 
ticularly acute shortage of the heavy and medium plate used for 
shipbuilding and ship -repairing. 
The cancellation of warship orders did not reduce the act- 
ivity of the Scottish yards but made room for merchant vessel 
building, ship converting, and repairing. The capacity of the 
yards was fully occupied and orders in hand and in prospect were 
expected to keep them busy for several years to come. Long 
delivery dates indicated the pressure of work. But although in 
1948 there was an increased demand for tankers, the rate of new 
orders began to decline. In the following year there was a sharp 
drop and the operative labour force had to be reduced. With the 
outbreak of hostilities in Kprea orders began to flow in, order 
books became full again and a shortage of skilled workers, par- 
ticularly of shipwrí,-;hts, joiners and plumbers reappeared. 
Although the basic industries in Scotland were prosperous 
and the level of unemployment was reduced to the point where the 
heavy industries experienced a shortage of skilled labour the 
government pursued a policy of bringing new industries to the 
Scottish Development Area. There was a need for new industries - 
(1) to provide alternative light employment for men un- 
suitable for,or unwilling to work in the heavy industries 
(2) to reduce underemployment among women, 
(3) to safeguard against widespread unemployment should the 
heavy industries become depressed, 
(4) to take the place of the disappearing coalmining in- 
dustry in the South West of Scotland. 
The level of employment in the Scottish Development Area 
as a whole,was not as high as it might have been. There was a 
pool of unemployed workers, although as has. already been said 
14u 
the heavy industries found it difficult to get workers of the 
type required. This phenomena can be explained by the fact that 
the heavy industries required men who were highly skilled and 
ph:r.sically robu,st. The unemployed workers did not meet these 
requirements, but were suitable for semi or unkilled and lighter 
work. The solution, therefore, to this problem of unemployment 
was the introduction of new light industries. 
i_oreover these industries brought employment for women for 
whom there had been little opportunity for work apart from domes- 
tic service and the distributive trades in a region where the mail 
the 
industries were coalmining, iron and steel and,shipbuildin,g in- 
dustries. Until recently little attention was paid to the pro - 
blem of employment of women, partly because the extent of un- 
emnloyment among them was concealed by the fact that many did 
not register for work since there was no prospect of getting 
jobs locally. Even had the Ministry of Labour returns showed a 
higher percentage of unemployment among women probably little 
would have been done. Provision of work for the men who were the 
family breadwinners was of primary importance. During and after 
the war it was necessary to utilise all the available human and 
material resources. Greater employment opportunities for women 
were created and unemployment among them was reduced. There was 
also a need for new industries to diversify the industrial struct- 
ure of the Scottish Development Area as a safeguard against 
widespread unemployment in the future. Although after the war 
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the heavy industries operated in boom conditions, the demand 
for shipbuilding had already showed signs of flagging.(1'here 
44- could not be a guarantée that the heavy industries would again 
become depressed. 
Furthermore, new i nd astris were required to maintain employ- 
ment in the South ',pest of Scotland as the coalmining there began 
to contract. Some of the coal deposits were exhausted and the 
uneconomic pits were closed . The National Coal Board antici- 
pated a decline in output of the whole of the central area. (2) 
A particularly large drop was expected in the Lanarkshire coal - 
field.(5) 
Post -war Industrial Estates. 
(I) Lanarkshire coalfield. As more and more pits in the South 
West coalfield had to be abandoned the numbers of redundant 
(4) 
miners increased. Their reluctance to be transfer2kelswhere 
intensified the need to bring new industries to the area, parti- 
cularly to Lanarkshire where the percentage of closures was 
highest . (5) In 1945 construction was started on the Newhouse 
(1) In 1946 the government set up a Shipbuilding Advisory Com- 
mitee consisting of representatives of shipbuilders, ship- 
owners, shipbuilding Trade Unions and sea going officers and 
men to advise on the stability of the industry. Estimates of 
the employment capacity were within the terms of reference of 
the Commitee. 
(2) National Coal Board,'Plan for Coal 19501 , (1950) 
()) The Report of the Scottish Coalfields Committee, Cmd. 6575 
(1944). 
(4) Table 6 p. 144. 
(5) The reluctance of miners to be transferred was discussed in 
Miss H.Heughen's report, Pit Closures at Shótts and the 
Migration of Miners, Edinburgh University, 1953. 
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Estate, located halfway between the pre -war estates of Chapelhall 
and Carfin at a site within easy reach of a number of scattered 
mining communities. The Blantyre Estate which began to be built 
in 15,46 adjoins a mine still in working order, but the other 
surrounding pits had already been aband6ned. In 147 the third 
of the post-war Lanarkshire estates was started at Coatbridge. 
(II) East - .ilbride, New town. The East Kilbride Estate which 
is one of the two newest of the Scottish Industrial Estates - 
work on it was began in 1 951 - is unlike the other Lanarkshire 
industrial estates. Indeed, it is unlike all the other Scottish 
industrial estates because it was not intended to bring employ - 
ment to a community where many were out of work or to safeguard 
it from unemployment. There was no sizeable community. The 
estate is being developed in conjunction with the building of 
the new town of East Kilbride in accordance with the long term 
policy of planned dispersal of industry and the industrial po- 
pulation. The new town is intended to reduce the congestion in 
Glasgow. 
(III) Glasgow, Old city. The building of the estates within the 
city boundry of Glasgow may therefore seem somewhat contradictory 
when the further growth of industrial centres is officially dis- 
couraged. Before the war, there was heavy unemployment in 
Glasgow, which might have justified the erection of government 
financed factories, but then the city was excluded from the 
Special Areas, After the war, when there was little unemploy- 
ment it was included in the Development Area. This made it 
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possible to extend the Millington Estate into Glasgow by build- 
ing the North Cardonald Estate, to begin construction of the 
new estates of Qeenslie and Carntyne in 1946, of Thornliebank 
in the following year, and to convert the former Cardonald 
Ordnance Factory into the Craigton Industrial Estate. Since 
neither the desire to encourage the further growth of Glasgow, 
nor the existence of heavy unemployment within the city could 
have been the motive for building of the five estates, a possible 
explanation is that there was a need to provide additional floor 
space for the local firms. ,;:any of them have prospered during 
the recent years and wished to expand production(without necessar- 
ily requiring more labour) , unless they were able to get larger 
premises locally some might have left Glasgow, thereby reducing 
employment within the city while the surplus workers could not 
have been easily transferred somewhere else. Thus the building 
of the Glasgow estates may perhaps be regarded as a measure to 
safeguard against unemployment brought about by the prosperity 
of the Glasgow firms and the physical limits to expansion within 
the existing premises. A large number of firms of local origin 
on the Glasgow estates may be taken as a confirmation of this 
hypot.lesis . 
(Iv) West Dunbartonshire and Renfrewshire. It was also to safe- 
guard against the danger of unemployment that three estates, one 
in West Dunbartonshire and two in Renfrewshire, were established. 
These were located in places particularly vulnerable to wide- 
spread unemployment in the event of depression of the shipnuild- 
Table 6 . 
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Closure and Openings of Pits or Surface Drift Mines 
in the South West Scottish Coalfield. 
Year Closed Opened 
Area Number Manpower 
Redundancy 
Area Number 
1947 Lanarkshire 109 Lanarkshire 2 
Ayrshire 1 
1948 Lanarkshire 5 85 Lanarkshire 1 
North Ayrshire 1 10 Ayrshire 1 
1949 Lanarkshire 10 289 Lanarkshire 1 
Dunbartonshire 1 6 Ayrshire 1 
1950 Lanarkshire 5 67 Lanarkshire 1 
North Ayrshire 2 69 
1951 Lanarkshire 4 70 Lanarkshire 1 
1952 Lanarkshire 1 15 Lanarkshire 1 
Total 32 720 10 
Source, National Coal Board, 
records. 
ing industry on which they largely depende for prosperity. 
The long term prospects of this industry were uncertain. The 
industrial structure of the two areas had to be diversified to 
protect the local communities from the dangers resulting from 
over-dependence on the ship yards for employment. Furthermore 
the need to provide lighter and less skilled work for men and 
more employment for women had been felt for some time. 
In 14() construction was begun in `:Nest Dunbartonshire of 
the Vale of Leven Estate located in the picturesque grounds of 
the historic ;trethleven mansion House, in a loop of the River 
Leven, opposite the town of Renton lying between Alexandria and 
Dunbarton. The latter is the largest town in the district and 
11 
is renoled for its shipbuilding and ancillary engineering in- 
dustries. These provide the main source of employment for the 
inhabitants of Dunbarton and the neighbouring towns. Although 
there is a number of cotton printing, bleaching and dye works 
at Alexandria and Renton, they are too small and the textile 
trade too much subject to fluctuations in prosperity to counter- 
balance the overdependence of the area on shipbuilding and to 
ensure a greater degree of economic stability. 
On the opposite side of the River Clyde the towns of Port 
Glasgow and Greenock in Renfrewshire were even more dependent 
on shipbuilding. Their two other long established industries, 
rope making and sugar refining had not grown sufficiently to 
prevent the one sided development of 'both towns. The associat- 
ion of Port Glasgow and Greenock with the shipbuilding industry 
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developed as a result of their geographical position. Because 
of the sandy shallows in the river, few ships sailed beyond 
Greenock, which consequently grew as a port, as did the adjacent 
harbour of Port Glasgow. There the quantity of goods handled 
increased rapidly until it became by the middle of the 19th cen- 
tury, as its very name indicates, the port for Glasgow. But 
when the River Clyde was dredged so as to admit the largest ships 
right up to the Glasgow docks, the importance of Port Glasgow 
and Greenock as ports declined. The shipbuilding industry, how- 
ever,of both went on growing and became the main industry of 
both. The vulnerability of Port Glasgow and Greenock to wide- 
spread unemployment when the shipbuilding industry was depressed 
was clearly shown in 1932. In Port Glasgow and in Greenock 
44,E of the insured labour was out of work. It was feared that 
after the second world war there might follow a decline in the 
activity of the yards such as there was after the first. In 
1946 construction of an industrial estate was begin in Port 
Glasgow to diversify its industrial structure. Five years later 
at the time when prospects of the shipbuilding industry were 
causing anxiety, construction of the Cairds Estate was started. 
The site, symbolically or perhaps rather ironically, is that 
of a former shipbuilding yard. 
(V) North Ayrshire. New industries were required in that part 
of North Ayrshire which was scheduled as a Development Area not 
so much to correct an unbalanced industrial developuent, as 
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because there was little industrial development. Disti11ifig, 
shoemaking, carpet weaving, and light engineering provided a 
considerable variety of industries but not enough industrial 
employment. Ayrshire was predominantly an agricultural area, 
famous for its breed of cattle. There was some coalmining but 
a number of pits in the Kilmarnock area had to be abandoned.(1) 
The kilwinning Industrial Estate was established in 1946, The 
Kilmarnock Industrial Estate was started in 1947. Factories on 
the latter were already in production when a number of pits 
in the neighbourhood of Kilmarnock had to be closed because 
coal could no longer be mined economically. 
The South WestScotland forms a closely integrated economic 
unit with its coalmining, iron and 'steel, shipbuilding and an- 
cillary engineering industries. Any change in the activity of 
Q 
one of these, ornintroduction of new industries toaparticular 
place has repercusions on the employment level of the whole area 
The position of the 'second Development Area' is however, differ. 
ent in this respect. 
(b) Dundee. The city of Dundee, separated by two rivers from the 
industrial centre of Scotland, is an isolated and artificial 
pocket of industry. The main industry whiòh is jute, came to 
Dundee by chance. The town had grown around the harbour us the 
importance of the port for traders with the Scandinavian and 
Baltic countries increased. Flax imported from them led to the 
development of the stilmaking industry. But the advent of steam 
put an end to the prosperity of the flax mills. Some 120 rears 
(1) Table 6,p.144. 
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ago, when they began to close down, two Dundonians sent home for 
testing and experiments a new fibre which they had come across 
in India. This was the begining of the jute industry in Dundee. 
The town later became the centre of jute manufacture in Britain. 
As the jute industry expanded in Dundee it became the main in- 
dustry of the city which came to depend on jute for its prosper- 
ity. For many years the industry prospered. Dundee grew wealthy 
and became the third largest city of Scotland. Then as a result 
of the inter -war slump, the jute industry was depressed. By 1932 
over 5C of the insured population was out of work. The second 
war brought a revival of demand. Since 1i39 the industry has 
enjoyed government protection. But difficulties in importing 
jute and consequent shortages kept production down. Even oy 
1945 the labour force was about one third of what it was in 1929. 
The end of the war was expected to ease the conditions of supply, 
wnile the demand for the products of the jute industry promised 
to remain high. The post -war prospects of the industry would 
therefore not have caused concern but for political factors 
abroad over which the British government had little control but 
which threatened the future of the jute industry in Dundee. 
Pakistan grows most of the jute purchased by Dundee. India has 
the mills and docks from which jute is sent to Britain. The 
establishment of the two as separate states, the initial friction 
between them and the desire of each one to develop its own jute 
industry made the future of the Dundee jute industry uncertain. 
But even had it been more assured, Dundee stood in need of in- 
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d.ustrial diversification to give it a ::.ore balanced economy. 
The first industrial estate, the Dundee Estate was established 
in 1916. ';Work on the second was started in the following year 
when a former government factory was converted into the Craigie 
Estate. 
Feasibility and cost of location. Only the desirability of 
bringing new industries to certain areas has so far been con- 
sidered. But although new industries may be required in par- 
ticular places, unless suitable sites are available , location 
there of industrial estates may not be feasible. Thus while 
new industries are badly needed in the old coalfields, it is 
precisely there, on account of the former mining activity, that 
the ;round is often unsuitable for factory building because of 
the danger of subsidence. There is a relationship between the 
cost of building and the quality of land . Onabad site the cost 
may be prohibitive. Land good for building is usually also shit - 
able for farming. So far the government's policy has been to 
refrain from turning rich arable land over to industrial uses. 
Thus the desirability and feasability of location and the 
cheapness of construction do not necessarily go hand in hand. 
Since no information is available about the alternative sites 
considered for the twenty Scottish Industrial Estates, and as 
no figures can be obtained to show the capital outlay in each 
t',QL 
case, it is impossible to discover to what extent,location of 
the estates was determined by the desirability of new industries 
in particular places and to what extent it was i-ifluenced by 
the cost factor. 
General Develo ,<<ent as at ist Dece.nb e r 
industrial Estates Acrea e lárea built iumber of 
or buil4in:=: tenants ( 1 ) 
5.i . f=et in 
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Scottish Industrial Estates vis -a -vis industrialists' loc- 
ation requirements. 
There are so far no industrial estates in the 'third' 
Development Area, although new industries and needed in the 
highlands, around Inverness. Considerable unemployment and 
under - employment exi is and the government is willing to build- 
factories. The question of why then, no industrial estates were 
started in Inverness and its neighbourhood leads to the con- 
sideration of the third main location factor, namely the satis- 
faction of industrialists, requirements. New industries may be 
desirable in certain places and the construction of industrial 
estates there is feasible, but unless industrialists are will- 
ing to move to the estates, assuming that no compulsion is ex- 
ercised, no industrial development will take place. Consequently 
the building of , overnment factories for renting, when prospect- 
ive tenants were not forthcoming, would have been a waste of the 
national resources. Industrial Estates Copanies)therei'of'e,to 
be successfml in attracting firms to the estates. have to be 
built not only where there is a need for new industries but also 
where the sites are most likely to satisfy the main location 
requirements of the industrialists. These have already been 
listed and have now to be considered, with reference to Scot- 
land, before proceeding to a more detailed study of locàtion 
factors on the basis of a sample study of firms on the Scottish 
Industrial Estates. 
153 
Many of the firms came because they were steered by the 
Board of Trade to a Developuient Area. The South West of Scot- 
land and Dundee were areas where the location of new under- 
takings was officially encouraged. The growth of the Scott- 
ish Industrial Estates was therefore artificially stimulated. 
In this section factors will be considered which might 
have influenced the choice of a location by a board of directors 
of a firm operating under no restrictive conditions. The 
weight attached to the location requirements varies with in- 
dustries, individual firms within the industries, and with 
the changing economic conditions. There are, however, some 
requirements which are conion to most industrial firms at 
most times. 
(a) Premises. The availability of suitable premises on rental 
basis ranked high among the industrialists' requirements in the 
pre -war days.(1) It was with this in view, when the policy of 
creating employment in the Special Areas through diversificat- 
ion of their industrial structure was undertaken, that the 
Industrial Estates Companies were formed. Their object was 
to build in the Special Areas factories which were to be made 
available on lease. Economic conditions have changed but 
factories for renting are still in demand.(2) The Scottish 
Industrial Estates, of their very nature, satisfy the demand for 
(1) Ch.6.p.86. 
(2) Ch.15.p.274 and p.278. 
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premises available onarental basis. Whether they are regarded 
as suitable depends on the interpretation of the word. Broadly 
speaking premises are suitable if theysatisfy the location re- 
quirements generally. In the narrow sense used in this context, 
what is meant is the convenience of the factory layout for pro- 
duction by the tenant firms. To ensure the maximum suitability 
the Scottish Industrial Estates Company provides four different 
types of standard factories, which can further be adapted for 
tenants by minor alterations. Also if required and necessary, 
the S.I.E.Ltd. builds factories according to the tenants, spe- 
cifications. 
(b) Labour. Firms moving to the Scottish Industrial Estates 
were not faced withascarcity of labour since industrial estates 
as a matter of policy were located where there was unemployment 
or under- employment or both. This did not necessarily mean 
that none of them experienced difficulty in finding skilled 
labour of the type required. 
It is impossible to esti:aate with any degree of accuracy 
the labour pool from which firms on any one particular estate 
recruit their workers. Factories on the Scottish Industrial 
Estates draw workers from a fairly wide and to a large extent 
common area. Some indication of the labour supply available 
can be obtained from the unemployment figures for the areas 
within which the industrial estates have been located.(1) The 
number of estates located in the areas has been in relation to 
(1) Table 25 p. >-AC 
§J 
the magnitude of unemployment. The level of unemployment was 
highest in Glasgow (with East Duribartonshire); 12 out of the 
20 Scottish Industrial Estates were located there. Then in 
order of magnitude of unemployment came Renfreshire, Dundee, 
Ayrshire (North and Central) and Dunbartonshire( !,';test) with 
2, 2, 2,r1 industrial estates respectively. At tnis stage no 
attempt is made to interpret such changes in the supply of labour 
as have taken place. Only facts are presented. Between 1 )2 and 
1952 the above order of unemployment was maintained with the 
exception of 1952 when Dundee ranked second. (1) The regional 
pattern of unemployment among women differed considerably before 
and after the war. From 1 )2 until 19)C the number of unemployed 
in the order of magnitude was, Glasgow (with East Duribartonshire) 
Dundee, Lanarkshire, Renfrewshire, Ayrshire (North and Central) 
and Dunbartonshire ;pest) . From 146 onwards apart from Glasgow 
being first and (until 1ï:52) Lanarkshire second, there was no 
consistent trend in the sub- areas. 
do.d. 
For the whole of Scotland,only in 1952,the number of un- 
employed women ,expressed as a percentage of all the insured 
female labour,exceede-d the comparable percentage for men. In 
Dundee alone the percentage of unemployed women was higher than 
that for men before the war, and on the average after it. Since 
1946 in the whole of the Scottish Development Area, at one time 
or another the percentage of unemployed women exéeded that of 
men. A firm coining to any one of the Scottish Industrial Estates 
(1) 1 ;) , is the earliest year for which seperate figures for 
and women could be obtained. 
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had a good chance of getting botn the male and female labour 
required. 
Some of the industrialists,however, did not find locally 
all the skilled workers they needed. In a region (excluding 
Dundee), dominated by the heavy industries, 'factory condition- 
ed' workers with experience of work i_i the light industries 
were relatively few. The Board of Trade offered grants toco n- 
pensate firms employing inexperienced labour. (1) But to start 
-production a nucleus of skilled workers had to be brought in. 
There were however two main obstacles to their transfer, the 
cost of removal that had to be borne by the workers and a lack 
of accomodation near the industrial estates. Recognising these 
difficulties and the importance the 
ment took steps to facilitate the transfer. Payments could be 
made towards the cost of meeting the cost of removal and re- 
settlement of the key workers and their_ dependants . (2) Firms 
were helped to accomodate them. A firm had to fulfil three 
conditions in order to get government help with housing:- 
(1) It had to be a new firm to the area; that is, it had 
to be in existence for less than five years. Help was 
only given to established firms if they started a new 
line of production. 
(2) The firm could not locally find workers with the par- 
ticular skill required and had to bring them from more 
than 20 miles away. 
(5) Employment by the firm of a number of workers depended 
on the key worker. 




A :ey worker qualified for the government assistance was 
defined as T an executive of at least managerial grade, or a 
technician of at least foreman status, who possesses skill and 
experience which are not available in the locality to which the 
firm is moving and who must, in consequence, be persuaded to _o 
with the firm to the Industrial Estate in the Development Area 
for the successful establishment of the firm's new project'. 
To provide acco.rodation for the executive grade, the Treasury 
was authorised to advance money to special housing associations, 
which on behalf of, the Board of Trade, would build houses to be 
let to the senior staff of the firms on the industrial estates 
or in factories administered by the Industrial Estates Companies. 
On the foreman level the Board of Trade undertook to sponsor 
applications for key workers' houses submitted by firms. It 
forwarded these applications to local authorities. iLost of 
the authorities were willing to allocate a certain number of 
council houses for key workers. The Board of Trade can exercise 
no power of compulsion over the local authorities and has to 
depend on their goodwill and co- operation. 
In Scotland from 1545 to 1552 with Treasury approval, 57 
managerial houses were built. Of these ;G were allocated to 
firms on the Scottish Industrial Estates and 17 to firms in 
individual site factories administered by S.I.E.Ltd. 488 key 
workers houses were obtained for firms on the estates and 1;?; 
for tenants in the other factories. In addition accomodation 
was found for key workers of 106 firms on the estates and for 
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24 in separate factories. Over the same period 89 licences to 
build were granted to firms. (1) 
A comparison of the mere number of key workers, houses 
allocated in the Scottish and in the other main Development Areas 
would suggest that Scotland was worse ofEboth in respect of the 
ehc 
Treasury financed and council houses. When provision of house - 
ing for key workers is related to new factory building there is 
a striping similarity in the house /factory ratio for all the main 
Development Areas. (2) 
(1) Source, Board of Trade. 
(2) Key workers' houses in all the Development Areas as at 31st. 
January, 1 951 . 
Development Area 'Local Authority Managerial Houses 





c b -c A a B ' b C 
North East 85 5' 53 4.0 202 14 18 
South Lancashire 82 43 19 10.0 - 10 
Merseyside 43__ 14 4x 1.1 - - 1 
West Cumberland 193 160 14 12.0 8 7 19 
Scotland(ex- 569 104 78 
Dundee) 61 10.0 6 16 
.Dundee 155 12 - - 
T;Jales(excluding 1351 63 79 5.0 C4 5 10 
Wrexham) 
Wrexham 151 750 16 80.0 
iTotal 3397 69 396 6.2 472 e 
A) Sponsored by the Board of Trade, number of houses, 
B4 Board of Trade only record is granting of a licence. Some 
may have been abandoned, number of licences. 
C) Number of houses. 
a, b, c, houses per million sq. ft of new factory floor area. 
x Others sponsored by I.inistry of Labour in Liverpool 
Loreover, firms in Scotland benefited from an additional 
scheme, namely the Industrial Workers Scheme. It was not con- 
fined to the Scottish Development Area. The scheme applied to 
some of the industrial workers who were not el giule for key 
workers'houses. To qualify for houses under I.W.S. workers had 
to be employed by firms engaged on a nationally important form 
of production, - exports, import saving goods, defence and other 
home priorities. rurther these workers had to prove that they 
had been unable to find accomodation within a reasonable travell- 
ing distance or livdd in bad housing conditions. Because of the 
housing difficulties many of the firms in the less fortunate areas 
were losing labour as workers moved to where living conditions 
ti,e 
were better. The object of the I.W.S. was to stauili.seAindus- 
thQ 
trial labour force by,provision of houses. The scheme was oper- 
ated as follows: so long as there was a restriction on house 
building, the Department of Health for Scotland made a provision 
that permits might be awarded to local authorities to build new 
houses on condition that a certain proportion of them, was 
allocated to industrial workers. The scheme had to be discon- 
tinued in 1;48, three years after it was started, whenArestrict- 
ions on building by local authorities were relaxed. No informas- 
ion was available as to the number of industrial workers employed 
by tenants of S.I.E.Ltd. who were allocated houses under the 
I.W.S. Numbers were bound to vary with the local authorities' 
attitudes and financial. resources. The scheme was regarded as a 
success. 
16C/ 
(c) The basic services. The basic services required by indus- 
tries are power, lighting, water supplies, and transport faci- 
lities. Since the object of the industrial estates companies 
is to make available to tenants factories with power, lighting 
and water supplies, which have already been mentioned, there is 
no need to discuss them in this context. Good transport faci- 
lities are more difficult to provide. In the siteing of in- 
dustrial estates the existing means of communication are of 
importance. The location of factories in relation to trans- 
port has therefore to be considered more fully. 
Whether on account of travelling by workers or of trans- 
port of raw materials and finished products by tenant firms, the 
transport facilities are a major factor in the location of in- 
dustrial estates. To attract firms to the estates such sites 
had to be selected as would best satisfy industrialists, trans- 
port requirements. 
In this respect the sites of the Hillington and the five 
Glasgow estates are perhaps the most satisfactory. The estates 
are located in a city which is a focal point of communication 
in Scotland by land, sea and air.(1) There the main roads and 
railways of Scotland converge, ships sail to all the parts of 
the world and planes land. The railway network in and around 
Glasgow is the most intricate in the country. There are over 
4U goods stations within the city itself and the rail collect- 
ion and delivery services cover the whole of Glasgow. Alterna- 
tively consignments can be transported by vans to and from 
other cities and towns in Scotland and England. 
(j) iiiap 3,p.165). 
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The Carntyne Estate lies close to the Carntyne 1ailway 
station and is only 3 miles from the centre of Glasgow. A mile 
further , the Queenslie Estate is located on the main Glasgow - 
Edinburgh road. South West of these estates, 5 miles from the 
city centre is the Thornliebank Estate, with the Thornlieoank 
raiiÑay station a mile away. To the North almost equidistant 
from the centre of the town, are the estates of Craigton, and 
North Cardonald. Across the road from North Cardonald lies the 
HillinTton Estate. Both these estates, which also from the point 
of view of transport can be regarded as one, are on the main road 
h 
throufare and railway line between Glasgow, Paisley, Port Glasgow 
and Greenock. Port Glasgow Estate and the Cairds Estate at 
Greenock are served by the same services. On the South West 
perimeter of the Scottish Development Area, in Ayrshire, are 
located the I'_ilwinnin.g and Kilmarnock Estates at 10 miles from 
each other. The former lies on the main Ayr -Glasgow railway line 
Of the Lanarkshire Estates, the one furtherest away from Glasgow 
is the estate at Larkhall. It lies 17 miles South West from 
Glasgow, on the main road to the South via Carlisle and a mile 
Estate 
from the Larkhall Central Station. The East Kilbride^is expected 
to have good transport facilities when the new town of East Kil- 
bride has been developed. The neighbouring estate of Blantyre, 
10 miles South East of Glasgow lies on the High Blantyre Road 
and is within less than half a mile distance of two railway 
stations. Both Carfin and Chapelhall Estates are 17 miles 
lE2 
from G4gow. Both have railway facilities near at hand; the 
former is 3 miles and the latter 1 mile off the main Glasgow - 
Edinburgh road. A mile up the road from Chapelhall, right on 
the Edinburgh- Glasgow road lies the Newhouse Estate. All these 
the 
estates are close to Motherwell through which runs railway line 
to the South. The Vale of Leven Estate is nearest of the three 
'Northern' estates to Glasgow, being only 1E miles North from it. 
The SUrling road runs close to the estate. There is a railway 
station at Renton which is just across the River Leven from the 
S.I.E.Ltd. factories. The other two estates are right away on 
the East coast at Dundee. From the point of view of distance 
from the centre of the industrial area 'of Scotland and from the 
markets in the South, and also on account of the cost of trans- 
port, it appears that Dundee is as far north as firms in the new 
industries are prepared to go. Since the distance and the trans- 
port charges acted as a deterants to the migration of firms to 
the Scottish Highlands, no prospective tenants for government 
financed factories there were forthcoming. This may be the 
principal reason why no estates have so far been built in the 
Inverness area. 
The Scottish Industrial Estates are also well served by 
air and sea communications. Both the Ayrshire Estates lie close 
to the Prestwick Airport. The Hillington and North Cardonald 
Estates adjoin be the Renfrew Airport. All the estates on the 
West coast are within easy reach of both these airports. On 
the other side of Millington within a half mile is the river 
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Clyde and the Glasgow docks.. The Glasgow port has six tidal 
docks with 123g miles of quays admitting ships as large as the 
'Queens' and merchant vessels of any size. There are 148 cranes 
belonging to the Clyde Navigation Trust as well as privately 
owned cranes to shift cargoes. Storage facilities are extensive. 
The sheds cover some 71 acres. There are over 58 miles of rail- 
ways so that in the majority of berthsdirect loading between 
ships and rail wagons is possible. Cargo can therefore be dis- 
patched to industries in Glasgow and other areas as sonn as it 
is unloaded from the holds. There is a special organisation which 
looks after cartage of consignments to the docks and ensures that 
they are delivered for shipping as and when required. 
The Dundee docks are of less importance in the international 
trade. Nevetheless a considerable amount of cargo is handled 
through this port. Several shipping companies offer coastal 
services to the larger ports of Britain and from Dundee ships 
sail to Ireland, North America, Netherlands and the North of 
France. 
The Scottish Industrial Estates, both on the West and East 
coast are within convenient distance of the Grangemouth and 
Leith docks. 
(d) Markets. Iharkets for raw materials and finished products 
are bound to vary with different firms in different industries, 
only general considerations can be taken into account in locat- 
ing industrial estates which are to house a number of firms in 
various industries. 
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Any firm which is at a distance from its source of supply 
of raw materials is likely to experience a number of disadvan- 
tagds:- transport cost, time taken to deliver goods, consequent 
the 
need to carry stocks which involves locking up of capital, and 
the difficulty of inspecting raw materials before purchese. But 
the material content of finished products of light industries 
tends to be comparatively low in relation to the labour value. 
The effect on production of the length of time taken to transport 
goods and the need to keep reserves, depends largely on the ex- 
tent to which production can be planned ahead. Good transport 
facilities go a long way to remedy such difficulties as arise 
because of the distance from markets. An attempt has already 
been made to show that the Scottish Industrial Estates are well 
served by all means of communication. The need to inspect raw 
materials before búing rarely arises in practice. With improve- 
ments in grading and greater use od standardised component parts, 
most firms in the ordinary course of business rely on samples 
and the reputation of sellers. When the materials are imported 
inspection is impossible in most cases. The Scottish Industrial 
the. 
Estates are especially favourably located for importation of 
raw materials,being close to the ports of entry of a lame 
variety of cargoes from different parts of the world. A. con- 
siderable amount of raw material produced in England is sold 
not directly by the manufactures but through manufactur &rST 
stockists. Glasgow is not only a large industrial but also 
1E5 
a trading centre. With the industrial development of Scotland_ 
and the increasing diversity of the country's industries the 
local supply of raw materials has grown steadily. 
There are also disadvantages for a firm in being away from 
the main markets for its finished products. There is the cost 
of transport which, if borne by the manufacturer,may prove a 
serious handicap in price competition, the difficulty of finding 
out quickly what changes are taking place in the markets and of 
maintaining a close contact with buyers. In light industries 
the cost of transport is unlikely to represent a high percentage 
of the price of the finished products and to impair apprecia.bl[ 
firm's comnetative position. The state of the main markets can 
be ascertained at a distance, changes in demand tend to take place 
gradually. It is more difficult however for firms on the Scottish 
Industrial ~`states to keep in close touch with foreign and English 
buyers, than if they were located nearer to London. Although for 
foreign buyers coming to Britain, Glasgow with its air and sailing 
facilities does not compare unfavourably with London, the greater 
social attractions of the metropolis offer a strong inducement to 
combine business with pleasure. 
The potentialities of the local Scottish markets should not how- 
ever be ignored. The aggregate consumption in Scotland is likely 
thÇ 
to increase because of the growing population,increasing level of 
employment and the improving standards of living in the country. 
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There are no government figures available to show the 
size of the Scottish national income, nor is there information 
to show how it is divided between savings and consumption. The 
Scottish national income for 1Y48 has been estimated at £; 451. (1 ) 
It may be assumed that the proportion of the national income that 
is devoted to current consumption and expenditure by public 
authorities in Scotland is the same as in Gt.Britain as a whole. 
Hence the disposable income in Scotland was probably around 
£755m in 1;48. (2) The amount may even have been greater since 
the percentage of the national income saved in Scotland could 
be expected to be smaller.() Both in Scotland and in Gt.Britain 
as a whole the genaral trend has been towards higher consumption 
expenditure as wages showed a greater relative increase to other 
sources of income. If this trend continues, as it is likely to 
do, and assuming that the high level of employment is maintained 
the demand for both consumption and capital goods in Scotland 
will increase. Consequently the opportunities for firms in the 
country to sell their finished products and to buy their raw 
materials and intermediary goods locally are likely to increase. 
(1) 
A.D.Campbell, Income, Ch.5 p.5C, in the Scottish Economy, 
ed. by A.K.Cairncross, (1;54). 
(2) This estimate is very rough. Source, Central Statistical 
Office, National Income and Expenditure, 1;46 -5,(154). 
(3) The per capita income in Scotland is lower. The propensity 
to save is therefore likely to be below the average for Gt. 
Britain. 
D.I.Hewell, Redistribution of Income,Studi Economici,Dec.155. 
6 'Í 
Amenities. Although economic factors are of greater importance 
in the location of firms, social considerations cannot be alto- 
gether neglected. These, however, have been losing importance 
with the gradual disappearance of the owner -manager class in in- 
dustry. The proximity of educational establishments and of shopp - 
and 
ing centres, recreational facilities,Apleasantness of the sur- 
roundings are considerations which are not entirely dismissed in 
siteing a factory, nor can they be if the top class executives 
are to be attracted there. 
The location of the Scottish Industrial Estates around Glas- 
gow and in Dundee and within a convenient travelling distance of 
Edinburgh, satisfies these social requirements. In Glasgow, 
Edinburgh and Dundee there is a large choice of good schools and 
the reputation of the Scottish universities has long been establ 
lished. The shopping centres compare favourably with those of 
the other large cities in Britain. By the way of recreation 
Scotland has much to offer. 
Location on Individual Sites and Ex- government Factories. 
The main location factors which have to be taken into 
account In locating industrial estates apply also to factories 
on individual sites. These factories have been erected by the 
S.I.E.Ltd. in places where the size of the labour pool or the 
industrial structure did not justify building an estate, but 
where new industries were nevertheless needed and where new 
firms were willing to come. Since factories of this type were 
1ba 
usually built for particular firms, their location requirements 
were known beforehand and could be taken into consideration in 
chosing a site for them in the Scottish Development Area. 
The ex- government factories however, mainly located for 
strategic reasons, were less likely to offer similar location 
advantages. A number of them have nevertheless been adapted for 
private industrial uses. These were transferred to the Board of 
Trade . In the Scottish Development Area they are administered 
by the S.I.L.Ltd. 
In 1552 there were 21 factories built by the S.I..Ltd. on 
individual sites. Fifteen ex- government factories on separete 
sites were administered by the company. The Cardonald Ordnance 
factory in Glasgow which was converted into the Craigton In- 
dustrial Estate housed 12 tenants. 






























































































































































Chapter 1 2 . 
Development of the Scottish Industrial Estates and individual 
and ex- government factories. 
Not only the location but also the development of the indus- 
trial estates and of the individual site factories administered 
by the Industrial Estate Companied was influenced by the economic 
conditions. At the end of the war the demand for industrial pre- 
mises soared and the government was faced with a threefold task 
of de- requisitioning industrial buildings, of converting the sur- 
plus government munitions factories to civilian industrial uses 
and of building new factories for private firms in the Develop- 
ment Areas, in accordance with the distribution of industry policy. 
The erection of government financed factories was, of course, not 
a new undertaking, as such factories had already been built by. the 
Industrial Estate Companies in the days of the Special Areas ad- 
ministration. 
There was approximately a million sq. ft. of developed factory 
space at the end of the war on the pre -war Scottish Industrial 
Estates at Hillington (excluding the factory occupied by Rolls - 
Royce Ltd.), Carfin, Chapelhall and Larkhall. During the war 
many of the factories on these estates were used for war product- 
ion, but when de- requisitioned, were easily re- adapted formanu- 
facture of goods to satisfy the civilian demand. After the war 
Rolls -Royce Ltd. gave up some of the blocks of the two million 
sq. ft. factory built for the company by the Ministry of Aircraft 
Production. (1) These blocks were converted by S.I.E.Ltd. and 
let out to tenants. Also a number of the government munition 
factories in Scotland were transferred to the Board of Trade to 
be administered by the S.I.E.Ltd. Some of them, after alterations 
were leased to firms as individual site factories. The Cardonald 
Ordnance Factory in Glasgow was converted into the Craigton In- 
dustrial Estate and a government factory in Dundee was adapted as 
the Craigie Industrial Estate. 
Lost of the factories now administered by the S.I.E.Ltd were 
erected after the war. Sixteen out of the twenty Scottish Indus - 
trial Estates are of post-war creationG2)The building activity 
was at its highest between 1945 and 1947 when some 7O;o of the 
construction work on the estates and almost 65,E on the individual 
sites, begun between 1 ,. 5 and 1952, was started.( But progress 
was hindered by material shortages, especially in the early years. 
(1) Ground at Hillington was feued to Ministry of Aircraft Pro- 
duction. On this site construction of a factory for Rolls - 
Royce was started in 1938 and 12 month later the company be- 
gan aircraft production. 
(2) Construction work began. Number of estates. 




1947 xn 5 
2 
x North Cardonald Estate is, in fact, a post -war extension of 
Hillington, no separate date is therefore shown. 
KR 3 are new estates, 2 are ex- government factories converted 
into estates. 
() Tenants had been secured for the advance factories before con- 
struction was completed. 
I 7 2 
Factory construction all over Britain was held up at various times 
by short supplies of steel, tiluber, glass, asbestos roofing and 
lead. In 1546, with the shortage of bricks, it was necessary to 
limit their uses; consequently plans had to be changed, building 
was delayed and costs increased. The completion of factories was 
also held up because of the long delivery dates for boilers and 
heating equipment. Nevertheless, a great deal was accomplished. 
Between 1;45 and 1;47, work was started on eleven new estates and 
on the conversion of two government factories into industrial es- 
tates. Construction of 5=,904,810 sq. ft. of factory floor area 
was started. Of this 4,478,037 sq. ft. was on the estates and 
1,426,773 sq. ft. on individual sites. 1,0E7,630 sq. ft. of the 
floor space on the estates and 59,661 sq. ft. on individual sites 
was allocated to tenants. 
But in addition to building factories for successful appli- 
cants during the early years when capital was more plentiful than 
Q11 
it became later, the government launched advance factory building 
programme. In Scotland plans were made for the construction of 
2,725,000 sq.ft. of new factory space in advance of specific de- 
mands from industrialists. Factories with floor area of some 
900,000 sq. ft. were so constructed .as to be particularly suitable 
for firms employing predominantly male workers. In the South West 
there still persisted a relatively high level of unemployment among 
men. By the end of February 1 ;47 approximately 1,000,000 sq. ft, 
of the advance factories were provisionally allocated to industries, 
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Later, however, because of Britain's economic difficulties, the 
government was forced to cut down its capital expenditure and the 
construction of advance factories had to be suspended. 
Few individual site factories were built in the Scottish De- 
velopment Area until. 1947. Work was concentrated on developing 
existing industrial estates and errecting new ones. Diversificattn 
of the industrial structure of wider areas was a more pressing 
problem and had therefore to be tackled first before dealing with 
the localised small pockets of unemployment. It may also be that 
industrialists preferred factories on the industrial estates. 
But even if they preferred a special factory they might have de- 
cided on renting a factory on the estates if one were quickly 
available. Time was an iiiportant consideration for firms wishing 
to launch their products on the markets while the post -war boom 
conditions continued. To build a special factory according to 
tenants specifications took some time. 
From 1947 onwards, although the demand for industrial pre- 
mises continued, the factory building programme was restricted 
because of the economic crisis which faced Britain. The short - 
lived attempt at currency convertibility in July 1947 increased 
the drain on dollar reserves and the proceeds of the Anglo- Amer- 
ican Loan which were dwindling away at an alarming rate, became 
almost exhausted. (1) The deficit on the balance of payments 
account began to cause concern. To avert the crisis, exports had 
(1) Anglo- American Loan. Cmd. 6708 and Cad. 6968. (194g) 
7 4 
to be increased while imports from the hard currency areas 
had to be cut, consequently, the government's economic policy 
was directed towards that end. A White Paper on capital in- 
vestment justifying the steps which had to oe taken was pub- 
lished in 1947. (1) It was emphasised that new investment in 
the future had to be brought into proper relation with the 
reduced supplies of materials. All the available human and 
material resources which could be released, were needed to 
increase the export potential of British industries. But as 
these resources were limited, it was necessary to cmnceutruue 
tneiu .moo iur a. possible on such types of investment as were 
most likely to strengthen quickly the country's capacity to 
export or to save imports. New projects were therefore to be 
restricted in order to make speedy completion of priority 
schemes possible. 
The White Paper was followed by the 'Special Memorandum 
on Capital Issues Control' to the Capital Issues Committee 
revising the emphasis of the original memorandum of guidance 
in view of the need for internal readjustment on account of 
the balance of payments difficulties. (2) Capital issues were 
to be restricted, at the same time the joint stock banks were 
asked to co- operate with the government by curtailing credit 
(1) Capital Investment in 1948. Cmd.7268 (1947). 
(2) First memorandum of guidance to the C.I.C., Cmd.'6645 (19481) 
May). Capital Issues Control, Special Memorandum on Capital 
Issues Control, Cmd. 7261, (1947 December). 
1 1 
(1) 
facilities to industries outside the priority group. Much of 
the reduction in investment however, was in the field of cen- 
tral and local governmentTs expenditure. 
The capital investment restrictions retarded progress in 
Scotland and prevented to some extent, a more balanced develop - 
ment.7heestablishment of many new projects with good long-term 
prospects had to be postponed and extensions of existing firms 
which neither earned or saved dollars, could not be carried out. 
The fall in government investment is clearly reflected in the 
sharp drop in work started by the S.I.E.Ltd. on the industrial 
estates and individual sites. In 1948 new factory building on 
the former was only about 1/14 and on the latter 1 /1 1 of the 
annual average for the first two of the post-war years. Every 
effort was made to complete factories which had already been 
to 
started and the allocation, and occupation of floor space by 
tenants, during the year, exceeded the aggregate for the whole 
period since the war. (2) Throughout 1948 the main emphasis by 
the government was on consolidation of previous progress rather 
than on approval of a large number of new schemes. The area on 
which work was started in 1949 was down by over a half on the 
estates but as it increased on the individual sites, the total 
for the year was just above the 1948 level by some 2,000 sq. ft. 
The allocation and occupation of factory space in 1949 well ex- 
(1) D.I.Hewell, Finance of Business in Great Britain, Studi 
Economici, Anno 1X n 1 -3, 1954. 
(2) Ch. 12 p.187 Table 5 
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ceeded the figure for any other of the post -war years. After 
1949, both declined considerably as a result of the earlier 
restriction on factory building. Later, although the restrict- 
ions were not altogether relaxed, the government' building 
programme began to expand again and in 1;50 work started on Me 
erection of new factories increased appreciably. It was partly 
due to an improvement in the economic position of Britain, partly 
to the intensified threat of world war as fighting broke out in 
Korea, and to the need of defence production,that the powers 
under the Distribution of Industry Act (1945) were extended. 
(1950) 
The Distribution of Industry Act,was passed and its supple- 
mentary provisions stimulated factory building in the Develop- 
ment Areas, In 1951, two new estates were started. On the 
East Kilbride Estate factories are being specially built for 
the Rolls -Royce Ltd. to enable the firm to expand its production. 
But as economic prospects deteriorated and the political situ- 
ation improved, the increased pace of industrial development 
was not maintained in the following year. 
Between September 1945 and December 1952 the S.I.E.Ltd. 
started factory building on 8,494,334 sq. ft. and allocated 
7,773,319 sq. ft. The total area under construction or built 
and which is administered by the Company amounted, by December 
1952, to some 14,739,000 sq. ft. (1) 330 tenants were listed.(2) 
The size of the different estates, having been dictated by the 
local needs, varies greatly from the Cairds Estate with only 
(1) Table 6'p. 150. 
(2) S.I.E.Ltd. handbook, (1953) 
777 
six acres and two tenants to the Hillington Estate with 246 
acres and 147 tenants. (1) But neither the area of the factory 
space occupied by firms nor the number of tenants is a true 
indication of the employment created and of the extent of in- 
dustrial diversification achieved in the Scottish Development 
Area which has to be discussed separately. 
Comparison of industrial development in the Scottish and 
other Development Areas and the regions ouside.(2) 
A comparison of the industrial development in the different 
areas of Britain,on the basis of the floor area of new buildings 
and extensions of the existing ones, is also unsatisfactory 
from the point of view of estimating how far the local needs 
for industrial premises had been satisfied since the supply 
is shown unrelated to the demand for them. But a study mf the 
factory floor area statistics for the different regions gives 
some idea of the relative importance of the Development Areas 
in the post -war building schemes. (3) 
In accordance with the government's distribution policy , 
new factory buildings and extensions in the Development Areas 
were encouraged by direct financial aid from the Treasury and 
by priority treatment in the granting of building licences and 
later of the Industrial Development Certificates, and in the 
(1) The figures for the Killington Estate include the forth 
Cardonald Estate. 
(2) An outline of industrial development in all the Development 
Areas for the early post -war years is given in the 'Distri- 
bution of Industry' White Paper, Cmd. 7450 (1948) 
(3) Table 7 p. 185. 
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allocation of building materials. Thus 41;ó of all the new 
factories and extensions completed in Britain by 1952 were 
built in the Dev elop.:.ent Areas. In the Scottish Development 
Area, although the number of )rojects was higher than in the 
other Development Areas, theft aggregate floor area was only 
1 1 , 5,CCC sq. ft. compared with 14,392,00C sq. ft. and 16,23, 
COO sq. ft. in the idorth East Coast and_ the South Wales Develop- 
ment Areas respecVely. These together with the Scottish DE- 
velopment Area, are the three largest ones. New factory build- 
ings and extensions in the Scottish Development Area represented 
of the total for Britain on the basis of the floor area 
and 7, in terms of the estimated value of the buildings. The 
corresponding percentages for the North East Coast Development 
Area were 12-; a and. .8T.s. For the South -,Jales Development Area they 
amounted to 14;'0 end_ 2C; 
The value figures however are not a reliable indication of 
l 
the amount of money actualy spent on factory buildings and 
extensions. They are compiled from the original estimates of 
the cost of construction submitted by firms to the Board of 
Trade when applying for building licences. The final cost 
has probably for most firms been in excess of the estimates. 
There has probably been a tendency to underestimate the cost 
either intentionally( since permission to build was more likely 
to be granted for smaller capital outlay) or because a rapid 
rise in prices of some of the building materials could not have 
been foreseen at the time when plans were drawn. Furthermore 
T 9 
costs were often increased above the original estimates be- 
cause shortages of certain raw materials delayed the com- 
pletion of work. The extent to which costs have been affected 
increases in prices was to some extent determined by the 
date when construction of the buildings was began and when it 
was completed. Inflation and the lack of information on the 
dates of begiñing and finishing of the different projects 
make the value figures not strictly comparable. It is im- 
possible to adjust these figures so as to take into account 
the effects of inflation and intentional underestimation of 
cost' if it had in fact been made. The figurs therefore have 
to be considered on their face value and regarded only as a 
very rough indication of the capital expenditure on factory 
buildings and extensions. The value figures in the Scottish 
Development Area appear to be lower than for the other Deve- 
lopment Areas. This need not necessarily mean that tne build- 
ing programme was smaller. The estimates may have been pre- 
pared_ at an earlier date. 
Comparison of the industrial development of the regions 
on the basis of a 'Relative Development Index' has the ad- 
vantage that by expressin new factory buildings and extensions 
in relation to the working population, the local need for in- 
dustrial premises is taken into account.ì)Thus, the relative 
industrial development of the different areas is shown more 
tie 
clearly. omparison of a mere number of new factories and. 
extensions in different areas without reference to the labour 
(1) 
Table 8,p.1 6 
1 8 0 
force of each has little meaning when an attempt is made to 
estimate the success or failure of the regional employment 
policy pursued by the government by encouraging new factory 
buildings and extensions in the Development Areas. The index 
for the Development Areas comprises both government and private- 
ly financed factories. Privately financed factory building 
in the Scottish Development Area was on a comparatively small 
scale in the post -war period. (1) Government financed factories 
were not available outside the Development Areas. The available 
figures are not so split up as to show new buildings separately 
from extensions to existing industrial premises. Since in the 
Development Areas tnere were previously few factories, it can 
be assured that new factories were mainly for new firms to the 
locality and not so much extensions of established enterprises. 
On the basis of the Relative Development Index it appears 
that the government had a large measure of success in steering 
new industries to the Development Areas and in discouraging the 
further growth of the congested industrial centres. The index 
for all the Development Areas in 1552 was 245 compared with 6E 
for ` est and South Britain and 144 for West and North. For 
the Scottish Development Area, however, the index was only 
.iossible explenation of the relatively lower industrial 
development in the Scottish Development Area than in the others 
could have been the government's refusal to finance more new 
factory buildings in Scotland, lack of private investment 
(1) Employment on the approved pro j ects ,table 2(, p .331 
capital for building, industrialists' reluctance to relit 
factories in this area, or a combination of all these factors. 
No figures are available to show on what basis and how much 
capital was allocated by the government to the different In- 
dustrial Estates Companies. There are no grounds on which it 
could be assumed that the S.I.E.Ltd. received less than its 
fair share. When industrial development in the rest of Scot- 
land, which was privately financed, is compared on the basis 
of the Relative Development Index, it is also found to be below 
the level for most of the other regions outside the Development 
Areas. A possible inadequacy of financial resources of the 
S.I.E.Ltd does not therefore appear to be the explanation of 
the lower industrial development in the Scottish Development 
Area. 
It may, of course, be that in the whole of Scotland the 
insufficient supply of capital slowed down factory building. 
Although the local supply of capital is limited in Scotland, 
savings are nevertheless appreciable.(1) In raising' capital 
outside Scotland, the smaller Scottish firms, even though 
sufficiently large to apply for stock exchange quotations, may 
be at a disadvantage. They are less likely to be well known 
on the London money market than their English counterparts. 
Thus they may find it more difficult and costly to float issues. 
which 
But the Industrial and Commercial Finance Corporation ̂was esta- 
(1) Scottish home Office, Digest of Statistics, No 1 April 1953, 
Finance, Banking and Savings, M. 
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blished with the express object of iielping the smaller firms, 
advanced a considerable amount of share and loan capital to 
applicants from Scotland. (1) Furthermore, in all the Deve- 
ex 
lopment Areas a high percentage of,new production units are 
branches of established English firms which probably would be 
able to raise the required capital without great difficulty 
irrespectivd of the proposed location of the branch. The reason 
why a number of them went to the Development Areas in England 
in preference to Scotland must have been other than financial 
especially as moving to a government financed factory available 
onarental basis reduced the need for capital outlay equally in 
all the Development Areas. 
It is therefore probable that the lower industrial develop- 
ment in Scotland was not so much due to inefficient government 
and private resources for new factory building and extensions 
as to relatively smaller number of applicants wishing to rent 
factories in the Scottish Development Area. Records of all 
those who made enquiries concerning industrial premises pro- 
vided by the government cannot be disclosed because of the 
possible effects on the firms in question. Some approached the 
Board of Trade, others got directly in touch with the Indus- 
trial Estates Companies, or in Scotland, with the Scottish 
Council. It is unknown how many firms looking for factories 
in the post -war period, considered location in Scotland, or 
(1) Annual Reports. 
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ed between 1245 and 1252, going to Scotland and how many were 
deterred from doing so for some reason. But the opinions 
expressed by executives of nearly one third of the firms that 
did move to factories provided by the S.I.E.Ltd. go a long way 
in showing whether location in Scotland did, in fact, have 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Port Glasgow 1946 
ueenslie 1946 
Thornliebank 1947 
Vale of Leven 1946 




Government- financed Factory Schemes in the Scottish Development Areas Administerey the S.I.E. Ltd. 
Post -war Building on Industrial Estates and Sites 
between 
Sep. 1945 
Erection of factories - work started 
between 
during Sep. 1945 
and 









122, 260 8,000 
362, 020 5,000, 258,388 10,000 
532,000 
685,640 7,600 43,955 22,000 






113,300 60,000 5,000 
304,620 55,000 
4,476,037 152,884 53,955 416,818 967,000 
1,426,773 62,995,163,872¡ 423;000 











1 Sep. 1945 
and 
1951 1952 1948 -52', Dec. 1952 
389,024 75,000 60,700 66,650 37,450 140,000 15,000 319,80d 394,800 
174,000 174,000 
121,654 58,270 63,384 15,000 8,000 86,384 144,654 
180,670 180,670 5,000 7,000 192,670 192,670 
97,500 97,500 15,000 15,000 112,500 
8,000 130,260 191,660 122,260 313,920 313,920 
3,000 276,388 638,408 111,084 64,276 2,000 7,000 254,000 327,276 438,360 
46,000. 578,000 578,000 
29,000 102,555 988,195 265,760 261,420 185,415 147,700 40,000 16,000 650,535 916,295 
1,000 395,714 509,414 30,000 168,984 158,000 151,000 507,984 507,984 
30,000 15,000 15,000 30, 000 30, 000 
242,360 35,000 207,360 95,000, 103,000 405,360 440,360 
705,265 330,830 96, 670 71,465 111,740 145,000 424,895 755,725 
224,860 109,400 63,460; 41,600 10,000 224,460 224,460 
15,000 600,164 100,000 264,086E 51,678 169,000 22,000 606,764 606,764 
65,000 178,300 20,600 82,400, 75,300 5,000 183,300 183,300 
150,000 205,000 509,620 58,820 136,950', 108,850 45,000 349,620 349,620 
229,006 1,819,657 6,297,694 973,444 1,067,630 1,521,760E 703,578 787,000 538,000 4,637,968 5;611,412 
120,000 769,867 2,196,640 99,661 561,817 593,874. 355,555 195,U00 356,000 2,062,246 2,161,907 
349,000 2,589,524-8,494,334-71,073,105-1,649,447;2,115,634 1, 059,133 982,000 894,00o 6,700,214 7,773,319 
(1) Last Kilbride - the Polls -Royce factory is built by the S.I.L. Ltd. as the agents of the Ministry of Supply. 
(2) Hillington includes the North Cardonald Estate. 
Craigie Industrial Estate, Dundee - a government factory was converted in 1947 into an Industrial Estate. 69,000 sq. ft. were occupied at the end of 1952. 
Craigton Industrial Estate, Glasgow. The Cardonald Royal Ordnance Factory was converted in 1947 into an industrial estate, 261,000 sq. ft. were occupied at the end of 1952. 
Source:- S.I.E. Ltd. 
Scottish Office - Industry & Employment in Scotland, 
Cmd. 7125, 7459, 7676, 7937, 8223, 8521, 8797. (1st 




Management Policy., -the allocation of factories, 
the tenancy pattern. 
The management policy of the Scottish Inda.strial 
Estates Ltd. falls into t "o phases. Under the Special 
Areas legislation the company enjoyed autonomy. The ma- 
nagement policy was formulated by its board of directors 
end the decisions were taken on the regional level. The 
period between the establishment of the industrial estates 
and the outbreak of the war was too short to allow such 
policies, as were decided upon, to exercise appreciable 
influence on the level of employment and on the indust- 
rial structure of the Scottish Development Area. The 
second phase began after the war. Since 1545 all but the 
most trivial decisions affecting the industrial estates 
companies have been made by the Board of Trade. 
The priorities in the allocation of the government 
financed factories to tenants have been periodically al -. 
tered to conform with the national policies pursued at 
the time. There were three main changes of emphasis.(î) 
Between 1945 -47 the unemployment among men in the Devel- 
opment Areas was higher than the national average. With 
the demobilisation of men from the armed forces it was 
expected to increase.A Á'riority in allocation of factory 
(1) The dates of the three periods are very rough. 
There was some overlapping. 
1 89 
space was given to firms employing predominantly male 
labour. When the balance of payments problem developed 
the need to build up reserves of hard currencies became 
the overriding consideration. From 1948 -50 the emphasis 
Was changed to favour firms which exported a high per- 
centage of their output', or which were engaged on product- 
ion that saved iln-,orts, particularly imports 
dollar area. From í95G when plans were laid 




priority was liven to firms that contributed to defence 
production. The impact of thechanges on the priority 
basis on the tenancy of the Scottish Industrial Estates 
will be considered in more detail in the light of the sam- 
ple survey. 
The allocation of factories to meet short term de- 
mands arising from national emergencies may have been ne- 
cessary but also may have been detrimental to the effect - 
4less of the long -term policy which was designed to se- 
cure balanced industrial development.on a regional level. 
In the South "Jest of Scotland there has always been a 
lack of employment opportunities for women because of the 
d.omit ,tion of the area's economy by the heavy industries. The 
allocation of new factories to firms employing mostly men 
would therefore accentuate rather than redress the lack of balance 
in the industrial structure. A more balanced 
industrial 
development would have helped to stabilise 
the regional 
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economy and reduce the c:anger of wide- spread unemployment, 
The economy of the south west of Scotland was unstable 
during; the inter-war period. The dependence of the heavy 
industries on foreign markets was one of the contributory 
factors. In the post -war period it was reduced. Never- 
theless , concentration on the industrial estates after 
the war of firms producing largely for exports, could 
hardly be re`_a.rded as in line with the stabilisation 
sought in the ;reneral policy of a balanced distribution of 
industry. in the event of a prolonged recession that or- 
iginated abroad or was caused: b T import,: restrictions im- 
posed by foreign countries on British goods, there would 
have been less safeguard against a wide- spread unemploy- 
ment in tlne Development Areas. Equally the location 
there of lefence projects although creating immediate em- 
ployment was not a , i_m foundation for long term employ- 
ment. The cancellation of rearmament orders previously 
had played havoc it' the economy of the south west of 
Scotland. The effect of a fall in exports or in defence 
production on the employment level partly depends on the 
adjustability of the firms to other lines of production. 
Since the new light industries are more flexible than the 
heavy industries, the danger of wide- spread unemployment Al 
after the war may have been relatively reduced. 
The shift in emphasis in allocation of factories may 
have also indirectly been responsible for the alleged let- 
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tine of factories after the war to bigger manufacturing 
units. Ireviously the policy was said to have been one of 
offering the facilities of the estates to small firms. 
Also, it may have been responsible for the acceptance of 
a large number of applications by companies wishing to 
establish their branches on the estates. 
An examination of criticism of allocation of factories. 
The policy of allocation of factories on the Scottish In- 
dustrial Estates after the war has been criticised because 
of the alleged - 
(a) denarture from the company's former policy of 
providing a relatively large percentage of small 
factories to that of letting instead factories 
mainly to bigger tenants, 
(b) acceptance of a hih percentage of branches of 
firms as tenants, 
(c) relative decrease in allocations to new firms 
of local oriin.(1) 
It was argued) that maintenance after the war of a 
stable high level of employment and provision of a safe- 
guard a. ai nst future unemployment, would have been better 
served by allocation of relatively la.rp;e numbers of facto- 
ries to smaller manufacturing units, than by the allocat- 
ion of relatively smaller number of factories to bigger 
tenants. But to accept this argument it has to be assumed 
first that the small undertakings are as stable and able 
to survive a trade recession as the big firms. It may well 
be however that the latter, with larger.-financial 
resources 
et their disposal are in a better position in this respect. 
(1) state Ne:s, 18.8.51, Opinions expressed by industrial- 
ists and officials interfiaiewed. 
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The policy of allocating factories to small unaertakinvs 
was favoured because es a result a greater.varaiety of in- 
dustries coulde bee±. brought to the estates. This 
would have diversified :Further the industrial structure of 
the Scottish Development Area and provided a greater safe- 
guard against wide spread unemployment. Apart from a ge- 
. neral slump, the economic conditions which could have de- 
pressed one industry need not ne_essaril,r have affected 
others. A large number of manufacturing units producing 
a wide range of -goods on the estates would therefore en- 
sure a greater stability of employment. Further it was 
argued that in the event of a large manufacturing unit 
leaving an estate factory a problem of immediate and size- 
able unemployment would be created and would be likely to 
persist for some time. The absorption locally of a large 
number of released workers might be a slow process. 
Branches of firms have been regarded as less suitable 
tenants than sole manufacturing units. They tended on the 
average to require bigger factories, but what -fas more im- 
portant they were thought to be more likely to leave the 
estates should a temporary recession develop. The transfer 
of a branch from a rented factory back to the parent plant 
was unlikely to be :sufficiently difficult and costly to 
discourage a move if the branch could not have been oper- 
ated at a profit.for a considerable period. Therefore the 
acceptance of a high percentage of branch factories as 
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tenants for the Scottish industrial istates was criticised 
as providing less safe ,guard ak,ainst the stoppage of pro- 
duction on the estates whiciiwould result in unemployment. 
It was argued that the sole manufacturing units were pre- 
ferable as they offered better prospects of maintaining 
employment stability. It was felt net more encouragement 
should have been :riven to local enterprise, particularly 
to new Scottish firms. These, althou'Y! starting on a modest 
scale were regarded_ aÇ of iL:portence to the long term in- 
dustrial development of Scotland. The Scottish Industrial 
Estates were in a position to fulfil a useful function as 
a 'nursery ground, for the native industries. 
An attempt may now be made to test the validity of the 
basis on which the criticism of the allocations of the fa- 
ctories in the post -war period was made. To this end the 
tenancy pattern of the Scottish Industrial hstates has been 
analysed. Some information was obtained from the Board of 
Trade as to the size, status(ie. whether the tenant is a 
sole manufacturing unit or a branch), and Tnationalityr of 
521 tenants out of 330 listed by the S.I .E.Ltd. (1) The 
difference is accounted for by the omission of premises 
let to banks and occupied_ by Post Offices located on the 
estates to provide services for the tenants. Of the 321 
tenants for whom information was available 15 were ex- 
(1) S .I .E.Ltd.. handbook (1 953) p62-';'). 
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because of the Jack of the statistical data required,except 
when no other premises are occupied outside the estates. 
The size of a manufacturing unit in this context is defin- 
ed in terms of the factory space occupied. A definition 
in terms of employment would have been more meaningful in 
a study of the role played by the Scottish Industrial 
Estates in the governments emplóment policy. Figures of 
employment for individual firms were however not ava.ilable,. (i ) 
A small manufacturing unit is taken to mean one which occu- 
pies a 'nest' factory or no more than two blocks of a stan- 
dard factory unit 'A' or 'E',each of which is 5C0Csq.ft. It 
is assumed here that a relationship exists between the size 
of the factory floor area occupied and the labour force 
employed and that the former is an indication of the latter. 
This relationship varies between industries, depending on 
the capitalisation, methods of production etc. Since how- 
ever the majority of the firms on the Scottish Industrial 
Estates are in the light industries group,(with such ex- 
ceptions as Rolls -Royce Ltd. ,Massey- Harris Ltd, Pressed 
Steel Co .Ltd . an_d. Eutlid(Gt .Britain) Ltd. which are medium 
enginee ing 
heavy undertakings) it can be expected that their floor - 
labour ratio will tend to be comparable. 
e) Ire-war policy. The iiesi.g'n of the standard factories 
adopted by the S.T.E.Ltd_. and the average floor area a.11o- 
(î) The size of firms in terms of employment could only 
have been measured for those which were included in 
the sample. 
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cated to individual_ tenants appear to confirm the view 
that originally the policy of the Company was to provide 
factories -"or small tenants. 
Design. The 'nest' type of factory as its naine suggests 
was intended for uudertakin s just begining t ieir indus- 
trial life. The standard blocks '11' and 'r although big - 
er are nevertheless small factories. A large manufactur- 
ing unit would therefore have to rent several blocks. Eut 
unless ad ecent blocT s were available it could not be 
be accommodated conveniently. 
Floor area allocated. Figures for the average floor 
area allocated to tenants indicate that were in 
fact let to small manufacturing units averaging 10)16(J sq. 
ft. over the period. but the average size of the floor 
area allocated to indiviuual tenants was even then in- 
creasing. In ï9.57 the average allocation did not e4ed 
one standard block; by ì 9 it was approximately two and 
a half 
(b) "'á r- ,rears . The war years were too abnormal to be 
taken into account in the study of the development of the 
tenancy pattern on the Scottish industrial Estates. Fa- 
ctories on the estates were re- allocated for war product- 
ion purposes. New build.ing,except such as was 
essential 
for the war effort, came practically to 
a standstill, 
(c) The' cost -: ".ar tenants. After 
the war the tenancy 
pattern on the bcottish industrial 
Lstates changed. 
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Whether this was a result of a change in police on the part 
of the S.I.E.Ltd., or whether the change was forced on the 
Company remains to be seen. 
Although the standard type of factories built on the 
estates remained unaltered the average allocation of space 
to tenants increased. Thus over the post -war period the 
average space let on the estates was about double the pre -war 
allocation. This increase was made possible first, by letting 
of several blocks to tenants, these were not always adjoining 
and in some cases were on different estates and second, by 
building non- standard factories which tended to be larger. 
They were built both on the estates and on individual sites. 
Information, however, was not obtained on the basis of which 
the special factories on the estates could be distinguished 
from factories consisting of several blocks let together. 
Factories on individual sites were generally not of the 
standard type. Their average size was 87,000 sq.ft. The ex- 
government factories administered by the S.I.E.Ltd. were even 
bigger averaging 110,000 sq.ft. Neither of these two types of 
factories was available before the war. The average floor 
area of the ex- government factories, factories on individual 
sites and those allocated on the estates since the war was 
34,000 sq.ft. This is about 33 times the average pre- war 
allocation. The statistical data available do therefore 
confirm the allegation that there was an increase in 
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size. Since 1945 f' etories were let out to relatively 
bigger tenants. It doe not prove however that this was a 
result of a deliberate change of policy or of a prefer- 
ence on the part of the S.I.E.ltd. for the bigger tenants. 
Branches. The second allegation was that after the 
war the ;iroportion of branches of firms which were accept- 
ed as tenants for the Sdottish Industrial Estates increased 
and was too high to provide an adequate safeguard against 
widespred unemployment. 
All manufacturing units in factories administered 
b- the S .I .E.Ztd. which are no.t sole manufacturing units 
are fescribe as branches in the following analysis. It 
'ras felt that without fuller information on the organ.sot- 
ion of the individual concerns little purpose would have 
been served by distinguishing here between a branch plant 
and a subsidiary company. the latter need not necessarily 
be more independent of the parent. Apart from the dis- 
tinction in law, the difference in control exercised by 
the parent may be small and depend more on the organisat- 
ion of the individual concern than on the status of the off- 
shoot on the estates. 
During the pre -war period 46; of the floor space was 
allocated to branches which represented 41y; of the total 
number of tenants on the estates. In the post -war period. 
allocations to branches amounted to L-7-!, of the floor space 
anö. their number increased to The increase in the 
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aye ̂a. ;e size of the factory suce e.11ocated to individual branches 
was evident throu host the post-war pe, rio,',.. 
The tr b i City o.f emp? 'wrnen.t will vary of course among 
the dl.Q-rerent branches. '',ether ,.r7)dact --,n of the branch 
will be maintei.ned or whether it will leave the estate 
factory in the event of e trade recession will largely de- 
pend on the attitude of the mana eurent of the different 
firms. it is not always based on purely economic consi- 
derations. Whet decision is rade is partly determined by 
(E) the 'nationality' of the parent company, 
(2) the original reasons for establishing the branch 
in a factory of 3.I .E.Ltd. 
( ) the line of production at the branch. 
'Nationality'. The analysis of the 'nationality' of 
the nar-nt companies whose branches are in S.I.L.L d.. fa- 
ctories is of interest in this context in so far as it 
throws sorúe light on the lrieinal reasons for establishing 
branchcs and on the like_l *. conirr e of policy in the event 
of a recession. The classification of the tenants in the 
factories administered by the S.I.E.Ltd.on the basis of 
'nationality' cannot be ïaade with any high degree of accur- 
acy because of the lack of a satisfactory definition of a 
firm's 'nationality'. It can be thought of in terms of the 
place of registration, the location of the policy __.akin; 
and controlling body, or even in terras of the nationality 
of the owners when the firm is not a corporate body. 
None of these concepts is however adequate. The class- 
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i Pics.tion on the basis of th_e place of registration is the 
most strai áht f onward method , but for the purpose of indi- 
cating the employment stability of branches can be mis - 
leadin . The registered office and the main plant need 
.,öt necessarily be in the rame place. It is the location 
of t'r_e main wors in relation to the branch which is of 
i.;r.por.tance when the concentration of production is con- 
templated.. The picture is further complicated if hold- 
ing companies exist. Their existence makes it also more 
difficult to classify firms on the basis of the location 
of the policy making and controlling body. Such classifi- 
cation is in any case impossible without inside knowledge 
of the organisations considered. The nationality of the 
owners is the least meaningful. concept. It has a very 
limited application as it exudes companies. 
The definition of rnationalityr adopted for the pur- 
pose of the clacrification is two fold. When a tenant of 
unit 
the S.I.E.Ltd. has only one manufacturing, rhich is on the 
an 
estates, inn individual site or ex- government factory that 
manufacturing unit is classified as a Scottish firm. Nh_en 
the tenants are branches their 'nationality' is deter - 
mined by the location of the main works of the enterprise1 
as was known in 1952. Thus for example a Scottish sole 
manufacturing unit acquired before 1952 by another firm 
whose main works were in England, will be classified as 
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an English branch. When the main plant is .nown to be 
outside Britain the branch is described as foreign. This 
term is therefore applied to Canadian firms which have 
their branches on the Scottish Industrial Estates. 
ecnparison pf the composition of the branch group 
before and after the Tar çhoTs a. significant change in 
the numerical distribution. Thus in the pre -war period. 
Scottish branches represented. 2G, of all the branches, 
English u b and foreign 10./ In the post -war period the 
' ' 4OA and 2G. The corresponding percentages were ),- , , 
latter figures include branches both on the estates and 
in ex- government and individual site factories. During 
branches 
both periods the aggregate floor area allocated to Ñ.nglish^ 
was the largest, but whereas during the 15;0's the Scottish 
branches held the second place, between 1 45 -j2 peri_:)d it 
was taken by foreign branches. The aggregate floor area 
allocated to all branches increc d, but the share of fo- 
reign bra..nches increased more spectacularly. Compared 
with the pre -war figures their increase was 23? , that of 
Scottish branches 15, that of English brañehes rose by 
only 1/0. The share of sole manufacturing units declined 
sharply by 3);',. 
The reasons for esta'Dli_bhin; branches. The Board of 
Trade records might have answered the question why the 
different firms came to the factories. But these 
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records were confidential and tnere ore not accessible. The 
-eculiar motives of those firms that have been included 
in the sample haare been ascertained in the course of the 
survey. The results of which will be discussed in the 
following chapter. The general reasons which decided firms 
of different 'nationalities' can however be surmised. Pro- 
bably all the North American firms established branches in 
Gt. Britain for the same reasons. After the war imports 
from the hard cl.Lrr.eney areas were restricted . The firms 
therefore established branches in this country to produce 
,_,cods for sale in the Sterling Area. As at that time few 
modern factories were vacant and building materials were 
short supply factories in the Development Areas which 
were provided by the government were attractive to the 
fo.rei}vn firms. But why 80 of the North. American firms 
chose the Scottish Development Area in preference to the 
others, where government financed factories were also av- 
aila.bleremains to be explained. Their choice was likely 
to have been influenced by the vigorous publicity campaign 
and the contacts established by the S.I.E.Itd. and the 
Scottish Council who sent their representatives to the 
United States and Canada. As a large number of the Amer- 
ican firms which came to Scotland were either originally 
founded by , or have on their boards of directors, men of 
Scottish extraction, it may well be that sentimental ties 
with the Told country' played some part in their decision. 
b 
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it is more difficult to determine why the Lnglish 
firms established their branches in 6.1.L.Ltd. factories. 
Two general reasons may be inferred from a consideration 
of the locations of 91 parent plants which are known,out 
of the total of 96 English branches on the Scottish in- 
dustrial. states and in ex- government and individual site 
factories. 2irst, since the majority of the parent plants 
were located in the London area and the ididla.nds, it is 
likely that some of them suffered war damage. Ihe short- 
age of building materials would have considerably delayed 
repairspeven when repairs were possible. The immediate 
availability of factory space in a Development Area was a 
considerable incentive to these firms to transfer those 
departments which could not continue in the original pre- 
mises. If however factories were available at the same 
time in other Development Areas some additional factors 
must have influenced the individual decisions in favour of 
Scotland. Generalisationsabout these decisions are not 
percentage 
possible. Second, probably a high ,\of the 91 branches was 
established in the S..L.Ltd. factories because it was the 
easiest and quickest method of expansion. In the London 
area and the ìidlands there was likely to be little room 
for expansion of the main factory. iiew factories were 
vacant and building licences were difficult to get. More- 
over labour was scarce. A number of English firms moved 
Table 10. 
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Location of main works of firms with branches on the 
Scottish industrial Estates and in ex- government and 
individual site factories. 
English Branches, 
number of Location of their 
branches parent -works. 
43 London 








i 9 other towns in 
the Midlands 
Rest of England 
Scottish Branches. 
lumber of location of their 
branches parent -works. 
West of Scotland - 
27 Glasgow 
5 Paisley 




4 Rest of Scotland 
50 
Source; board of Trade records. 
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to Scotland out of necessity, although most were likely to 
have been offered a choice of the other Development Areas. 
Some English firms come to Scotland with the intention of 
entering the local market. 
pieither a local scarcity of labour nor a lack of room 
for expansion was likely to have been the reason why Scott- 
ish firms established branches on the estates. some of the 
27 branches whose main plants are in Glasgow may be except- 
ions_ The main works of the other 23 branches were not in 
areas which were so congested as to make local expansion 
difficult. Their expansion would not have been discouraged 
by the Board of Trade since about 30, of these firms were 
already in the Scottish Development Area:ìh Lack of capital 
to build the additional space required for increased pro- 
duction might have been one of the reasons why these firms 
rented S. I. i. Ltd. factories. 
Linesof production. The third general factor likely 
to influence the continuity of production in a branch on 
the estates is the nature of its product. The branches can 
be divided roughly into four categories, branches - 
(1) producing the same goods as the parent plant, 
(2) processing a product at a particular stage of 
production, usually performing a simple operation. 
The product is later returned to the parent plant. 
(3) servicing goods produced by the parent firm, 
(4.) manufacturing an entirely different article. 
Branches in the first two categories are most likely to be 
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closed down and production concentrated at the main work$ 
in the event of a recession. A high percentage of the 
English branches is likely to be in these categories. The 
location of the parent plants suggests, that as expansion 
of production on the origi4a1 sites was impossible, these 
branches are 'overspill} departments. Branches in the third 
category are more independent of the current production. in 
fact, in the event of recession and a fall in demand for 
new products, the repair work of the old is likely to in- 
crease. Furthermore, since those branches were set up to 
service a particular area and often to act as sales organ- 
isations, they are less likely to be closed down. r'irially 
the branches that are engaged on entirely different lines of 
production from the parent and are self contained units, 
are likely to have the highest employment stability of the 
different types of branches. But there was no information 
available to show how the production in the branches com- 
pared with that of the parent plants. 
Such information as has been obtained and analysed 
here shows that the allocation to branches, both in terms 
of their numbers and the floor area occupied increased 
after the war. This was coupled with an increasing av- 
erage size of allocation of floor area. it could be argued 
that, as as result of both these trends, less safeguard was 
provided against unemployment than if more factory space 
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had been allocated to sole manufacturing units and the size 
of the average allocation had been kept lower. The pre- 
dominance of English branches , if they ere merely 'over- 
spill' departments may be considered as undesirable. These 
branches are most likely to be closed down should the ge- 
neral level of economic activity temporarily decline. A 
fall in demand for a firm's products is likely to encourage 
the concentration of production at the parent works. liven 
if the demand for their particular products does not de- 
the 
cline, a slack in the economy geaerally may lead to^con- 
centration of production, if the supply of labour and factory 
space in the neig ourhood of the parent plants becomes 
available. Thus the original motive for coming to the Scott- 
ish Development Area would have been removed. The danger 
of considerable unemployment might be greater if the English 
branches left, than if the same number of Scottish branches 
closed down. The former are on the average bigger, in terms 
of the factory floor area occupied, and employ more workers. 
it is not suggested however that all the English branches 
are 'overspill' departments and are therefore less desirable 
as tenants. 
Scottish branches as a group may however be regarded 
as preferable, if the arguments stated above are accepted. 
They tend to be smaller and fewer of them are overspill' 
departments. 
L C 3 
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It is the foreign branches however that areAmost likely 
of the branches to continue production irrespective of the 
fluctuations of trade. Their heavier transfer costs provide 
a greater incentive to attempt to tide over a down swing in 
the trade cycle. What may be more important, a withdrawal 
from this country could mean losing a foothold in the ster- 
limg markets., expecb'lly so long as restrictions on imports 
from the hard- currency areas continue. The end of these re- 
strictions would not however necessarily imply that the fo- 
reign branches would be closed. Some of them found that their 
operative costs in Scotland were low compared with those of 
the parent plants, although the economies of large scale pro- 
duction have not yet been achieved. Should Scotland lose 
this economic advantage , the departure of foreign branches 
would have serious repercusions on the employment level 
since on the average foreign branches are bigger than either 
the English or Scottish branches. 
The total number of branches accepted as tenants after 
the war and the floor areualloted to them is high compared 
with the sole manufacturing ulnits. As a result of this, the 
maximum safeguard against unemployment in the future might 
not have been secured. But the higher percentage of floor 
area let to a greater number of branches has probably not 
reduced the prospect of the employment stability to the 
extent the figures alone might suggest. The reasons why 
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the branches were established in the S.I.L.Ltd. factories 
and the nature of their products have to be taken into account. 
The increased share after the war of the allocated space go- 
ing to Scottish and foreign branches, leading to a more ba- 
lanced distribution among the three categories of branches 
may lead to a greater employment stability. The factors 
affecting the Scottish, English and foreign undertaking, 
apart from a general slump, are likely to vary considerably 
even if they are in the same industries. The dangerttherefore, 
that the level of activity of all the branches will decline 
at the same time is somewhat reduced. A sole manufacturing 
unit need not automatically be a more stable and desirable 
tenant. 
ivative and i,ew r firms. r'inally the third criticism that 
relatively little encouragement was given to native firms, 
particular{y to the new ones, by allocation to them of S.1.L. 
Ltd. factories remains to be considered . The first part of 
of the criticism is but another way of saying that the share 
allocated to the Lnglish and foreign branches was too high. 
That the distribution of factory space among the different 
categories of tenants was not balanced, has been confirmed 
by such figures as were available. There is no indication 
however that the allocations to the "English and foreign branches 
were made at the expense of the Scottish firms. it is the 
i0 
second part of the criticism that has to be examined now. 
Scottish branches are not regarded here as new under- 
takings. It is assumed that a firm would have to be fairly 
well established before it would set up a branch. Thus only 
sole manufacturing units will be considered. Here again the 
problem of definition arises. There does not seem to be a 
satisfactory definition of what Is a new firm. In this con- 
text two bases for determining newness have been used - 
the existence of previous premises and the ae of the units 
at the time of allocation of factory space. ,t was ascertained 
from the Board of Trade records that 60 out of the 109 sole 
manufacturing units had previously occupied a factory. On 
this basis only 45 ¡ of the units were new firms. But it 
may be argued that the number of the older firms was in fact 
not as high , since some of the undertakings may have started 
in temporary premises, while awaiting completion of the 
factory on the estates. The age of the units at the time 
of the allocation of the factory space is a better indication 
of newness.(1) The period required by undertakings to esta- 
blish themselves is bound to vary depending among other 
(1) Information both on previous location and on age was 
not available in all cases. The results of the two 
analysis are not derived from the study of the same 
firms. 
_11 
factors on the industry to which they belong. Firms which 
have occupied a government financed factory for five years 
are considered by the government as established and are no 
iongdr entitled to a rent rebate. A firm which has been in 
existence for five years or. less is regarded as a new under- 
taking for the purpose of this analysis. The period during 
which the units were in existance before the allocation to 
them of S.1. Ltd. factories was ascertained from the 3oard 
of Trade records in respect of 57 firms. Only 30j,, of these 
were five years old or less.(1) This is an even lower per- 
centage than on the first basis. ..hichever basis is used 
it would appear that the majority of the 1u9 sole manufact- 
uring units were not new undertakings. 
Thus all the three allegations appear to be based on 
facts. Allocations of bigger factory floor area were made 
to individual tenants. A high number of branches were accepted 
as tenants. Industrial estates facilities were offered to 
Scottish firms, particularly to new undertakings, on a rela- 
tively small scale. The question still remains as to whatextent 
(1) Age of prospective tenants at the time of the allocation 
of factories. 
number of years in existence. ,dumber of tenants, 
percentage. 
6-10 3 23 
11 -30 12 
21 -30 11 10(Y/0 
31 -50 11 




this was,result of a policy on the part of the authorities 
and to what extent has it been brought about indirectly by 
a change in the economic conditions. ?-whether the inter- 
pretation of these facts fully justifies such criticisms as 
have been made must also be considered. 
The S.I.i;.Ltd. is not in the strict sense a business 
undertaking. :gut it cannot ignore the preference of firms 
for particular types of factories, if it is to attract tenants. 
Offering e-f small factories was probably the most practical 
way of securing them before the war. It was to the small 
firms that the industrial estate facilities were most likely 
TAB,tív 
to appeal. A i,irnited capital resources,,uncertainty of the 
economic prospects,Adifficulty of research into the suitability 
of location, made the availability of government financed 
factories on rental basis and msupply of information on 
location free of charge, a consiaerable inducement for the 
small firms to Eo to the Scottish Development Area. These 
considerations were of less importance to big and established 
undertakings:, especially as the level of economic activity in 
the country as a whole was low and there was little industrial 
expansion anywhere. 
A change in the economic conditions after the war may 
have been partly responsible for bigger average allocations 
to individual undertakings. The tr.e boom, the increased 
demand for factory premises and the consequent scarcity of 
L1; 
vacant factories, the difficulty in obtaining cog building 
licenses and in accumulating capital reserves on account of 
inflation and taxes, tended to increase the attractivriess of 
the industrial estates. r actories which could he 
occupied immediately, or within a relatively short time with- 
out capital outlay, became a considerable inducement also to 
bigger firms to move to the Levelopment Teas. These firms 
however required more factory space. Had the S.l.F.ltd nôt 
provided them with larger factories, they would probably not 
have come to Scotland. 
it may be however that in so far as priority in allo- 
cation of factory space had been given by the board Trade 
to firms with high export potential the scales have been 
tipped somewhat Iñ favour of the bigger firms. The small 
firms tend to concentrate on the home market. Sales abroad 
involve more risk. There is the difficulty of finding agents. 
The cost of an independent selling organisation is often 
prohibitive for a small firm. Some have pooled their re- 
sources for the purpose of safes promotion abroad and have 
broken into foreign markets. These are however the except- 
ion rather than the rule. It may therefore be that as the 
Scottish firms in the light engineering group tend to be 
smaller than the i nglish, fewer of them were eligible for 
the Scottish Industrial estates factories on the grounds of 
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export potential. Those that have come to the estates 
after the war have also on the average been larger. 
The increasing average allocation of floor space on the 
Scottish Industrial Estates may reflect a general trend 
in British industry towards larger manufacturing units.(1 ) 
The increased a.ttractiviess of the industrial estates 
facilities to bigger undertakings resulted in willingness 
on the part of a considerable number of English firms to 
come to Scotland. The acceptance of them as tenants for 
the S.I.E.Ltd. factories created immediate employment. There 
is therefore some advantage in this imigration even if only 
on a short term basis. Should most of them stay permanently 
there would be a positive long term gain. 
The forebodings of those who criticised the allocations 
of the S.I.E.Ltd. factories have not so far been realised. 
The number of tenants who have left is small.(2) Although 
on the average they occupied medium size factories, their 
labour value was low, since they did not reach their potent- 
ial employment level before leaving.(3)In the aggregate their 
labour force amounted to 6 %) of the total number of workers 
employed in 1952 in the S.I.E.Ltd. factories. Thus no ap- 
preciable unemployment was created as a result of their de- 
parture. Even when, as in one case, a large number of workers 






The sizes of firms which have left the 
Scottish Industrial Estates classified 
on the number of workers employed. 
Numbers of workers. 
employed. 
Number of firms. 
1- 10 4 
11- 20 9 
21- 50 5 
51- 70 2 
71- 100 2 
100- 200 1 
201- 300 2 
301- 400 - 
401- 500 - 
501- 1 000 2 
27 x 
x The total figure does not include one firm 
for which the labour value was not available. 
Source, The Scottish Industrial Estates Ltd. 
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was involved no prolonged unemployment developed. The 
surplus workers were quickly absorbed by neighbouring firms. 
Had economic conditions been less favourable generally such 
rapid absorption might not have been possible . So far 
English branches have not shown a lesser stability of 
employment. Of the tenants who left, English branches 
represented 380, Scottish firms 55 %, and premises rel sed 
by the government 7441)The English branches which were allo- 
cated factories after the war have shown a somewhat higher 
rate of industrial growth than the other categories of te- 
nants. Thus, if the trend continues they offer good pros- 
pects of increasing employment in the long run. 
The Industrial Growth of Tenants. The growth of tenants 
of the S.I.E.Itd. has been estimated on the basis of the 
(1) No information was obtained on how many of the Scottish 
firms which left the estates were branches and how many 
were sole manufacturing units. They could therefore not 
be expressed separately as percentages of the total num- 
ber of branches and of the total number of sole manufact- 
uring units. 
Of the firms which came to the Scottish Industrial 
Estates after the war, 76 were English branches and 
125 Scottish firms. - Ch.13, p.219, 
The English branches which left oetween 1946 and 1)52 
represented 14A of those allocated factories during this 
period, the figure for Scottish firms was 126. 
following formula, - 
i,'loor expansion (sq. ft. ) 




As the labour figures for individual tenants (with the ex- 
ception of those included in the sample) were not obtainable, 
the additional floor area acquired since the time of the 
original allocation of factory premises was used as an in- 
dication of Growth. These figures are not altogether satis- 
factory because some of the tenants might have acquired add- 
itional floor area in anticipation of, and not as a result 
of actual expansion in production. in so far as this has 
happened the additional floor area acquired does not reflect 
real growth. To obtain the coefficient of growth the number 
of years the individual firms -had been on the estates had to 
be taken into account, since the duration of tenancy has some 
effect on expansion. English and foreign branches showed the 
Greatest growth. Some of the expansion since the war may 
have been however merely an increase in the floor area to 
meet the original space requirements, which might not have 
been fully satisfied when the initial allocation was made. 
3ut the information obtained suggests that the greater part 
0.n 
of the expansion was motivated by,,increased level of product- 
ion. This may be taken as an indication that location in the 
S.I.L.Ltd. has proved satisfactory. ? fuller treatment of 
this point is only possible on the basis of opinions voiced 
by the business men concerned. These will be the subject matter 
of the following chapter. 
Table 12. 
Coefficient of Tenants' Growth. 
Year of Sole Scottish Branches 
original manufacturing 










c).066 - 0.070 
0.055 0.03 0.100 
i 
0.008 0.009 ' 0.018 
0.036 0.040 ; 0.180 
0.025 - f0.194 
0.110 0.084 1 0.120 































(1) Expansion built privately. 




Number of Undertakings and the Size of Factory Space Allocated 
tranc es 
of Tenants Scottish Units Scottish English Foreign 
No. "rea sqft.lo. Area sq.ft. No. Area sq. ft. No. Area sq.ft. No. Area sq.ft. 












4 95.000 6 
( LI.085) (9.720) (27;250) 
241 8.183.024 75 1.003.837 I.474.554 76 
3u6 8.856.984 109 1.1121.%i57 96 
1537- 
j2. (28.944) 





































space as a percentage. 
3ra.nç hes Scottish English !Foreign lgov.and semi-gov. 
estab. 






































The success achieved by the Scottish Industrial Estates. 
The sucess achieved by the S. I.:. Ltd. can be looked at 
from three points of view, that of the inhabitants of the 
Scottish Development Area, that of the tenants of the S.I.L. 
than 
Ltd. and of the economy as a whole. We shall therefore 
consider, - 
the role of the S. I. E. Ltd. in the government's 
policies for employment and the diversification 
and distribution of industry, 
the performance of the tenants of the S.I.E.Ltd. 
the economic and social gains and losses from 
the point of view of the economy of the whole 
country. 
The primary objects of the industrial estates were to create 
employment and to diversify the industrial structure on a 
regional basis. Thus the first question which has to be 
asked is to what extent has the S. I.E. Ltd. been successful 
in achieving these objectives. 
(a) Employment. 
An outline of the unemployment position in Scotland 
before and after the establishment of the S. I.,. Ltd.. will be 
helpful in assessing the contribution of the Scottish in- 
the 
dustrial Estates tcAcreation of employment in the Scottish 
Development Area. Trends in unemployment between 1929 and 
1952 are considered. 1929 as the earliest year for which 
unemployment figures are available that are comparable with 
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tih those of later years. This year is associated with 
the economic crisis. But the crash occured in the second 
half of the year and did not have an immediate effect on 
the level of employment. 1929 was not an abnormal year in 
so far as the unemployment figures are concerned. The use 
therefore of 1929 as the base year neither minimises the 
effects of the slump mn employment, nor exaggerates the ex- 
tent of the subsequent rectvery. The trends of unemployment 
in Scotland are shown by unemployment percentage series and 
by the unemployment inidices. (1) .lumbers of unemployed workers 
th¢ 
are expressed yearly as a percentage of insured workers in 
Scotland from 1929 to 1952. The indication of trends in 
unemployment by the percentage series has the disadvantage in 
that the National insurance Scheme was altered. It was ex- 
tended in 1948. The new groups brought into the scheme 
included; non -manual labourers with salaries over .,423 p. a.) 
self - employed persons, temporary civil servants and local 
authorities' employees. The statistical data before and 
after 19L18 is therefore not strictly comparable. Unemploy- 
ment among members of these groups was likely to have been 
low. When therefore the numbers of unemployed workers are 
expressed as a percentage of the 'new' insured population, 
the level of unemployment would appear to have fallen more 
than it actually did. But since in Scotland the insured 
(1') Table 24,p.529 
-4 
Table 14. 
_cercentae oneir,-)1D:Ted in ,;)eaMT ver 
i-J.rincipal towns in Scotland '.:here unemplo:Tment in 192 
exceeded the percente of unem.ployment for Scotland. 
Local office UneiluDloyment as at 
of ,Linistry Ju177._1.22. 
of Labour. ale ! Female Tot.1 
ClydebanL, ii5uL, 2u),2 1;u1? 
±'ort Glas- 4-1,-, (;4 45r/4 
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ital goods industries in Scotland were not the first to con- 
tract. On the basis of the trade cycle theory one might have 
expected them to have done so. In spite of what appears to be 
the evidence to the contratWt is probably true that they did 
in fact contract first. The earlier peak of unemployment among 
women could have been caused by the tendency on the part of 
the employers to dismiss women first, expecially as a higher 
percentage of then, were unskilled. it may well have been that 
employers in the capital goods industries endeavoured to retain 
their labour force intact as long as possible even though the 
volume of production decreased. There is a considerable ad- 
vantage in maintaining teams of highly trained workers in an- 
ticipation of future demaiid,even at the time when the demand 
for the output does not fully justify it. This is particular- 
ly true of the heavy industries in which team work is of im- 
portance. Another factor might also have accounted for the 
earlier high unemployment among women in Scotland. In the 
19301s a high percentage of those who were employed were in 
domestic service. in some places there was no alternative 
work for them, particularly in the West of Scotland where the 
heavy industries were the main source of employment. At the 
time of falling incomes the dismissal of domestic servants 
was likely to have been one of the first household economies. 
rrom 1934 onwards a slow recovery began. This could not have 
been ascribed to the beneficial effects of the pecial Areas 
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(.ievelopment and improvement) Act which was only passed in 
that year. The improvement in employment was more likely 
to have been caused by a general economic recovery and the 
adoption by the government of the rearmament programmeyin 
1936. The first Scottish Industrial listate was not esta- 
blished until 1937. The government's regional employment 
policy could not therefore have had much impact on the em- 
ployment policy position before the war broke out. 
'roll' employment was reached during the war. The 
effect of the mobilisation of all available human resources 
is reflected in Scotland in the unemployment figures, for 
1940 the first full year of war, 1943 the peak year of the 
war effort and finally 1945 the last year of war. The in- 
crease in unemployment among women in 1940 . over the 1939 
level and a drop of some 50 /, in the number of unemployed . 
the 
men was caused byAmobilisation of men for the armed forces 
a,e 
on the one hand and on the other by,registration for war 
w-)rk by women, who could not be immediately absorbed by in- 
dustries. In 1943 the total unemployment was reduced to the 
unprecedently low level of 17o. The unemployment indices 
dropped from 136 in 1939 to 17. 1.3y. 1945 there was very 
little change in the employment position. The end of war 
production and the release of men and women from the armed 
forces increased slightly in 1946 the unemployment level. 
This increase was however temporary and was largely caused 
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by readjustment to the 'semi' peace -time economic conditions. 
Even in 1946 which was the year of highest unemployment in 
the post -war period only 50 of the insured workers were un- 
employed,compared with 290 in the peak year of the inter - 
war period. On the average unemployment in Scotland of 
approximatel during the 1543 -52 period was roughly six 
times less than between 1929 and 1939. 
There has therefore been no serious unemployment in 
Scotland since the war. The level of unemployment in Scotland 
has nevertheless been higher than in ingland.(1) further- 
more such unemployment as there has been in Scotland has not 
been distributed evenly over the country. The unemployment 
problem had not therefore disappeared altogether. The same 
was also true of the other areas defined formerly as the 
Special Areas. The pre -war government -sponsored industrial 
estates scheme was extended by the Levelopment Areas le- 
gislation to cope with the regional unemployment which still 
remained. 
The impact of the Scottish industrial Estates Ltd. on 
the employment in Scotland can only be studied in the post- 
(1) Percentage of Insured Persons Unemployed. 
Year Scotland England Source, Royal .ommtssion on 
1938 16.3 12.0 Scottish Affairs,:1952- 54,Cmd. 
1983 2.7 1.0 9212, (1954), p. 19. 
1949 3.0 1.0 
1950 3.1 1.0 There is a small difference 
1951 2.5 1.0 between the above figures for 
11952 3.3 2.0 Scotland and those in table 2.4 
because the former are 12 months averages, and the latter 
are calculated on the basis of the July figures. 
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war period. As has already been pointed out the estates were 
in existence before the war for too short a time to have had 
much effect on the Scottish economy. It would be incorrect 
to compare the annual changes in the level of employment 
provided by the projects on the estates with the changes in 
the level of employment in the regions within which they are 
located and to hold the former entirely responsible for the 
latter. There was a number of other factors in operation in 
the post -war period which affected the level of unemployment 
in the Scottish Development Area. This is partly shown by the 
much greater variations in the level of unemployment than in 
employment created by the new projects. The considerably 
greater decrease in unemployment than the increase in employ- 
ment on tiese projects was to some extent the result of the 
multiplier effect of the employment initially created. The 
size of the multiplier can not be estimated here. It is never- 
theless possible to obtain some rough idea of the contribution 
of the S.I.L.Ltd. to the reduction in unemployment in Scotland 
by considering the volume of employment created by projects in 
the government financed factories and the changes in the level 
of unemployment in the areas within which they are located. 
r'or the purpose of the following analysis, unemployment 
for - ,.'o.;en 
in Scotland is shown on a regional basis.(1) rieuresAare 
given separately for each region in which an industrial estate, 
or estates are located. There are six of these regions; 
(1) Table 25 =r p 33O 
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Glasgow and East Dunbartonshire,iunbartonshire 
Lanarkshire, Ayrshire .north ;central, 
Renfrewshire, Dundee. 
All of them are in wh,t is now scheduled as the Scottish 
Development Area. In the accompanying table under the head- 
of the 'Rest of the development Area are included small 
places, where the pockets of unemployment did not justify 
the establishment of estates, but where individual govern- 
ment financed factories were eri'ected. Unemployment figures 
were compiled for the purpose of comparison on the same re- 
gional basis from 1929 to 1952. This meant that they had to 
be calculated as if the ácottish Development Area existed in 
its present shape from 1929 onwards. Returns of tie kinistry 
of Labour local offices had to be grouped together to give 
the unemployment figures on the required basis. 
These figures are given in table 25 for a number of se- 
lected years. They were chosen to show the unemployment 
position at certain times when trha current events were likely 
to influence the level of employment. 1929 was the earliest 
year for which statistics comparable with those of later years 
were available. in 193.2 the culminating point of the slump 
was reached. In 1934 the Special Areas (Development and im- 
provement) Act was passed. in 1936 the rearmament programme 
was initiated. 1938 etas the last pre -war year and one during 
which the level of activity was relatively high. The pre- 
war unemployment figures are given to show how small in com- 
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parison was the problem of unemployment after the war. They 
also show that the uneven distribution of unemployment in Scot- 
land was not a temporary phenomena. Throughout the 1929 -52 
period the percentage of unemployed insured workers in the 'Scot- 
tish Development Area' was higher than in the rest of Scotland.(1) 
The employment created by the projects in the S.I.E.Ltd 
factories after the war may be compared with the existing un- 
employment. The graph on page 230 shows the changes in the em- 
ployment of men and women in the factories in relation to unem- 
ployment in Scotland.(2) Workers of different ages could not 
be treated separately because some of the firms in this study 
were unable to supply information on this point. In 1;46 ,4.7 
of the insured workers were unemployed in Scotland; 2.7A of them 
were in the Scottish Development Area and 2A in the rest of the 
country. During 1;47 -48 there was a decline in unemployment, 
while employment on the industrial estates in all the regions 
with the exception of Ayrshire markedly increased. This con- 
tributed on a considerable scale to the fall in unemployment in 
the Scottish Development Area. In 1948 -49 the holding off on the 
part of foreign buyers from placing orders in Britain, in anti- 
cipation of devaluation, affected the level of employment in 
Scotland. Unemployment increased. At the same time, restrict- 
ions imposed by the British government on capital investment 
which was not on priority lists slowed down the building of the 
government financed factories. This accounted partly for the lower 
rate of increase in employment on the new projects during 1943 -49 
in the Scottish Development Area. The combined effect of the 
(1) Table 2.p._'.0 
(/) Table 2 . p . p» , table 27.1).-2. 
Employment in government 
financed factories in the 
Scottish Development Area, 
m men, 
w women. 
The insured unemployed 




;source, Ministry of Labour. 
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different factors was to reduce employment during 19L.9 -50 
still further. The number of new privately financed projects 
decreased both in the Development Area and in thë rest of Scot- 
land. The number of new projects located in the S. I. E. Ltd. 
factories during 1919 -50 suggests that the government tried 
to counteract the unemployment trend by encouraging new projects 
to go to the Scottish Development Area. The fall in unemploy- 
ment during 1G5u -51 may be partly attributed to this policy. 
but the rate of expansion on the Scottish Industrial Estates 
was not maintained during 1970 -51. 3y 1951 -52 unemployment 
increased. Restrictions on imports imosed by some of the Com- 
a 
monwelth countries,to cope with their balance of payments dif- 
ficulties , had repercussions on the 3ritish economy. Scottish 
industries were not iñune from the effects. .c or the first 
time since the war employment on the Scottish industrial Estates 
fell. When total employment on all projects in the S. 1. E. Ltd. 
is considered, there was some increase. This was in contrast 
to the general trend, as employment in the six regions of the 
Scottish Development Area and in other parts of the country 
fell. Thus the figures in the accomanying taJles suggest that 
the projects in the S..E.Ltd factories have shown not only 
employment stability but even expansion in the face of the ad- 
verse economic conditions. 
y 1;52, 73, of the approved post -war projects sited in 
Scotland which accounted for approximately 840 of the newlyV rcated 
2;2 2
employment were located in the Scottish Development Area. (1) 
Of these 572h were in the government financed factories and 
provided 82¡ of the newly created employment in the Scottish 
Development Area. The above figures show that the industrial 
development, as measured in terms of employment, in privately 
o 
built factories was on a relatively small scale in thei Se\ttish 
Development Area and even smaller in the other parts of Scot- 
land. Since there was no restriction on factory building in 
the Development Areas, this must have been the result partly 
of inability and partly of unwillingness on the part of private 
investors to finance factory construction in Scotland. There 
would not however appear to have been similar unwillingiess 
to carry on manufacturing in the Scottish Development Area, 
judged by the number of successful applicants for the S.I.E. 
Ltd. factories. - Information on both the successful and un- 
successful applicants would have been more meaningful. but 
it was not available for the latter.- it can therefore be 
assumed that if the programme of building government financed 
factories had not been carried out in the post -war period, the 
rate of the industrial deyelopment in the bcottish Develop- 
ment Area would have been slower. 
The immigration of the new manufacturing undertakings 
to the Scottish Development Area although it reduced the 
numbers of unemployed workers, did not alter the incidence of 
unemployment in Scotland. The distribution of the unemployed 
workers on the regional basis in the post -war period hardly 
(I) Table 2b . p . >1 
differed from that of the pre -war days.( )In the late 1920's 
1 h Q. 
and ii,1930's on the average 72j of the unemployment in 
Scotland was concentrated in the 'Development Area', but 
only about a half of the population of Scotland lived there. 
In the post -war period hbout 70yÁ of the unemployed workers 
were in the Development Area. its population in relation to 
the rest of Scotland hardly changed. Since the majority 
of the new projects after the war were located in the De- 
velopment Area, a bigger reduction in the incidence of un- 
employment there might have been expected. 'A drop in em- 
ployment by the heavy industries, such for example as had 
been caused by the closure of some of the mines in Lanark- 
shire, might have to some extent neutralised the effects of 
locating new projects in the government financed factories. 
But had the S.I.E.Ltd. not attracted new firms the concentrat- 
ion of unemployment in the Scottish Development would have 
increased. 
un the basis of the statistics which have been obtained 
it can be argued that the S.I.E.Ltd. has achieved a measure 
of success in reducing unemployment in the Scottish Develop- 
ment Area. But as it has already been pointed out, no de- 
finite targets have been laid down. It is therefore impo- 
ssible to assess precisely how much success has been achieved 
in terms of reduction in unemployment as a result of a de- 
liberate employment policy on the part of the government 
carried through the S. i. E. Ltd. 
( 1) Table 28.1;. .53 
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(b) The Diversification and Distribution of Industry. 
The second objective that the government sought to 
achieve by the establishment of the industrial estates was 
to diversify the industrial structure of the Development Areas 
and at the same time to secure a more balanced distribution 
of industry generally. The role of the Scottish Industrial 
kstates in relation to the diversification of industry in 
the Scottish Development Area and in rel ltion to the dis- 
tribution of industry in Scotland, remains therefore to be 
considered. As a background to this study it will be help- 
ful to sketch roughly thé industrial structure of Scotland. 
An indication of the relative importance of the different 
industries in the Scottish economy could be obtained from 
the analysis of output figures of the different industries 
or from their employment figures. The former would have to 
be expressed on the basis of a common denominator, for ex- 
ample in the terms of money. But the value of the output 
or the cost of production are subject to a variety of factors 
for which due allowance could not be made here. A more im- 
portant drawback to the use of the output figures is that 
there are no comprehensive oOut statistics for the different 
Scottish. industries for the period 1929 -52. Employment 
figures for the different industries in Scotland are how- 
ever available for all these years. The employment figures 
are preferable therefore to the output figures as ari in- 
dication of the industrial structure of Scotland. The em- 
ployment figures were consequently arranged to show: - 
(a) the diversity of industry in Scotland, (table 17 ), 
(b) the distribution of industries in terms of employ- 
ment between the Scottish :Development Area and the 
rest of Scotland, (table 13), 
(c) the changes in the employment levels in the different 
industries in the 1,evelopmentiArea and the rest of 
Scotland, (table 1; ). 
Methods of computation of th6 employment figures. it was 
felt that it was unnecessary for these purpuses to give em- 
ployment figures annually, instead, a number of years was 
selected, which were of particular significance. The pre- 
war and war years were chosen for the same reasons as before. 
The post -war years were chosen for the following reasons: - 
191;_5, the last year of war; 191.7, the economic crisis; 1948 
the change in the National insurance Scheme and in the i.;inistry 
of Labour standard industrial classification, balance of pay- 
ments difficulties which led to the devaluation4 1951,out- 
break of the Korean war; 1954 the last year of this study. 
The employment figures for these years have been obtained 
by subtraction of the number of unemployed from the number of 
insured workers in the same industry. Only the total employ- 
ment figures are given. No distinction is made between male 
and female workers since both groups tend to be concentrated 
in the same localities. Separate figures would not throw 
additional light on the distribution of industries. The 
employment figures have been compiled for the manufacturing 
2,6 
industries in Scotland, - with the exception of very small em- 
ployers of labour,- for construction and related industries 
and for the distributive trades. The main concern of this 
study is with the manufacturing industries. The construction 
and related industries were included because they recruit 
from the same pool of male labour. The distributive trades 
were included because they offer alternative employment to 
factory work, particularly for women. 
The industries considered have been grouped on thebasis 
of the standard industrial classification of the Ministry of 
Labour. The exception is the coal mining industry which was 
included in the tables together with the other heavy indus- 
tries under the heading of the 'investment industries'. As 
the 1inistry of Labour classification was changed in 1948 
to conform with the international classification, some adjust- 
ment of the employment statistics in the tables was necessary 
to maintain the same composition of the industrial groups. 
The Linistry of Labour classification was thé most practical 
for the purpose of this study since the employment statistics 
could be extracted from the Ministry of Labour records. 
The significance of the tables. In table 17 employment 
in Scotland is classified under the headings of industrial 
groups and expressed as a percentage of the toatal insured 
population in Scotland. This table shows that there were 
light industries in cptland even in the 1930's. But it 
also shows the relatively small part played by them in the 
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Scottish economy with the exception of the food and textiles 
industries. There was particularly little development of the 
newer types of light industries, such as those included in the 
construction and repair of vehicles and aircraft, electrical 
engineering and precision instruments. it can be seen from 
the employment percentages that the heavy industries declined 
in relative importance during the 1929-52 period. Only during 
the war years did the shipbuilding and ship- repairing, marine 
engineering , steel melting, iron puddling and iron anu steel 
rolling industries improve upon their 1529 position. The pig 
iron and coal mining industries steadily decreased in relative 
importance in the Scottish economy. t is of interest to note 
that the share of employment provided by the construction and 
building industries increased in 1932. This suggeststhat so 
far as Scotland is concerned, the public works programme might 
not have been as ineffectual in counteracting a cyclical trend 
as it has been supposed to be. (1) The increase in the employ- 
ment percentage of the distributive trades in thelate 1930's 
is however surprising. It might have been that the redundant 
industrial workers who sought employment in these trades,which 
before because of the lower wage structure. were less attractive, 
remained in their new jobs even though conditions in industry 
improved again. 
The war had a considerable effect on the industrial 
structure of Scotland. The relative importance of the food, 
textiles, clothing, furiture and other consumer industries 
(1) Ch. 1 pp 
16. 
2)8 
declined, as workers were transferred to industries more 
directly concerned with the war production. A revival of the 
heavy industries followed. These changes in the relative im- 
portance of the different industrial groups were of a temporary 
nature. The stimulus given to the'newer'industries by the 
war production which increased their relative importance had 
however 10216 term effects on the industrial structure of Scot- 
land. 
lfter the war the Scottish economy did not settle back to 
the same pattern as in the 1930's. but the change in the 
country's: industrial structure was very gradual. The heavy 
industries were still the dominant group although their re- 
lative importance had somewhat declined. The industries pro- 
ducing consumer goods had on the whole regained the ground 
which they had lost during the war. The construction and re- 
lated building industries declined. shortages of building 
materials and restrictions imposed by the government on non- 
essential building were partly responsible for this. The 
decrease in the relative importance of the distributive trades 
from 194.8 onwards is again somewhat puzzling. The manufact- 
uring industries,which in the post -war period were in need of 
labour, might have been able to draw away some of the workers 
from the distributive trades. If that did in fact happen, it 
would explain the decline in the relative importance of these 
trades in terms of employwent. but the extension of the 
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National Insurance Scheme to cover self -employed persons 
should on the other hand,increased the level of employment 
in this group, since there is a particularly large number 
of one -man or family businesses. 
The important difference between the pre- and post- war 
pattern of the industrial structure of Scotland was the re- 
sult of a considerable advance made by the newer industries. 
There were three factors working towards this change: the 
decentralisation of industry during the war, particularly as 
the South of England became a danger area, the stimulus given 
to the new light industries by the armament production, and 
the government's post -war policy for the regional diversifi- 
cation of industry. 
When the industrial structure of Scotland as a whole is 
considered in the light of table 17 the need for industrial 
diversification does not appear so obvious. I'he light in- 
dustries were not entirely unrepresented. _Lt was the small 
scale on which they had developed which created problems. 
These problems were particularly serious in the Scottish 
Development Area. Thus the governments regional diversifi- 
cation of industry policy had to be considered not only in 
terms of bringing new industries to the Scottish ,Jevelopment 
Area but also of encouraging there the growth of light in- 
dustries. 
The concentration of the heavy industries in the Scott- 
ish uevelopment Area (excluding :)undee and the Inverness area ) 
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had also created the problem o' unbalanced distribution of 
industry in Scotland generally. In the 19th century and in 
the early 1920's these industries attracted an increasing 
number of workers. The area became the centre of industrial 
population in Scotland. Other industries therefore tended to 
in:ì_ustri 
move to , and new to establish themselves in,the south -west 
of Scotland. The unbalanced distribution of industry in Scot- 
land is shown in table 1 In it the numbers of workers em- 
ployed in the different industries located both in the 'De- 
velopment Area' and in the Pest of Scotland are expressed as 
a percentage of the insured population in those industries. 
In considering the following figures it has to be remembered 
1 
that the Scottish Development Area is about lj th. thesize 
of the rest of Scotland. Thus the concentration of industries 
in the west is even greater than might appear at first sight. 
On the average in the 1930's about 09 of all workers employed 
in the heavy industries were working in the Scottish Develop- 
ment Area. In the post -war period this percentage was 8L . 
Employment in coal mines is not included in these figures. 
The distribution of coal mines as between the Development 
Area and non -Development Area is more even, but that of course 
could not hage been the result of a location policy. if the 
employment figures in the mining industry are included with 
the other heavy industries, then the percentage of workers 
in the group as a whole who were employed in the Development 
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area was approximately in both the pre- and post -war per- 
iods. 
The distribution of the light industries in Scotland , 
a4though more even, still falls far short of what could be 
regarded as a balanced distribution of industry. The highest 
concentration in the Development Area appears to be among 
firms in the tailoring industry. On the average in the 1930's 
about 732, of their employees were working in this area. After 
the war this percentage increased to 82. The other light 
industries the concentration of which increased in the Develop - 
ment Area in the post- as compared with the pre -war period 
were: furniture and upholstery, leather goods (excludi :foot- 
wear) and tanning, boots and shoes (excluding rubber). The 
percentage increases were respectively 69 -7370, 63 -72 ¡c and 
53 -67v. The distribution of the chemical industry remained 
more or less unchanged with .about of the workers in the 
Development Area. The division of employment between the 
Development and _,on- .uevelopment Area in the food, textiles 
and paper industries, was roughly in the ratio of 1 :1 and 
there was little difference between the two periods. The 
newer light industries , particulat .y the precision instruments 
industry, gravitated towards the Development Area. The over- 
all picture of industrial location in Scotland is therefore 
one of unbalanced distribution not only of the heavy industries 
hut of the light industries as well- 
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The change in the employment trends in the different in- 
dustries in Scotland partly accounts for the change in their 
relative importance in the Scottish economy and for the dis- 
tribution of industry in the country generally. The level 
of employment in the different industrial groups within an 
area is influenced by two factors, the varying fortunes of 
the member firms and the introduction of new undertakings. 
The employment indices in table I; reflect both. It has 
however been impossible to attribute the variations in the 
employment trends to each cause separately. 
The employment indices are calculated for the same in- 
dustrial groups as were included in table 7. 1929 is the 
base year. 3ut because of the extension of the Rational 
Insurance Scheme, which made the pre- and post- 1948 figures 
not strictly comparable, an alternative set of indices was 
calculated with 1948 as the base year. Thé new entrants to 
the scheme had probably little effect on the level of employ- 
ment in the manufacturing industries generally as shown by 
the statistics extracted from the 1,inistry of Labour records. 
Thus the first series of indices is likely to have been little 
affected by the expansion of the Aational insurance Scheme. 
It is therefore preferable to the series based on 1948 as it 
covers a much longer period. 
The employment indices for all the industrial groups in 
table 9were higher in 1952 than in 1929, with the exception 
¿4_ 
of the coal mining and pig iron industries. The level of 
employment in these two industries declined in absolute terms. 
The relative decline in importance of the heavy industries as 
a group in the Scottish economy is however to be accounted 
for,not by a fall in the total level of employment, but by 
a relatively lower rate of expansion' than that of the light 
industries. The increase in employment in the different in- 
dustries in those two broad categories was not uniform. The 
new light industries: motor vehicles (aircraft), electrical 
engineering and precision instruments industries expanded 
most and out of all proportion to the others. 
The trends in the activity of the industries in the 
ieveloprrent Area did not exactly parallel the trends in the 
rest of Scotland although the same economic factors would 
have been expected to affect similar industries regardless of 
location. On the whole the light industries expanded most 
in the Development Area. The greater rate of expansion is 
probably attributable not to the greater success on the part 
of the firms located there, but to imigration and the esta- 
blishment there of new undertakings. .reference for location 
in the Development Area was undoubtedly influenced by general 
economic factors and the topography of Scotland. but the 
government's policy of regional diversification and distri- 
bution of industry was probably an important factor in in- 
fluencing the location of light industry in the Scottish 
Development Area. 
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The im act of the Scottish industrial .states on the in- 
dustrial structure of the Scottish _oevelopment Area and on 
the distribution of industry. 
The contribution of the Scottish Industrial Lstates to 
furthering the diversification of the industrial structure of 
the Scottish l.'evelopment Area is roughly inuicated by the 
tenancy of the factories. It was impossible to express the 
extent of industrial diversification created by allocation of 
the S.I.E.Ltd. in terms of employment. Lmployment figures 
for individual undertakings could not be disclosed by govern- 
ment departments. In any case sire the diversification of 
industry is a long term policy and the majority of the S.I.E. 
Ltd. tenants rented factories after the war, their contri- 
bution to the industrial diversification in the Scottish De- 
velopment Area could not be fully assessed at this stage. 
As has been shown in the table26 the actual employment on 
the ndw projects was considerably below the potential employ- 
ment as estimated by the firms themselves. The spread of 
firms among the various industries does however show that a 
foundation has been laid for a diversified industrial struct- 
ure. 
ln table 2u the 330 tenants of the S.I.1.Ltd. are class- 
ified on the basis of industrial groups. The same Ministry 
of Labour classification was used as in the preceeding tables 
in this chapter. The facilities of the Scottish Industrial 
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Estates are intended primarily for manufacturing units. But 
premises were provided for : canteens, banks, post offices 
and kinistry of Labour exchange office to service tenants on 
the estates. Undertakings providing services represent 2.14,, 
of all the tenants. The manufacturing undertakings are fairly 
evenly divided between producers of investment and consumer 
goods. The former represent 43 c and the latter .4 ¡. Tenants 
in construction and related building industries account for 
5.5i. Producers of investment goods on the estates and those 
in the construction etc. industries are not however in the 
heavy industries class. Although the final output of a few of 
the firms in the engineering group could be regarded as in- 
volving heavy engineering work, they are engaged on assemble-.y 
work only. Those tenants classified under shipbuilding and 
ship- repairing are ancilla y industries in the light industries 
group. 
l able 20 shows that in the allocation of S. I. i .Ltd. factor- 
ies among firms in different industries a balance has been 
maintained as well as diversity achieved. The diversity is 
greater than the broad classification suggests. The variety 
of goods produced by the S.I.E.Ltd. tenants is impressive. 
They range from synthetic jewels to earth moving equipment. 
The contribution of these various undertakings to the 
diversification of the industrial structure can be considered 
from two angles, first ,whether they were new to the area, 
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second, to which industrial group they belong. Of the O6 
tenants for whom more detailed information was obtained 12 
were English Branches which were known to have had previous 
premises in Scotland. These had been vacated on allocation of 
S.I.E.Ltd. factories. 56 were branches of Scottish firms of 
which 2 /3rd. have been established in the Scottish Development 
Area for some time. All these undertakings were therefore not 
new to the area. But sinee presumably these undertakings 
were allocated factories to facilitáte their expansion, if 
they did in fact expand, they helped to redress the balance 
in favour of the heavy industries. Allocation of factories 
to them can therefore be regarded as in keeping with the 
government's policy of regional diversification of industry 
through encouragement of light industries. 
On the basis of industrial classification it would 
appear that at least some 22,0 of the tenants belonged to in- 
dustrial groups which were already fairly well represented 
in the Scottish Development Area. A considerable number of 
tenants belong to the food and drink, textiles, clothing, 
and paper and printing industries. It could therefore be 
arued that firms belonging to these industrial groups were 
not the best types of tenants from the point of view of in- 
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dustrial diversification. In this respect those tenants who 
are classified under shipbuilding and ship -repairing industry 
1R- 
are even less desirable. However,,,interestsof local industries 
could not have been altogether ignored. Some of the estab- 
lished firms were very badly housed. It was important not 
only to attract new undertakings, but to prevent the emi- 
gration of existing firms. 
Among the new undertakings attracted to the Scottish 
Development Area by the S. I. L. Ltd. was a number belonging 
to industries new to Scotland. Among them were industries 
which had been only recently established in Ùritain. One 
of these is the accounting and office equipment industry. 
.ranches of five well -known firms belonging to it are loc- 
ated in the Scottish Development Area. The other new in- 
en,ines 
dustries brought to the area are electronic and aircraft,in- 
dustries. The range of precision instruments manufactured in 
the Scottish Development Area was expanded byftintroduction 
of new firms. 
The general conclusion is therefore that the S.I...Ltd. 
by offering its facilities attracted new firms and new in- 
dustries to the Scottish Development Area and encouraged ex- 
pansion of existing light industries. Thus the increase in 
employment in the light industries there,and in their im- 
portance in the Scottish economy , can be partly attributed 
to the government's policy of diversification of industry 
through the establishment of the S.I.L.Ltd. 
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The distribution of industry policy has only been success - 
ful in so far as industrial firms were steered away from the 
congested centres in the south of England and in the 1idlande 
to the Scottish Development Area. The very success achieved 
in diversification of the industrial structure of this area 
by the introduction of new undertakingsthere, accentuated the 
problem of the unbalanced distribution of industry in Scot- 
land. The south west was already the industrial centre of 
the country. In view of the topography of Scotland and the 
pattern of economic development, the S. I. E. Ltd. could not have 
achieved both objectives of the government's policy. The 
success of the S. I. L. Ltd. can only be considered with re- 
ference to the diversity of industry achieved in the Scottish 
Development Area, because its activity was restricted to that 
Area. from the point of view of,inhabitants of the Scottish 
Development _area the S. I. E. Ltd. has achieved a .:Measure of 
success. 
The success of the SI.L.Ltd. from the point of view of tenants. 
it is not enough to bring new undertakings to the Scottish 
,Development Area, if they are to contribute to the creation 
of employment and to industrial diversification, It is necess- 
ary to ensure that these firms remain there. The success of 
the S.I...Ltd. has therefore to be also considered with regard 
to the company's chility to retain its tenants. To succéd from 
this point of view, the S. Lh.Ltd. has to provide suitable 
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factories, in locations that satisfy industrialists' require- 
ments. Whether it has succeeded in this respect can be esti- 
mated on the basis of, the opinions expressed by the indus- 
trialists interviewed,(which will be discussed in the next 
chapter), the number of firms which expanded and contracted in 
terms of floor area occupied, and the number of tenants who 
left. 
The firms which. expanded. Application by the tenants for 
an additional floor area may be taken to indicate that they 
intend to remain in the S.I.i;.Ltd. factories and are satisfied 
generally with the facilities provided. information was ob- 
tained only for tenants who applied for and received addition- 
al floor area. It might have been that, had additional space 
been more readily available, more tenants would have expàñddd. 
It is unlikely, however, that a high percentage of the appli- 
cants haebeen refused. in order to qualify for the allocat- 
ion of factories in the first instance they had to satisfy 
the 3oard of Trade priority requirements. 
24.8 ¡_ of all the tenants listed in 1952, expanded in 
terms of the floor area occupied during the period 1937- 52.(1) 
The additional floor area acquired accounted for 21.0x, pf the 
total area built or being built in .ecember 1552. 
The firms which contracted. During the period 1937 -52 
the 
(excludingAwar years) only J.(22;,; of the tenants contracted. 
The space released represented u., .)L5u of the total area built 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































or building in December 1952. 
The firms which left the S.I.E.Ltd. factories. A possible 
measure of the success achieved by the S.i.E.Ltd. is the rate 
of closure of the manufacturing units. 
It can be assumed, that the three firms which left the 
Scottish Industrial Estates during the war and subsequently 
returned to bigger premises must have been satisfied with the 
facilities provided by the S. . E. Ltd. 
besides these three, information was obtained only for 
the tenants vho left since 1946. Before the war the estates 
were in existence for such a short time that the tenants hard- 
ly had the time to establish themselves let alone fail. During 
the war those who had to stop production on the estates, did 
so on account of exceptional circumstances. ror these two 
reasons, the lack of information on the rate of departure from 
the estates before 1946 is of little importance. 
Twenty eight tenants terminated their leases between 1946rß 
and 1952. (1) Twenty six of them were located on the estates 
and two on separate sites. The total number of the firms 
that left represents EJ.5, of all the tenants listed in 1952. 
This percentage cannot be accepted as an indication of the 
number of tenants who were disatisfied with the facilities 
(1) Although leases.of the S.I.E.Ltd. factories are usually 
for 10, or for 21 years, with the option of a break at the 
7th and 14th year, the company has been prepared to re- 
lease firms from their contracts at an earlier date in 




Number , Area and Labour Value of the firms which left the S.I.E. 
Ltd. factories. 
Area, sq. Year Number of 
firms To aI 
1945 
3 55 500 
1947 2 15 000 
'1948 2 39 000 
1950 3 77 200 
1G51 3 53 50U 
1952 15 926 600 
28 1 177 800 
Firms. 
ft. Labour Value 
Average T6ta3 Average 










61 800 1823 121 
42 100 3573 128 
28 tenants as a percentage of all the 330 tenants listed 
in S. I. L. Ltd. handbook (1952) pp. 62 -93. 
Area. 
T77 800 sq.ft. as a percentage of the total approx- 
imate factory floor area built or being build in 1952 
( 14 739 000 sq.ft. ) 
Labour. 
3573 workers as a percentage of the total labour 
force employed in S.I.L.Ltd. factories, estimated 
at m7:81.7 in June 1952. 
ource, k). . .Ltd. 
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provided by the S.I.E.Ltd., without analysing the reasons for 
their departure. ',our firms left on completion of a particular 
line of production.(1) It was understood from the beginning 
that their leases were temporary and there was no question of 
them remaining. Only 24 (7.3iA) firms at most may have found 
the tenancy unsatisfactory for one reason or another. Eleven 
out of those 24 ceased production because they went into 
liquidation. it is impossible to say whether the location on 
the Scottish Industrial Estates contributed to their difficul- 
ties and was therefore in any way responsible for their fail- 
ure. whatever were the reasons for their liquidation, the 
) Firmst reasons for leaving Scottish industrial Estates. 









Termination of work in connection withwar 
Experimental work completed(special 3 
Purchased own factory. year lease). 
round alternative accomodation. 
Transferred production to parent factory 
in another area. 
Change of ownership, transferred product- 
ion to another area. 





rate of failure on the estates and in the factories admin- 
istered by the S. I. I,. Ltd. was low. (1) Only 3.3 of the te- 
nants listed in 1952 went into liquidation. This percentage 
can be roughly compared with the percentage of liquidations 
of 9.1 and 7.3./ in Scotland and in hngland aryl Wales res- 
pectively. The latter two figures were obtained by expressing 
the number of companies which went into liquidation between 
19146 and 1952 as a percentage of all the companies on the 
registers in Scotland and in hngland and Wales in 1952. An 
accurate comparison of the rate of liquidations in the S.I.E. 
Ltd. factories with that in Scotland and in England and Wales 
generally was impossible. The total figures of liquidations 
were obtained from the board of Trade annual Company Reports. 
In these reports however no distinction is drawn between 
manufacturing and non - manufacturin` companies. All the eleven 
tenants of the S.I.E.Ltd. were manufacturing companies. 
Classification of the eleven firms on industrial basis 
shows that they belonged to a variety of industries. (2) 
(1) iv:r. G. R. Allen' s supos it ion that the rate of failure would 
be higher on Trading states than in other locations be- 
cause of a relatively greater ease of starting a business 
in an estate factory, was confirmed by his study of the 
Slough Trading Lstate. The study of the Scottish industrial 
±states has shown t-e the contrary. The fact that the two 
studies cover different periods does not affect the results 
since the rates of failure on the estates are considered 
in relation °failure outside them. 
G.h.Allen, The growth of Industry on Trading hstates 1920 -29 
with Special Reference to Slough Trading hstate.,Oxford .Sco- 
nomic Papers, 1951, Oct. lvo. 3. 
(2) Industrial groups to which the firms which went Into li ui- 
dation belonged: clothing 2, electrical engineering 2, iight 
engineering 3, Textiles 1, household goods 2, unknown 1. 
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Other tenants belonging to the same industries have done well 
on the estates. This suggests, that the liquidations of the 
eleven firms were hot caused by the unsuitability of the S.1.L. 
Ltd. facilities for the particular types of light industries 
to which they belonged. Their difficulties were probably 
caused by factors unrelated to their location. 
It would appear that only 13 out of the 28 who left, 
ie. 3.9i6 of all the tenants, found the facilities provided by 
the S.I.i.. Ltd. in some way unsatisfactory. It can be argued 
therefore that the S. l..-...Ltd. has from the point of view of 
q 
the tenants been,sucessful venture. 
The stoppage of production by the 28 firms did not 
create an unemployment problem in the locality in which they 
were situated. The labour value of all of them was small at 
the time of the termination of leases, although, on the basis 
of the floor area occupied, a considerable potential employ- 
ment could have been expected.(1) Since the factories vacat- 
ed by them were re- allocated, the employment level in the 
area concerned was not affected. 
On the basis of the above analysis it can be concluded 
that the S. I.L. Ltd. has succeeded, not only in attracting 
new undertakings to the Scottish .ievelopment Area, but also 
in retaining them as tenants. Thus it had contributed to ti__c 
creation of employment and to the diversification of the 
regional industrial structure. 
(1) Table 
Table 17 . 256 
The employment in a number of industries expressed as a percentage 
of the insured ,copulation in Scotland, 1529 -52. 
ì eur Sñipbuilú.- J_ i.z iron Steel melt- 
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Food. Textiles. Tailor- 
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i;4ö 4.71 l ';',i 1"! .i 1 5.íú5 4.55 1.17 
1;51 4.¡4 1.U6 11.1É ;.;6 1.54 
1552 4.45 1.64 11 .17 3.,;:. 4.15 1.21 
Chemicals Furniture Rubber Leather Boots Wood 
. tanning shoes 
192; 1.u7 6.76 6.6:; 6.27 v. ,. 1.16 
15'32 ,.L1 6.61 6.6u C.21 6.51 u- 
15-56 6.L7 6.(2 u.+; 0.24 u.]j ;t 
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. InvuE t.:.unt û o 3d3 
1. Metal manufacture 
2: Shipbuilding and repair:: 
3. Engineering 
4. Metal goods 
5. Construction and repcair 
of vehicles - 
A. Total Investment Copan 127 8 7 15 
B. Construction and relatod 
! -.,::a_! ri ed 
1. Building ar.d civil 
ea¿in_erSrg 
Building and material 
oqaipMur.t 
B. Total C^:itructi_.^. aL'O 
rel.:. . t,.,. _:.u tried ' 








1E , 1 3 3 
C. Consumer Goods ir.dutri o: 
1. Food, drink »nd tobacco 
4. Tertilos 
3. Clothing 
4. Consumer durable good:, 
(1) i;otY..:L314 OOad 
(b) CtL"or mar.u:actbtirg 
irltrius r 
5. Chamical and int.,_ -,' 
gcodc inlustrie: 




C. Agricultura fishorie: 








































































T3 ;C 17 163 
3erviced 5 1 7 
GFtA2:D TCTAL -. 147 7 11 47 _4 17 - - 13 , , 
, 2 13 295 2C 15 î5 33C 
[ 
- 
(1) i2;lnaxaock 2.. L - -- 1 = ï' - :c exceeded the estimate of potential o:rployment. 
(2) %Irl L::t!_te - had rot been completer by 1952 but tar:unto more secured for them. 
(3) _ r2a, la (Lea- aá.::.ira) is includel ur:3 ̂ r :Iillirbton (A..:.îr.;.:.:i.iro). They fora in fact one estate. 
(y) Cr,.:6L . +:. " ... r Cardenc.îd Ordn..nca F- ctorÿ. Employment figures arc included under e.. govornment factories. 
(3) 2 741`.r_ - _ °a t =ilea :arc. hilt bi Z.I.E. Ltci for the dolls -Bayee Compare. Figures are not available. 
Chapter 15. 
A sample study of tenants of the S.I.L.Ltd. 
Objects. in the preceeding chapters the tenancy of the 
Scottish industrial Estates and the location factors have 
been discussed in general terms. This sample study of the 
tenants of the S.ï.E.Ltd. was undertaken to obtain more de- 
tailed information. The objects of the sample were: - 
(a) to discover, (1) the type of firms attracted, 
(2) what effect if any, the change in em- 
phasis in priorities given by the govern- 
ment when allocating factqries. had on 
the tenancy of the S. I. h. Ltd. , 
(3) the reasons of firms for coming to the 
Scottish Industrial hstates, 
(4) the views of firms on the advantages and 
disadvantages of being tenants of the 
S. I. ï.. Ltd. 
(5) the location factors considered by firms 
to be of importance. 
(b) to estimate the extent to which the tenants requirements 
had been satisfied, 
(c) to consider the alleged disadvantages of a location in 
Scotland, 
(d) to obtain information on the basis of which the economic 
and social gains or losses resulting from the establish- 
ment of the Scottish Industrial Estates could be con- 
sidered from the point of view of the tenants of the 
Ltd., the Scottish Development Area and the economy as a 
whole. 
The plarli_ing of the sample. size. The sample was plann- 
ed to cover one third of the tenants of the S.I.L.Ltd. (1) 
(1) The total number of firms was 306 because 24 of the 330 
listed in the S.I.L.Ltd. booklet (1952) were excluded 
from the study of the tenancy of the Scottish Industrial 
Estates for the reasons given on pagel93 . 
2G4 
Choice of firms. some information was available on the 'sta- 
tus', 'nationality' and the factory floor area occupied in 
respect of 306 firms . It was therefore possible to select 
firms so as to get a representative sample of the different 
types of tenants, such as Scottish units, Scottish branches, 
English branches, foreign branches and government and semi - 
n 
governmet establishments, proportional to the total numbers. 
The aim was also to include a number of firms from each of 
the Scottish Industrial Estates, and some from the firms lo- 
cated in factories on individual sites or in the ex- govern- 
ment factories.(1) 
The way the information was obtained. A questions .ire 
was prepared to serve as a basis for interviews. The firms 
selected were approached by post and an interview with the 
nana ing director or works manager was requested. During the 
first few interviews it was found that better results were 
obtained if the questionnaire was not produced. Opinions 
were more freely expressed in conversation, than when answer- 
ing the questionnaire's questions one by one. Only one firm 
asked whether a questionnaire which could be left with them 
was available. They said that they would pefer to consider 
e 
the questions and to return it by post. When the questionnait 
(1) The term Scottish industrial Estates will be used to 
describe all the three types of location. Specific ref- 
erence to tenants on individual sites and in ex- govern- 
ment factories would in some cases make identification 
of the firms possible. 
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was returned most of the spaces were found to have been 
left blank. Questionnaires were sent to five firms,either 
because it was inconvenient for the director to grant an 
interview or the works manager wished to consult the head 
office before giving any information. 
Response to the sample. The response to the sample 
was about A number of the firms approached either 
did not answer or replied that they could not give infor- 
mation. In order to obtain a sample of 100 tenants, alter- 
native firms were asked for an interview. As a result of 
this, the numerical distribution between the different types 
of tenants of the firms which were eventually included in 
the sample was somewhat less balanced than origin -ally plan- 
ned. (1) 
The field research was carried out over a period of 
approximately one year. it was completed in 1953 when l0 
firms had been interviewed. un the whole the firms ap- 
proached were very co- operative. The amount and value of 
the information given varied considerably depending to 
(1) i'umber of firms of different Firms in the sample as a 
types as a percentage of the percentage of a corres- 
total in the sample. ponding group of the 306 
firms. 
Scottish Units 40 
















to some extent on the status in the company of the person 
interviewed. Those who gave interviews were usually the 
managing directors or works managers. A few were account- 
ants or personnel officers. When the tenant was not a 
self contained manufacturing unit but a department separ- 
ated from the parent company, with records kept at the head 
office, the information which a works manager could give 
was often limited. The accountants or personnel officers 
were not always closely acquainted with the broader policies 
of location etc. Thus some of the information represented 
personal opinion. nvoinformation could be obtained on 
the capital structure of the firms interviewed or on their 
finances. Discussion of this subject is therefore impoS- 
s ib101e. 
The types of firms attracted to the Scottish Industrial 
Lstates. The information obtained showed that the Scottish 
Industrial Estates did not appea4 primarily to small firms. 
Analysis of the size of tenants in terms of the factory 
floor area occupied/or in terms of employment indicated 
that on the average the tenants were of medium and not 
small size.(0The average floor area occupied by tenants in 
the sample was 36,737 sq. ft. A comparison of the size of 
the undertakings in terms of employment showed that on the 
Scottish Industrial istates the percentage of smaller estab- 
lishments was lower than either in the .Jevelopment Areas, or 
(1) Ch.13,p.1 94. 
2(7 
in Scotland and Britain as a whole. (1) 
The sample study confirmed the conclusion arrived au 
on the basis of the statistical data supplied by the Boaru 
of Trade and obtained from the Stock Exchange Year Book in 
respect of 57 tenants of the S.I.E.Ltd., that mainly esx;,b- 
lished firms had been located on the estates. (2) The sai- 
ple study had a wider coverage. The age of the firms at 
the time of arrival was obtained for 84 tenants,ie. 840 of 
those in the sample. Only 143 were new undertakings with- 
out a previous location. (3) Altogether 23/. were either 
new or had been inexistence for less than five years.Thus, 
77A of the tenants of the S.I.E.Ltd. can be regarded as 
tine 
established businesses at the the of entry into factories. 
But it was the new or the recently established firms whip. 
(,) Table 21 , p 268 
(2) Ch. 1i p. 21(, 
(5) Age of firms on arrival on the estates. 
Number of years in Number of firms as 
existence a percentage. 
0 -5 25 
6 -10 5 
11 -20 17 
21 -30 17 
31 -50 10 
51 -100 27 
over 100 1 
1OOA 


















thritain Scottish welsh ivorth- Eastern. Scotland 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
16 26 28 25 31 31 
35 0 40 44 44 44 
34 23 25 23 20 31 
6 3 5 5 4 2 
9 1 1 2 - 1 
- 1 1 1 - l 
100 100 100 100 100 1 
figures for Li. A. in which there are iaaustrial estates are shown. 
- less than one percent. 
col. source , Ministry of Labour Gazette, December 1952. pp.411 -2 
( figures for '.:est Cumberland are not shown se- 
parately.) 
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which were more likely to be short of capital and there- 
fore attracted by factories available on a rental basis. 
Thus the age distribution of the tenants is contrary to 
what might have been expected. 
Two reasons cari be suggested why relatively few smaIL, 
and new or recently estaolished firms had been located on 
the Scottish Industrial Estates. Either relatively large 
number of applications by these types of firms have been 
turned down by the Board of Trade, or relatively few of 
them have apolied. The bigger and established firms tend 
to have lamer financial resources at their disposal. These 
would enable them to tide over a trade recession. Further- 
more established firms are :ore likely to have built up 
'good will' and acquired regular custo.:,ers. Thus the big- 
ger and established firms may be regarded generally as 
safer tenants offering a greater stability of employment. 
For these reasons they might have been given preference 
by the Board of Trade in allocation of factories. There 
is however no evidence to suggest that this was the case. 
It is one of the objects of the industrial estates to en- 
courage small and new undertakings. 
It seems more probanle that relatively fewer small 
and new firms had applied for the estate factories. In 
the post -war period these factories were attractive to 
bigger firms; they were available and there was a short- 
age of factory space. It was easier to find a workshop. 
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Although a good factor :, on a rental oasis is undoubtedly 
an advantage for a small or new firm, proxiity to the 
markets may be an overriding consideration. Such a firm 
has to build its connections. i;iuch depends on personal 
contact. One man may have to combine the duties of works 
manager, raw material buyer and sales representative. The 
volume of production may not justify at first even the 
renting of a 'nest factory'. 
The wide range of products manufactured by tenants 
suggests that the Scottish Industrial Estates Ltd. has attra- 
cted a variety of light industries. The firms in the sample 
were as follows:- final consumer goods producers, 52 
intermediate goods manufacturers, 43 
service branches, 4 
research centre. i 
100 
Although some of the light industrial groups are represent- 
ed on the Scottish Industrial Estates by several firms, 
their products are not identical. For example, there are 
a number of tenants in the textile industry, but each of 
them specialises inadifferent type of material. Similarly 
the firms in the clothing trades produce for customers in 
different income groups. The 95 tenants who are in pro- 
duction manufacture some 95 different main products. In 
fact, the range of goods produced is much greater as many 
firms manufacture a number of products. The variety can 
be indicated by listing some of the products manufactured 























Allocation of factories, change in emphasis. The 
effect of the changes in priorities granted by the Board 
of Trade in allocation of factories on the Scottish In- 
dustrial Estates remains to be considered. (1) 
Emphasis on (a) employment of men (1945 -47), 
(b) production earning or saving hard 
currency (1948 -50), 
(c) rearmament contribution (1951 -52). 
(a) As shown by the sample study from 1945 to 1;47 the 
allocation of factories on the Scottish Industrial Estates 
to firms employing mainly men was higher tan to those 
employing mainly women. (2) But it'was lower when com- 
pared with the later periods. 
(b) No information was available on the numbers of firms 
whose production saved imports. »;; of the firms in the 
sample directly exported some of their production. This 
(1) Ch. 5 p.188. 
(2) Employment, 
Period As a percentage of total number of firms, 
firms employing - 




1945-47 ' 52 37 11 
1948-50 55 37 
27 
49 
1951 -52 ,57 14 29 7 
15 firms came before the war,1 figures not available 83 
1 not in production at the time of the sample = _j 
100 
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This percentage would have been higher if the output of the 
manufacturers of component parts, later exported as an in- 
corporated part of some final product, could have been in- 
cluded. No estimates of indirect exports were available. 
Of the firms which exported directly, 6700 came to the Scott - 
is:. Industrial Estates between 1948 and 1950. (1) 
(c) It was impossible to estimate accurately the number of 
firms contributing to the reariarnent programme. The only 
indication was the number of firms working under government 
contracts. Eleven percent of the firms interviewed said that 
they were doing work for the government which was in connect- 
ion with the defence prograrnn e. (2) Only one of these firms 
(1) Exports. 
Year ,,Number of firms arrivint on the estates each Near. 
of 
production 1938 1959 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 IN1mber 
exported. Hof firms 
5 -10 1 5 1 7 
11 -20 1 1 1 1 4 
21 -40 1 1 1 1 3 1 8 
41 -60 1 1 1 3 1 3 10 
61 -80 2 1 1 1 5 
81 -100 2. 1 `1- 3 
21 2 11 71 6 13 4 1 1 37 
(2) Government contracts. 
Date of arrival 
on the estates. 
? 
1,93.9 1946 1948 1947 1951 Total number of firms. 
Humber of firms. 
2 1 2 5 1 11 
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came to the Scottish Industrial Estates between 1951 and 1952. 
The analysis of the sample study suggests that the change in 
emphasis on priorities granted by the Board of Trade in the 
allocation of factories had on the whole little effect on the 
tenancy of the Scottish Industrial Estates. The arrival on 
the Scottish Industrial Estates however between 1948 and 1 5C 
of a high percentage of firms exporting _,art of their product - 
i )n was probably to so -e extent the result of the change in 
; riorities. 
The reasons for coin .i g to the Scottish Industrial Estates. 
The reasons why the various firms cause to the Scottish 
Industrial Estates did not differ appreciably as between the 
different types of tenants. Some firms gave more than one 
reason. The reasons are listed on page 274 in the order of 
frequency with which they were mentioned. It is impossible 
in this summary to show the reasons in order of importance. 
Some firms considered several to be equally important. Seldom 
was the decision to rent a factory influenced by one factor 
alone. 
Some of the reasons given, such as the availability of 
factory or labour did not answer the question of why the Scott- 
ish Industrial Estates were preferred to the other government 
sponsored estates. Factories and labour were also available 
there. One of the points which emerged from this investigation 
was that the choice of a factory was not in most cases the 
result of intensive research into location possibilities. A 
Reasons for coming were given by 96 
not applicable to the two government 
tablishments. 
Reasons for cowing. 
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tenants. The question was 
and semi -government es- 
The number of tenants 
giving the reason. 
(1) Expansion on the site previously Dumber Percentage 
occupied or where parent is lo- 
cated was impossible, 
(a) no space available, 341 
(b) no labour available.211 55 40.5 
(2) Immediate possession of a factory 
on the Scottish Industrial Estates 
or one soon E,.vailable. This was 
particularly important for 5 firms 
whose original premises had been 
destroyed,(4 by enemy action dur- 
ing the war, one by fire). 24 17.6 
(3) Local markets, firms wished to ex -. 
pand their share of the Scottish 
markets, or believed that there 
were potential customers. 17 12.5 
(4) Factory offered, looted for pre- 
mises, Scottish Industrial Estates 
suggested. 12 
(5) Factory available on rental basis, 
had no capital to buy own premises, 
preferred to spend capital on mo- 
dern machinery. g 6.6 
(6) Good factory provided by the S.I.E. 
Ltd, 7 5.1 
(7) Cheap rent charged by the S.I.E. 
Ltd. 3 2.2 
(8) Strategic location. 3 2.2 
(9) Firms came during the war and de- 
cided to stay afterwards. 3 2.2 
(10)TSentimentaltïotives, directors of 
Scottish origin. 2 1.4 
(1 1) Firms came for the sake of 'made 
in ScotlandTlabel, good selling 
point. 1 0.7 
136 100.0 
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number of firms did not look at alternative premises offered 
to them by the Board of Trade. Few mentioned that any esti- 
mates of manufacturing and distribution cosh were made for 
the different locations as a guide to a choice of a site. A 
high percentage of the firms wished to expand or to go into 
new production as soon as possitle, while the poet -war boom 
conditions continued. The strong demand for products of all 
types after the war made cost a secondary consideration. What 
mattered most was to get premises and labour to start pro- 
duction. A number of firms said that they rented a factory 
on one of the Scottish Industrial Estates, although they 
preferred another because it was available sooner. 
The reasons for the location on the Scottish Industrial 
Estates as shown by the sample are not strictly comparable 
with the reasons given by firms to the enquiries by the Board 
of Trade. (1 ) The pre -war Board of Trade survey s :covered 
about three to four times as many firms as have been included 
in this sample. They were not confined to firms either in 
the Special Areas or on the industrial estates.(2) Some of 
the reasons in the summaries of the surveys did not appear 
in the summary of the sample reasons and vice versa. But 
when the two sets of reasons are examined side by side they 
suggest that the i:ílportance attached to the various location 
factors before and after the war was changed. Such differ- 
ences as emerged were probably more the result of the chang 
ing economic conditions than of difference in the sample 
(1) Board of Trade Industrial Surveys 1935 -38 
(2) Table ¿ -2 p 276 
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basis. In the Board of Trade samples the reason most 
frequently given for a choice of location was the convenience 
of premises. In the sample study of firms on the Scottish 
Industrial Estates it was the availability of premises and 
labour. The proximity of other factories in the same in- 
dustry was not mentioned in the latter sample. This o1course 
is not surprising as there were none, or relatively few fir_Ls 
in the same industry on the Scottish Industrial Estates. It 
is of interest to note that some of the firms interviewed 
considered it advantageous to be the only firm of a type in 
the neighbourhood. The reason given for this was that the 
labour turnover of trained labour was smaller. Knowing that 
there was no market 'next door' for labour with the parti- 
cular skill, workers had a greater incentive to be more effi- 
cient. 
It might therefore be that such success as has been 
achieved by the S.I.E.Ltd. in attracting firms has been con- 
siderably facilitated by the economic conditions in the post- 
war period. These put a premium on factory space which was 
quickly available and on the supply of labour. The ability 
of the S.I.E.Ltd to retain its tenants and to attract new 
ones will be put to a more severe test should the general 
level of economic activity decline. 
Tenants views on the advantages and disadvantages of 
being tenants of the S.I.E.Ltd. The advantages of being 
on the Scottish Industrial Estates given by the tenants who 
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were interviewed were : - 
Advantages. Number of tenant. 
(1) factory available on rental basis, thus 
no capital outlay, 40 
(2) modern well designed factory 36 
(3) amenities generally, pleasant surround- 
ings etc., 19 
(4) labour available, lb 
(5) immediate possession of a factory or 
early date of entry, 18 
(6) low rent, 
(7) community services, canteens, sports 
grounds etc., 14 
(6) industrial services, maintenance of 
buildings by S.I.E.Ltd. arrangements 
for supply of electricity etc. 14 
(9) collective security, Tenants'Associat- 
ion, help with repairs of machinery, 
some inter -trading, 6 
(1c)proximity of markets, 2 
(11)location in an atea which is not in- 
dustrially congested, 2 
(12)security of tenure, 2 
(13)strategic location. 1 
These advantages were enumerated by 88 firms, Ten did not 
think that there were any advantages in location on the 
Scottish Industrial Estates. One government establishment 
was excluded. In one case no answer was given. The above 
sum;nary shows the frequency with which the various advantages 
were mentioned. Most firms stated more than one. The answers 
obtained were further analysed to discover which advantages 
were considered as the most important and whether the emphasis 
put on them by the different types of tenants varied signific- 
antly. (1) A factory available on a rental basis was consider- 
ed as the most important advantage by the largest number of 
firms, followed in a descending order by good premises and 
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the availability of factories and labour. The iinporuance 
attached to the advantages uy the different type) 
varied. 66, of the firms which consideredfactory oncrental 
basis as the most important advantage were Scottish units. 
94A of these units were private companies. Thus the saving 
of capital outlay on buildings appears to have been particular- 
ly attractive to the small undertakings. A number of English 
and foreign branches of public companies also regarded a 
factory available on a rental basis as the most important 
advantage. As they were starting production in an area of 
which they had no previous experience, it was not unreasonable 
that they preferred not to tie up their capital from the start. 
The majority of the English branches,because they were est- 
blished as a result of an expansion by the parent attached 
more importance to a readily available factory and the supply 
of labour. 
As might have been expected some of the advantages of 
being a tenant of the S.I.E.Ltd., given by the firms were 
the same as the reasons for coming to the Scottish Industrial 
Estates. But the frequency with which they were mentioned 
gave 
differed. Thus only 9 firms,the availability of a factory 
on a rental basis as one of the reasons for coming to the 
Scottish Industrial Estates. Forty mentioned it as an advant- 
age. A readily available factory and the supply of labour 
were given as reasons by 24 and 21 firms respectively. Both 
separately were considered as advantages by 13 firms. It 
CvÚ 
may well be that these differences reflect changes in the 
economic conditions. Some of the firms were on the Scottish 
Industrial Estates for several years. During that period 
the replacement of old,or the introduction of new plant and 
machinery,which was postponed during the war had to be carried 
out by many of the firms. Prices however had increased. At 
the same time the high level of taxation made it difficult to 
plough profits back into the business on a sufficient scale. 
A factory therefore which was available without a capital out- 
lay became an increasing advantage. 
Although the general level of prosperity continued, there 
was a slackening in some sectors of the economy. This may 
account for a slight reduction in the premium put on the supply 
of labour and a readily available factory. Both however re- 
mained on the whole scarce. A modern, well-designed factory 
and amenities, such as pleasant surroundings were considered 
as the two other important advantages. It was argued that it 
was easier to get labour if good working conditions were offer- 
ed. There was also some saving of production costs, eapecially 
as the S.I.E.Lta. standard factories have factory floorsall on 
one level, material handling expenses were reduced. Machinery 
could be conveniently arranged . The rate of accidents among 
workers was lower. Pleasant surroundings improved their morale 
and performance. Furthermore they gave a favourable impress- 
ion and added to the prestige of the firms genarally. Customers 
therefore could be shown round the premises. 
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There was also some saving to firms because of the com- 
munity services provided on the Scottish Industrial Estates. 
Canteens operated by the S.I.E.Ltd. on the estates were regardea 
as a considerable advantage. When they were run by the indivi- 
dual firms themselves usually an annual subsidy was necessary 
in addition to the original capital outlay. 
When the facilities provided by the S.I.E.Ltd. are taken 
into account,the rent charged for the factories was regarded 
by a number of the firms as on the low side. The rents ranged 
from 1Cd to 1/A per sq. ft. depending on the location. Some 
thought that in the South of England or the Midlands they would 
have to pay 3 to 4 times as much per sq. ft. of the factory 
floor area. The comparison of rents is however difficult be- 
cause of the different types of factories and locations. Some 
of the tenants belonged to firms with factories elswhere, but 
they usually owned them. This was also generally true of those 
tenants who were not branches but had a previous location. Thus 
they had no experience of rented premises and were not sure 
how the rents would compare. Their rents on the Scottish In- 
dustrial Estates did not however seem to them excessive. 
The other advantagesof being on the Scottish Industrial 
Estates which were mentioned by the firms interviewed are self - 
explanatory. No com-ent is therefore necessary. 
The disadvantages of being on the Scottish Industrial Estates 
A number of the firms , which on the whole were satisfied 
with the factories and a location on the Scottish Industrial Estates 
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mentioned one or more disadvantage. None of them were however 
sufficiently serious in themselves to lead any of the firms 
to leave the estates. The disadvantages stated were : - 





(2) distance from 
the centre of 
industry to which 
the firm belonged, 8 
(3) high rent 
(4) high heating charge 6 
(5) labour shortage, 
(6) no alterations to 
buildings allowed, 
(7) no room for expan- 
sion, 
(3) unsuitable build- 
ing, 
(y) site not easily 
accesible to cus- 
tomers, 
(10 )distance from the 
parent,factory, 
(11)red tape in deal- 
The main disadvantage Number of 
firms ment- 
ioning it. 
(1) transport difficut- 
ies, 6 
(2) distance from the cen- 
tre of industry to which 
the firm belonged, 6 
(3) high heating charge, 4 
(4) no alteration to build- 
ings allowed, 4 
5 (5) high rent, 3 
(6) unsuitable building 3 
5 
(7) distance from the 
4 parent,parent, 2 
(3) no room for expansion 2 
3 
(9) site not easily acces- 
ible to customers, 1 
2 
(10)labour shortage, 1 
2 
ing with the S.I.E. 
Ltd. and the Board 
of Trade. 
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These disadvantages can be roughly classified under two 
headings, criticism of the S.I.E.Ltd. and of the location gene- 
rally. The main criticism under the first heading was a high 
heating charge and rent. The S.I.E.Ltd. provides heating for 
the factories on the estates. The heating charge has to be paid 
irrespective of whether the heating was fully utilised or not. 
It was regarded by some tenants as too high. But few firms 
had 
2$3 
made estimates of what it would have cost them to provide their 
own heating. The cost of individual heating installations, 
maintenance, wages of a boilerrnan, fuel etc. would be likely 
to work out at more than with the heating centrally supplied. 
It was difficult to discover on what basis a number of firms 
regarded the rent of factories as high, or what they would 
have considered as a reasonable rent. Some of the tenants 
thought that the rents charged in Glasgow for privately rented 
factories were lower. These factories were however generally 
old buildings and not comparable with the factories on the 
Scottish Industrial states . Some of the firms said that if 
this were the only consideration they would prefer a poorer type 
of property and a lower rent. 
Only a few of the tenants were disatisfied with the fa- 
ctories on the Scottish Industrial Estates. Two found that the 
ceiling was too low for convenient handling of materials, One 
needed a particular type of floor. No alterations to the build- 
ings were however permitted without the S.I.E.Ltd. consent. But 
this would probably apply to most rented premises. It was u.11eg- 
ed by two firms that in dealing with the S.I.E.Ltd.sthere was 
some red tape because the approval of the Board of Trade was 
often necessary. This took time. It was argued that a decision 
from a private owner would be forthcoming sooner. Finally a 
number of tenis in factories where there was no room for ex- 
pansion considered this as a disadvantage. Moving to a bigger 
factory on the same or another estate was regarded as trouble- 
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some. 
Of the more general criticism of the location, the one most 
frquently made was that the transport facilities for workers were 
inadequate. Although the Scottish Industrial Estates -.are on 
or close to bus routes, the services operated often do not fully 
:_:eet the requirements at the time of peak loads. At other times 
the intervals at which the buses run are long. Thus if somebody 
has to be sent from the factory to the custo:iers, premises there 
is a waste of time. Some of the estates are near passenger rail- 
way stations;. relatively few .;ork >ers make use of the railway ser- 
vices. Buses are a more convenient mode of transport for them, 
as many travel only a fairly short distance. 
A few of the firms fouud it difficult to recruit labour of 
the type required locally. Some of them eonsidgred location in 
an area where there were no :,orkers available with experience of 
work in the prticular industry to which the firm belonged as a 
disadvantage. For this reason they would have preferred to be in 
an area which was a centre of their industry. Being away from 
these centres was also re arded as a disadvantage by a nuttier of 
other firms, because of the distance from the main markets or 
from the parent works. The latter tended to have been located 
in the centres of their industries. 
Alternative lócation. Of the firms included in the sample, 
Other things being equal, 18 firms would have preferred another 
location nearer to the markets. Most of them would have preferred 
to be near London which was the biggest market for their products. 
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A few which used bulky raw material with a low value content 
would have liked to have been close to the source of supply. 
Seventy six firms were not interested in an alternative location. 
Three have not considered it. Two did not know. One firm did 
not give an answer. 
The opinion of the majority of the firms which were inter- 
viewed was that under the prevailing conditions the advantages of 
being on the Scottish Industrial Estates outweighed such disadvan - 
tages as existed. This view was substantiated by the fact that 
all of them were prepared to remain as tenants of the S.I.E.Ltd. 
Location factors considered to be of importance and the ex- 
tent to which requirements have been satisfied. The location 
factors considered by the tenants of the S.I.E.Ltd to be of im- 
portance were not necessarily those hich influenced their de- 
cision to come to or even to remain on the Scottish Industrial 
Estates. The firms' views on the location factors do however 
S 
help,to estimate roughly the extent to which their location re- 
quirements had been satisfied. The location requirements are 
grouped under four headings: industrial requirements, site, labour 
and transport. The following analysis of the different factors 
is based on the answers given by 98 tenants of the S.I.E.Ltd. One 
firm did not answer and the questions were not applicable to the 
government establishment. The importance attached to the differ- 
ent location factors did not vary so much with thé type of the 
tenants as with the kind of goods produced by the firms and their 
methods of production and distribution. 
2:36 
(1) Industrial requirements. (a) The proximity of raw material 
the 
markets. Twenty four firms consideredtproximity of raw material 
markets to be an important location factor. The raw materials 
used by most of these firms were either bulky or perishable. It 
was suggested that when a factory was near to the producer or 
distributor of their main raw materials there was some saving of 
the costs of production. Transport costs were lower. The pro- 
ximity made it easier to obtain new supplies quickly and reduced 
the need for the individual firms to carry large stocks. Thus 
less capital was tied up, floor space was saved and the cost of 
storage, such as insurance etc. was lower. It is doubtful how- 
ever whether this consideration carried much weight in the post- 
war period with many firms. At a time of shortages of various 
raw materials there was a tendency to build up stocks whenever 
possible. (b) The proximity of markets for 
finished products. More firms attached importance to the pro- 
ximity of markets for their finished products. The main argument 
was that it was easier to obtain orders. If the factory was near 
to the customers, personal contact could be maintained without 
great difficulty and better service facilities could be offered 
if required. There was also saving in the costs of distribution 
such as the employment of agents, maintenance of showrooms in the 
areas where potential customers were to be found, transport etc. 
The analysis of markets for tue relw materials showed that 
59y of the tenants of the S.I.E.Ltd. could obtain in Scotland all 
or some of their raw materials. A number of the branch factories 
2;;? 7 
was directly sup)lied by their parent companies in England. 
As the purchases were done by the central buying departments, 
a local supply of raw materials was of no particular importance 
for the branches. 
The analysis of markets for the finished products of the 
firms on the Scottish Industrial Estates showed that 29.E sold 
their products locally. (1) While 61,E sold both in Scotland 
and in England. No precise figures were available but the volume 
of sales was often said to be higher in the English markets 
which tended to be bigger. The eleven percent of tenants who 
did not directly sell in Scotland were branches . Their pro- 
ducts were marketed through the parent companies in England. 
Some of the markets were abroad. As already stated the total 
volume of exports by the firms on the Scottish Industrial Estates 
could not have been ascertained.(2) Thirty seven percent (DX the 
(1) Markets of the firms on the Scottish Industrial Estates. 
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(2) Ch. 15 p. 271 
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tenants of the S.I.E.Ltd. in the sample exported directly part 
of their production. Exports by a number of those firms were 
0.S 
substantial. (1) It was important for them in some respects 
to be near to the docks as for the other firms to be near to 
markets.1hu :,ulk of the exports was shipped fro_i1 the Clyde . Some 
of the products which were small in size and with a high value 
content, were sent by air from Prestwick or Renfrew. 
The importance of the proximity of markets to a firm depends 
to some extent on the method of distribution adopted. If the 
goods are not sold from the factory directly to the customer 
as a result of personal contact, the location of a factory close 
to its main customers is not so important. Twelve percent of 
the firms interviewed marketed their products through wholesaler 
Ten percent depended largely for orders on the response to the 
advertisments in the trade journals etc. Eleven percent were con- 
tractors to t: government departments. Three percent have their 
own retail shops. Five percent have sales offices in a nuiiber 
of big towns. 
Such information as could be obtained does not permit an 
assessment of the relative importance of the different markets 
to the firms on the Scottish Industrial Estates. It does however 
suggest that many of them have been able to find both suppliers 
and customers in Scotland. While those firms which are engaged 
in foreign trade have been located within easy reach of docks. (2) 
(1) Ch. 15 p. 272 
(2) Ch. 11 p. i62 
Privately built factories are less likely to oe erwected on sites 
where much expansion is possible. Private oners way oe unaule or 
unwilling to invest more capital in enlarging premises for their 
tenants. Thus a firm may either be unable to expand or would 
have to terminate its contract before the expiry of the laase , 
thereby incurring a financial loss. On the Scottish IndustrialEstares' 
if there is no room for extension of the factory occupied by the 
tenant, he can move to a bigger one on the same or another estate. 
There is no loss arising out of the termination of a contract. 
The actual cost of transfer from one factory to another and the 
loss off time to production was insignificant for those firms which 
had moved. 
Ninety one of the firms interviewed preferred a site in an 
industrial area and nine in rural surroundings. All the Scottish 
Industrial Estates are located in the industrial belt of Scotland. 
But with the exception of those in Glasgow they are not in an in- 
dustrially congested area. Some of the individual site factories 
administered by the S.I.E.Ltd. are in locations which can be de- 
scribed as rural. 
Special sites were either desirable or necessary for 10 of 
the tenants. One required an isolated site because the raw mater- 
ials when processed gave off an offensive smell. The others need- 
ed them because the nature of their products required sites where 
the air was clear and free from dust. These firms were located 
on the estates which best suited their requirements. 
Availability of a factory. One of the main location factors 
29] 
in the post -war period was the imediate availability of a fa- 
ctory. The S.I.E.Ltd. was able to offer factories with an im- 
mediate or relatively near date of occupation. After the war a 
number of factories on the Scottish Industrial Estates was de- 
requisitioned. These became available immediately. The wait- 
ing time for the new factories which were being built varied. 
At times the progress was held up by shortages of building mater- 
ials, but on the whole construction proceeded rapidly. No time 
was lost on preparation and approval of factory designs as the 
pre -war plans for the standard factories were available. Build- 
ing could therefore be started right away. It was facilitated 
by the priorites given by the government for the construction of 
industrial buildings in the Development Areas. 
Labour. The supply of labour was regarded as one of the 
foremost considerations in the location of the plants. But the 
demand for the different types of labour varied considerably. 
Thirty two firms required mainly skilled labour, 24 semi- skilled, 
11 unskilled. Although the tenants on the Scottish Industrial 
Estates belong to the light industries, just over 50;0 of the 
firms in the sample were looking mainly for male workers. 
The Scottish Industrial Estates were established,among other 
reasons, in order to bring work to places where there was a per- 
manent surplus of workers and where there was a considerable 
underemployment. The supply of labour was therefore on the 
whole plentiful. But during the post -war period when the level 
of employment was generally high, the pool of labour from which 
2)2 
firms on the Scottish Industrial Estates could draw their workers 
was very much reduced. Few of the workers who were available 
had previous experience pf light industrial work ÿ'_ had been 
'factory conditioned'. This, ih the opinion of the employerb, 
was particularly true of women, among whom in the Scottish De- 
velopment Area there was no strong tradition of factory work. 
Although many of the workers did not posses the skills or 
the degree of skills required 7,; of the firms in the sample 
found workers, who after training satisfied their requirements. 
Ten percent had-been unable to find locally the skilled workers 
needed, or to train them fully by the time of the interview, as 
in some trades the period of apprenticeship is lengthy. Only 3o 
of the firms could not find labour that was at all suitable. 
Altogether 93; of the firms included in the sample had to 
train some or all of their workers. Only 5 needed technical 
college facilities or further education centres for this purpose. 
All of them were located on the estates which were within a short 
travelling distance of colleges or other centres. One firm sent 
their most promising young men to Oxford or Cambridge. On the 
whole production by the firms on the Scottish Industrial Estates 
did not necessitate employment of a large number of highly quali- 
fied personnel. The majority of the workers were trained on the 
job. Fifty six percent had no other method. The rest in addition 
to training their workers on the job used other methods. A num- 
ber established small training centres before the actual product- 
2 3 
ion was began.. Some sent selected workers to the parent company 
or to other branches for training. A fairly high proportion of 
the firms run their own training schemes. (1.) 
the 
The recruitment of skilled workers or,,,bringing in of instru- 
ctors was handicapped by the difficulty of finding housing accomo- 
dation for them. Some 250 key workers were brought in by the 
firms interviewed. A number of them was sent by the parent com- 
panies for such time only as was necessary to train the local 
labour force. Thirty seven of the firms in the sample applied 
for key workers houses.(2) Not all of them qualified since some 
(1) Firms which trained their labour. 
Methods of training. Number of 
firms. 
on the job only, 54 
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were local firms. Not all of the men on whose behalf the firms 
applied were eligible for the key workers houses. Twenty six 
of the firms were allocated 160 key workers houses and 16 mana- 
gerial houses. Five firms solved their own housing problem by 
buying houses and converting them into flats for their workers. 
Transport. Godd road and rail services were regarded by most 
of the firms as an important location factor both on account of 
workers and the distribution of products. Only one firm provided 
own transport for its workers. Twenty four firms had their own 
haulage although few relied on it exl.usively. more use was made 
of the road than of the rail services. Fifteen firms shipped 
their products from the Clyde or Leith docks. Four seat them by 
air and 8 dispatched mainly by post. The location of the Scott- 
ish Industrial Estates in relation to transport has already been 
discussed at some length. 11) It will therefore suffice to say 
now that the transport facilities are generally adequate. 
The alleged disadvantages of a location in Scotland consider- 
ed. Relatively few firms belonging to the light industries 
sited their factories in the Scottish Special Area before the war. 
This was partly the result of preconceived ideas by some of the 
industrialists about location in Scotland. The two main alleged 
disadvantages were, bad labour and the distance from the markets. 
The prevalent opinion among employers in light industries 
that labour in the Special Areas was generally bad did not appear 
to have been based on personal experience. In 1928 the Industrial 
Transference Board found that many industrialists were under the 
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impression that workers from the depressed areas, who had peen 
employed in the heavy industries, particularly in coal mining 
were of indifferent labour value. (1) The belief was that they 
were not easily adaptable to the requirements of other occupat- 
ions and were prone to causing disturbances. In the opinion of 
the Board these views were based on ignorance. In 1932 the in- 
vestigations undertaken on behalf of the Board of Trade by the- 
Glasgow University showed that the impression that the industrial 
relations in the South West of Scotland were bad persisted. (2) 
The district was said by the industrialists to be 'seething with 
unrest which was of a subversive character'. The experience of 
the Local Devdlopment Board was that when businessmen were approa- 
ched and asked whether they would consider a location in the 
South West, '..the answer invariably was that in their view, the 
reputation of the area for strife and disorder was so bad that 
they would not consider investing their capital in it.T(3) 
Statistics for industrial disputes published in the Ministry of 
Labour Gazette over the period 1927 -30 do not show that the loss 
of working days owing to disputes in the South West of Scotland 
was high when compared with other areas. The report published 
by the Ministry of Labour in 1934 stated that the belief tit 
(1)Cmd. 3156, p.10 
(2) Board of Trade,Industria.l Survey (1932) 
(3) ibid. p.140 
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that the labour in the Clyde area was troublesome and undisiplined 
was áenerally known to be untenable. (1) But industrialists were 
nevertheless still unwilling to risk their capital in the South 
West of Scotland. With the war there came a change. During and 
after the war labour was scarce. Industrialists were only too 
glad to employ any available labour. Thus they came into contact 
with workers from the South West of Scotland. The good quality 
of these workers was established. 
A number of English firms which established their branches 
on the Scottish Industrial Estates said that their decision to 
come to Scotland had been influenced by their experience of Scott- 
ish labour during the war. Ninety four percent of the firms in 
the sample found workers in the Scottish Development Area to be 
adaptable, hard working and willing to learn. In the opinion of 
some of the firms the local workers were slower in learning new 
jobs than the workers in the industrial centres in England. This 
was attributed to the lack in the Scottish Development Area of a 
tradition of work in the light industries. Once the local workers 
have been trained, it was believed that they compared favourably. 
But a fair comparison was difficult as the work done at the branch 
and at the parent often differed. Two percent of the firms con- 
sidered the workers to be fairly satisfactory but not hard work- 
ing or responsive to financial incentives. Four percent were not 
satisfied with the labour they obtained. One percent found that 
(1) Cmd. 4728, (1934) p. 224. 
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the quality of labour varied so much that a generalisation was 
impossible. 
In some places where the unemployment during the inter -war 
years was particularly severe or the treatment by employers harsh, 
there still lingered-a suspicion of)and hostility towards the 
employer. Little information was available on the employment of 
ex- miners. A number of the firms interviewed did not know what 
previous jobs were held by their workers. Only six said that they 
employed ex- miners. Four of these firms thought that on the whole 
they were good workers. One firm found that the older men found 
it more difficult to adjust themselves to factory conditions. 
Another believed that the mentality of some of the ex- miners was 
still affected by the trade depression of the inter -war period 
but that the effects were wearing off. 
The relationship between workers and the firms on the Scott- 
ish Industrial Estates was good. Trade Union membership did not 
appear to have been high. No exact figures were available. A 
number of the firms had only a rough idea of how many of their 
workers belonged to a trade union. (1) On the whole the opinion 
Ui:_ 
was that the workers and particularlyAwomen, were not active 
trade unionists. This was accounted for by two main factors. 
The wage rates were usually higher than the minimums specified 
(1)Trade Union membership as estimated by the firms. 
Membership. Number of firms. 
High (over 50,0), 
low (under 50;x), 
some Zpercentage uncertain) , 





3 firms were 'closed shop'. 100 
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in the national agreements. The conditions of work were good. 
Thus workers had no major grievences. There was therefore no 
strong incentive to attend trade union meetings. If these were 
held in factories after working hours, the fact that some workers 
lived at a distance from the estates discouraged attendance. The 
relations between trade unions to which the workers belonged and 
the firms were on the whole amicable. Of the hundtsred tenants of 
S.I.E.Ltd. only one said that relations with a particular trade 
union were bad. One described them astnot too bad.' Three firms 
found that they varied from time to time. 
During their period of tenancy , up to the time of the inter- 
view, one firm had two strikes and four had one strike each. Two 
of the strikes had no trade union support. Only one was described 
as serious. 
The allegation which was made before the war that the labour 
in the South ',lest of Scotland was 'bad and 'seething with unrest', 
in the post -war period can be refuted on the basis of the ex- 
perience of the firms on the Scottish Industrial Estates. 
The second alleged disadvantage of a location in Scotland 
was the distance from the markets for the raw materials and fini- 
shed products. The location of the firms on the Scottish Indus- 
trial Estates in relation to markets has already been discussed 
in the light of the sample study. It did not appear that these 
firms were at a serious disadvantage. Allowance has howe'r to be 
made for the favourable economic conditions during the post -war 
period. It could nevertheless be argued that the Scottish markets 
2/i 
were likely to have been underrated, while the importance of 
proximity of a factory to the main markets has been overemphasis- 
ed. 
iL'C) 
Chapter 1G . 
Some. aspects of the cost of the Scottish Industrial Estates. 
The cost of the Scottish Industrial Estates to the national 
economy ire largely determined by the effect the location on the 
estates had on the costs of production and distribution of in- 
dividual firms. In this chapter the economic gains and losses 
of firms resulting from their location on the Scottish Industrial 
Estates will be discussed. It would have been most meaningful to 
estimate the economic gaina and losses of these firms by com- 
paring their ;production and distribution costs with those of 
similar firms in other locations. Such a comparison can not be 
made because most of the firms interviewed were unable to disclose 
any cost figures. At best tie cost3of tabour and materials were 
expressed as v. percentages. These percentages might have been 
compared with corresponding percentages of the same firm in its 
previous location, or alternatively with estimated costs in a 
hypothetical location. If the tenant was a branch, then its costs 
might have been compared with those of the parent works. Such 
comparisons however, presented difficulties. Some of the sole 
manufacturing units owned the previously occupied premises before 
renting a factory on the Scottish Industrial Estate. The proceeds 
of the sale of the buildings were used by a number of the firms 
to modernise their machinery. As a result, the firms felt that 
their costs in the two locations were not strictly comparable. 
Since only rough percentages of cost were available, a comparison 
of the cost s:Ts of the firms on the Scottish Industrial Estates 
with those in a hypothetical location would have been impracti- 
cable. A comparison of the costs of a branch located on the 
Scottish Industrial iLstates, with those of the parent company in 
another location was complicated by the fact that the production 
of the two often differed. It was therefore felt that on the 
basis of the information obtainable a discussion of the economic 
gains and losses was only possible in general terms. 
Since the following discussion is based on personal opin- 
ions expressed by the industrialists interviewed, such terms as 
high and low with reference to costs and employment are used 
freely. It was felt that ananalysis of opinions expressed by 
industrialists was both of interest and importance. In the past 
the location of industry was largely influenced by general be- 
liefs. The investigation1car = ied out among firms in the Scottish 
Development Area, showed that even now few firms miade areful 
study of location.(1) The general beliefs are therefore likely 
to continue to influence the choice of sites by industries. 
The fact that firms applied for factories on the Scottish 
Industrial Estates showed that they expected that the economic 
gains would outweigh any possible losses resulting from the lo- 
cation on the estates. The advantages of being on the Scottish 
Industrial Estates have been discussed oh the basis of the 
sample study. Reference has also been made in the previous 
chapter to the disadvantages to firms resulting from their lo- 
cation on the Scottish Industrial Estates. To obtain some 
idea of the net ;gins, such losses as have been incurred need 
(1 ) Ch. 15p. 273 . 
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to be more fully taken into an account. 
Broadly speal.- :ing, these losses could either be inií;ial,ie. 
incurred once and for all, or recur_ °ent. 
i initial Costs. Transfer costs. First of all there were the 
transfer costs. These of/course, were only incurred by those 
tenants who either had a previous location or were branch f'ac. to- 
ries. it Las beE:n shown that relatively few of the. tenants of 
the S.I.L.Ltd. were new sole manufacturing units.(1) It can 
therefore be assumed that some transfer costs were incurred by 
the majority of the firms. These costs consisted of transport 
charges, i__sur once etc. while stocks and machinery were in tran- 
sit, the ipss of production time and the loss of silled workers 
who refused to be transfered. 
The firms interviewed did not give their cost of transfer 
in money terms, but the opinion was that the cost of the transfer 
of machinery was a small percentage of its total value. A num- 
ber of firms on moving from one factor:r to another took the 
opportunity to dispose of their old machinery and to replace it 
by new. Since the new machinery was delivered by suppliers to 
the factor:: On the estates, much of the costs of transortiag 
the machinery from one place to another was avoided. Símilartl, 
some of the branch factories were started new equipment. 
The cost of transfer of stocks of raw materials was again con- 
sidered b y the majority of firms to have been low. Most of the 
firms dia not carry large stocks; some were going to buy the 
(1) Ch.13p. 209. 
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raw materials required locally and 4Arer build up reserves gradually. 
The loss of Production time due to the transfer from one 
was 
factory to another varied as shown by the answers given by 5 
of the firms into viewed. (1) k number of the sole manufactur- 
ing units which had been previously located in the Scottish 
Development Area, moved by stages. There was therefore, either 
no complete stop or the break in production lasted for only few 
days. The length of the stoppage depEnded largel; on the tie 
it took to transfer the machinery and the period required for 
the traini lg of labour. Several of the firms recruited workers 
and began to train them in temporarily rented premises, before 
a factory on the estates was available. Thus the loss of th-c 
production time was reduced. ','.hen it was several months-;it was 
on account of some special circumstances. Some of the firms had 
to bring their machinery from abroad and this took time. One 
firm had to spend several months repairing plant salvaged from a 
parent factory hich had been blitzed during the war. Another 
had to wait chile the factory floor was reinforced to take a 
special type of machinery. The two firms which had the longest 
ia.tus in production were held up by a delay in the supply of 
(1) Loss of production time caused by the transfer. 
Feriod. Number of tenants. 
NO stop, 
almost at once, 
few weeks, 
one month, 
2 -3 months, 
4 -5 .z 












component parts for the articles manufactured by them. 
The loss of skilled workers .consequent upon the change of 
location 
was small. On the basis of the information given by all the 
firms in the sample study it would appear that only some 4 of 
the key workers required, refused to be transferred, or decided 
after a short time to return to the area from which they came 
for personal re. sons. A ,ractice frequently adopted by firms 
requiring key workers for their branches which were being set 
uo on the Scottish Industrial Estates was to ask for volunteers 
from among the skilled workers in the ,parent plants. 
None of the costs involved in the actual transfer of pro- 
duction were regarded by those who were interviewed to be oro- 
hibitive.ly high. one of the firms in the sample stud_ applied 
to the .Jovernment under the Distribution of Industry Act ,1 5O , 
sec. 2(;), for a grant towards the removal ex'<enses. 
Cost of training. All firms are faced with the cost of 
training labour but the degree of training required varies in 
different locations and can be regarded as primarily an initial 
or a recurrent cost depending on the labour- turnover. A number 
of the firms coming to the Scottish Industrial Lstates brought 
new industries to the Scottish Development Area. As there were 
no local workers with the skills required, practically the 
whole of the labour force had to be trained. After the workers 
had been trained, so long as no other firers in the same industry 
came to the area, labour turn -over was negligible because there 
was no alternative employment of the same type in the neighbour- 
hood. This was true of the skilled workers in the particular 
trades and did not apply to unskilled labourers who were easily 
interchangeable. Nevetheless, for the firms which brought new 
industries to the Scottish Development Area the cost of training 
labour tended to be more in the nature of an initial cost. None 
of the firms interviewed aplaied to the government under the Dis- 
tribution of Industry Act, 1950, sec. 3 (1), for a grant to com- 
pensate them for the employment of inexperienced labour. 
In conclusion it may be said that neither the cost of trans- 
fer accounted for by the loss of production time, the loss of 
skilled workers, nor the initial training expenses were considered 
by the management of the firms interviewed to have been a serious 
discouragement to their transfer to the Scottish Industrial Estates. 
II Recurrent Costs. Secondly, an attempt was made to find out 
whether the recurrent costs, either variable or fixed, had in- 
creased or decreased after the firms in the sample study had es- 
tablished themselves on the Scottish Industrial Estates. 
Variable costs.(a) The training of labour. The cost of train- 
ing labour was a recurrent expense for all the firms on the Scott- 
ish Industrial Estates. Since most of them employed largely semi- 
skilled labour, the training was neither prolonged nor expensive. 
Furthermore the cost of training was kept down by the low labour 
turn- ovér.(1) Only a few of the firms considered their labour 
(1) A study of 7 industrial groups showed that the overall per- 
centages of labour turnover expressed as an annual rate were 
27.2A for men and 42.0 ./o for women during the 6 months period 
January to June 1949. 
British Institute of Management,Labour Turn -over Analysis(1949) 
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turn -over on the estates to be higher than was usual for the 
industry to which they belonged, or to be above the labour turn- 
over which they had experienced in a previous location. The cost 
of training labour, was in the opinion of the firms interviewed, 
somewhat higher on the estates than in the areas which were the 
centres of light industries since the workers required a more 
thorough training. For the English branches there was said to 
have been no saving on the wage bill as a result of location on 
the Scottish Industrial Estates. The wage rates in the different 
industries, were very much the same for the Glasgow area as for 
Manchester or Birmingham; in the London area they tended to be 
somewhat higher.(1) Five of the Scottish Industrial l;states are 
located on the outskirts of Glasgow. Employers on the other 
estates usually paid the same wage rates since skilled workers 
have often to be recruited from the Glasgow area. Wages, how- 
ever, represented more than 50o of the prime costs for only 
about a quarter of the firms in the sample study for whom some 
information on costs was obtainable.(2) 
Transport costs. For approximately half of the firms in 
the sample the cost of raw materials accounted for more than 
5 of the prime costs. These figures do not imply that the 
(1) Ch. 16,p.307, table 23. 
(2) Labour as a percentage of prime cost(ie.labour 4- material) 
,'ercentage. Number of Firms. Percentage. Number of Firms. 
1-20 8 
21 -3u 5 under 50 2; 
31-40 11 
41-50 12 50 7 
51 -60 5 
61 -7u 3 over 50 }r 
71 -80 3 
81-90 1) 4 46 
307 
Table 25. 
i!ourlr wazes of Ldalt walkers in a number of selected 
occupations in --ctoher 1952. 






















Z- 17 2.75 2.79 
Lanufactureof 
.achinery, 
;.14 iron .iloulders, 
labourers(un- 











5.17 2.75 2.P7 bakers, 
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the transport costs were necessarily high for all of them. 
Since some of the r,-w materials used were of high value in 
e 
relation to theirwi ;iit and bulk,their transport cost was a 
small percentage of the purchase price. iviany of the firms 
pointed out that if substantial orders were placed the cost 
of trans Jort eras often borne by the suppliers. The production 
costs of branch factories using bulky materials supplied by 
the ììarent would have been lower had the two been located 
closer to each other. But this was not necessarily the case 
when branches were set up on the estates with the object of 
directly supplying their customers in Scotland. The cost of 
transport of the finished products borne by the firms in the 
sample varied. Again, some of the products had a high value 
in relation theitsize and weight. Although no exact figures 
were available,a nigh percentage of the total production of 
the firms on the Scottish Industrial Estates was said to be 
marketed or sent back to the parent factories in England. It 
is therefore obvious that if the firms had been located nearer 
to the customers or to the parent factories, the distribution 
costs would have been lower. 
Sales costs. The distance from their main markets resulted 
in higher sales costs for some of the firms on the Scottish 
to some extent 
Industrial Estates. That the costs were depended on the sales 
methods used. As has already been pointed oat some of the 
S.I.E.Ltd. tenants found it necessary to maintain show rooms 
30'9 
or to have saes offices in England where most of their poten- 
tial customers were to be found. 
Ot_: er variable costs. The difference; in charges for 
electricity, gas,an.d water in the Scottish Development Areat 
and the other regions were not regarded by the firms which were 
intervieed, to be of great importance from the point of view 
of production costs. 
Fixed costs. The fixed costs such as rents and local rates 
,aid by the firms on the Scottish Industrial Estates compared 
favourably with what they would have to pay in other locations 
in Lngland.. The difficulty of comparing rents has already been 
em,?hasised in a previous chavter. It may be noted however that 
the highest rent _ a,;-able Der foot on the Scottish Industrial 
Lstetes was 1 /j .. In the new towns in the South rents were 
higher, for example , at Harlow rents were from 4/- per sq.ft . (1 ) 
The burden of local rates on industry was reduced by the de- 
therefore, 
rating provisions for industrial property, the eff`ct n 
of variat- 
ions in local rates on the fixed production costs in different 
locations was of little significance.(2) 
On the basis of the. information obtained, it may be con- 
cluded that the total costs of production and distribution 
were probably higher for many of the firms on the Scottish 
Industrial Estates, than would have been incurred by them 
were they located in the centres of light industries. Such 
disadvantaes as there exist in being away from these centres 
are likely to decrease as the light industries in Scotland de- 
(1) Financial Times , 2.1 0 .53 . 
(2) The Local Government Act,1929,sec.68 
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velop. The disadvantages experienced appeared however to have 
been outweighed by the two main advantages of the location on 
the Scottish Industrial Estates, the availability of modern 
factories on rental basis, and the supply of good labour. 
In the period 1 45 -52 only of the tenants of the S.I.E.Ltd. 
left because they found the location unsatisfactory.(1) None 
of the firms interviewed contemplated termination of their leas- 
es in the foreseeable future. Twenty five percent of the 
firms analysed had expanded in terms of the factory floor area 
occu.ied.(2) Thirteen percent of the firms included in the 
sample study extended the range of goods orod.uced. Since the 
firms on the Scottish Industrial Estates are undertakings carried 
on with the view of making profit, it can be argued that the 
economic gains must exceed the losses which result from the 
location on the Scottish Industrial Estates. 
The value of the estates from the point of view of the 
Scottish Development Area. The Scottish Development Area's 
economic gain from the establishment of the Scottish Industrial 
Estates is unquestionable. in the economy of the area there 
was room for the develópment of both the light and heavy indus- 
tv,t 
tries, and in introducing,,new the government took care not to 
handicap the old. The effect of the diversification of the 
tle 
industrial structure of area was twofold. First, employment 
opportunities were increased. Second, some safeguard was pro- 
vided against wide spread unemployment should the heavy in- 
dustries contract. 
Fears had been expressed that the allocation of factories 
(1). Ch.14.p.255 
(2) Table 15.p.250 
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on the Scottish Indo.stri.cl Astates had not diversified t 'rie in- 
(.uÜtr- of trie Scottis;_ Development ±rea ira the gray most li -rely to 
maintain the stability of enì . io ment . ())It had been _ar.r aed that JI their procu: urbn 
f.i:_.ms in the light industries exporting a high percentage ,or 
contributing substantiEllr to the defence production might prove 
no less vulnerable to unemployment than the heavy i 1dustries 
have been.(z)In the interwar period the loss of some of the 
foreign m^rkets and the end of war contracts contributed to 
severe unemployment in t' e heavy i iä:ustries in the Scottish 
Development Area. Such information as -tas been obtained from 
the sample study does not sagest that firms on the Scottish 
Industrial Estates depend heavily either on foreign :uar:.ets 
or defence orders. Althou the firms on the estates have not 
been put to t b.e test of a severe recession, tole were affected 
by the reAri ctio :s on i_..ports imposed temporarily by Australia 
and South Africa. .dvell though orders fell, most of the firms 
were able to maintain sta.bilit,- of employment, either by switch- 
ing to other guar sets or changing to other lines of production. 
During the period of readjustment a number of firms worked a 
shortened day. Only 3 found it necessary to lay off some of 
their wor,_ers . Eight percent of the firms in the sale changed 
lines of production at one time or another. Some did so for 
the above reason, others because of the saturation of markets 
for particular products, change ici. taste and increased compet- 
ition from abroad which reduced profit marlins. 
Li the li 
(1 ) Ch.13p.191 . 
(2) ;;h.13p.1ëa-39. 
!).t :1.-QUSt7.'t ciJ are í_1or 'iG?ï OlG G.i.,` ]:1 ZiíJ.:JG>é: 
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in the heavy industries. ,Lines of production can be changed 
more rapidly and ;wt _Less cost . Short of a .general depression 
the forger are therefore more 1i l to maintain stability 
of employment when faced wite'decline in demand for their 
particular products. The establishment of the Scottish In- 
dustrial ,,states has therefore contributed to provision of a 
safeguard against a Side spread unemployment in the future. 
áocial considerations. The trae value of the Scottish 
:industrial Lsta:.tes does not lie in the economic gains alone. 
and social considerations, even though they are not subject to 
measurement have also to bé taken into account when an appraisal 
of t e benefits derived from the establishment of the estates 
is attempted. 
(a) .Lmi. ration. it can be assumed that the number of 
workers employed on the Scottish Industrial Estates represented 
a surplus of labour in the area. It can be further assumed 
that in the absence of the estates,the surplus workers would 
have been faced with the choice of applying for national assis- 
tance or of leaving the area in search of work. The emigrat- 
ion of population on a large scale results both in economic and 
social losses. It leads to a break up of families. It is the 
younger, the more skilled and enterprising persons who are most 
likely to leave. The prosects of attracting new industries to 
the area are thereby reduced. 
(b) Furthermore emigration on a large scale is likely to 
result in t),eloss of social capital invested in the area. The 
investment in drainage, roads, street lighting Gtc. would be 
in excess of the reduced local demand, but these assets would 
have to be :qaintainea to rovide services for those -::ho re- 
mained. The cost of the services falling on the ratepayers 
v:oula go up resA.ting in higher local rates. Although the in- 
creased rates would be unlikely to have much effect on the 
local industry because of tne partial aerating of industrial 
prooerty, theu- ,ould in all probability contribute to farther 
emigration of oopulation. 
In the post-war period, in the Scottish Development Area 
n 
neither ti.t7c emigration ¿r the loss of the social capital was 
a problem. The surplus of labour was small and there as an 
actual shortage of sT7illed v/orkers. Social investment in 
houses etc. was inade4uate and not excessive. In the future) 
however, should the economic conditions change and the heavy 
industries in the Scottish Development Area suffer again, it is 
houed that the Scottish Industrial Estates by maintaining em- 
ployment stability will help to decrease the rate of emigration 




The National Government which established the industrial 
estates presented them to Parliament as an 'experiment'. An ex- 
periment is usually carried out with a view to obtaining definite 
information. Usually an experimenter anticipates the result but 
the government did not suggest how it would be decided what this 
experiment had demonstrated. It is true that the experiment was 
an attempt to provide employment and to diversify industry in 
the depressed areas, but no criteria were suggested by which it 
or such 
could be decided whether such employment,as was generated,lidiver- 
sification,as was achieved,had been obtained at a reasonable 
economic cost. Nor was it suggested how it would be shown that 
the establishment of the industrial estates was the best method 
for dealing with the depressed areas. 
The idea that the estates should be an experiment was a 
noble one, but unfortunately it seems to have been still born. 
There is no evidence available to show that the government made 
efforts to collect all the detailed information which would have 
been needed to make a complete appraisal of the results. Most im- 
portant of all the amount of money spent on the estates has been 
kept secret. Despite the inadequacy of the information an attempt 
will be made in this chapter to assess the results of the 'experi- 
ment'. To this end the past record of the Scottish Industrial Es- 
tates will be examined briefly anct their future prospects considered. 
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L ployment. The reduction in unemployment in the Scottish 
Development Area which has taken place during the last twenty 
years can not be attributed entirely or even largely to the 
Scottish Industrial Estates. The change in economic conditions 
and the renewed prosperity of the heavy industries were mainly 
from 
res onsible for the decrease in the rate of unem.alo: rient 22 
in 1 i2 to 2» in 1552 in the Scottish Development Area taken as 
a ?hole. The Scottish Industrial 1:states nevertheless played 
an important part in reducing pockets of unemployment and the 
underemployment of women. In the 11 u's unenplo;; went among them 
,:'as partly concealed because many of them did not register for 
Industrial work as employment ojjjortunities for women were few 
and far between. By 152 .5 -j 7 workers were employed in the 
government factories in the Scottish Development Area ; 20,C27 
jobs have been created for women. At the same time, a greater 
number of senior su_;-ervisory and executive jobs became available 
for both sexes. ,:a.ny firms ;.hich came tO the Scottish Develop - 
ment area emphasised the difficulty of finding locally young 
persons suitable for training for managerial positions. This 
the 
was attributed to,paucity of ooenin s which previously existed 
for the ambitious and enterprising men and women. The old es- 
tablished firms in the heavy industries offered limited scope 
ht 
for .,rorotion for young people. It was believed that many of 
them moved to the London area or the iJ_dlc.nds, where prospects 
for an industrial career were better. This belief must have 
discouraged new firms from seeking locations in the Scottish 
S16 
Development Area. If in the future the estates succeed in check- 
ing emigration they will have served Scotland well. 
Diversification of industry. The contribution of the estates 
to the diversification of industry in the Scottish Development 
Area can be indicated by a study of the tenant firms. It has 
been shown in the preceeding chapters that a variety of light 
industries has been located on the Scottish Industrial Lstates. 
Chv 
Some of them were new to Scotland, among them being aircraft 
(engines), business machinery, and clocks and watchez industries. 
The extent of the diversification is greater than appears from 
the broad classification of the firms in table a;, A list of 
some of the products ,Jives an indication of the variety. 
Aero engines, accounting machines, light fittings, lubricants, 
batteries, biscuits, machine tools, matresses, 
carpets, cardboc:rd bo_es, needles, nylons, 
dehydrators, drills, ophthal.iic lenses,oxyzen, 
electric shavers,electrolitic copper, paints,plastic mouldings, 
furniture, fireplaces, refri`krators, rivets, 
gauges, golf balls, switchboards, soap, 
hauling equipement,hormones, tents,typewriters, 
insulations ,ilitercomrgunica.tion systems, v?cu n cleaners,valves, 
jelly cristals, ji,. s, watches, wringers, 
ketchups, knitwear, yarns (elastic) . 
It is difficult to see how a more diversified pattern of tenancy 
could have been achieved, if at the same time a nucleus of a 
number of light industries was to be built. 
The value of the estates to the Scottish Development Area 
so far has not lain primarily in the reduction in unemployment, - 
this was not a major problem after the war. The impact of the 
etates on the economy of the area taken as a whole has been 
small as ;r et . By 1:.52 the number of -,corkers employed in the 
government financed factories was, on the basis of a rough 
estimate, 6,0 of those employed in the Scottish Development Area. 
The number of S.I.L.Ltd. tenants was only some of the firms 
on the Scottish register of com anies in 1952. The chief impor- 
tance of the Scottish Industrial Estates lies, therefore, in 
the 
the foundations which have been laid for future development of 
a diversified industrial structure. The Scottish industrial 
Lstates have helped to dispel prejudices against the location 
of light industries in the Scottish Development Area. The 
task of securing as tenants firms in the light industries was 
made easier for the S.I..Ltd. by fortuitous economic conditions. 
After war labour l..as scarce in the traditional centres of the 
light industries, while in the Scottish Development Area there 
was still some surplus labour. The development of the estates 
was also facilitated by the government control over the locat- 
ion of industry. Since licences for factors= building out- 
side the Development Areas were difficult to obtain, new firms 
or firms wishing to expand sought location on the industrial 
estates. 
Future ,prospects. The prospects of the Scottish Industrial 
Estates depend largely upon the viability of the industries 
and firms which have already been drawn to them. The period 
when fresh firms can easily be attracted is now past. The 
chances of further development can be assessed by considering 
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the past gró:.th of the industries. It is therefore necessary 
to stud,; the _istory of some of the industries prominently re- 
presented on the estates. 
Perhaps the most outstanding example of a ¿rowing industry 
which has been introduced to Scotland recently .and expanded ra- 
pidly is the office and business machinery industry. Since the 
war the Scottish Development Area has become a centre of this 
industry which is also relatively new to Great Britain. The 
rate of growth of this industry in the U.Y. can be illustrated 
by figures for production. In 1;35 the output of office applian- 
ces was valued at _1 ,572,GO6. In 152 it was £45,081,0()G. The 
leading manufacturers in this field, British Olivetti Ltd., Add- 
ing ilachines Ltd., I .L.1 .United I,,ingdom Ltd., National Cash 
Register Ltd. ,r Remington Rand Ltd., have all established their 
branches on the Scottish Industrial Estates. 
The cioc'-s and watches industry is also new in the sense 
that the mass production of clocks and watches today is totally 
different from hand production by highly skilled craftsmen. Be- 
fore the war Great Britain imported almost all its alarm clocks 
and a high percentage of its watches. Now the home demand, es- 
l,ecially in the lower price range, is su.iplied on an increasing 
scale by manufacturers operating in the U.Ï. Three of the large 
firms in this industry, S.Smith and Sons (England)Ltd.., West - 
clox Ltd. and U.I.Time Ltd. have their branches on the Scottish 
Industrial Estates. 
The biggest firm in Scotland connected with the aircraft in- 
dustry, the Rolls -Royce Ltd. is now housed in S.I.E.Ltd. factories. 
Originally the firm's Scottish branch moved to a factory built 
for them by the Ministry of Aircraft Production. The estates 
therefore can not claim to have attracted the industry to Scot- 
land; they have however facilitated its expansion. 
The indices of industrial production can be taken as an in- 
dication of the rate of industrial growth. Comparable official 
figures published by the Central Statistical Office and the Scott- 
ish Home Office are available for different industries in the U.K. 
and Scotland respectively.(1) The base year for the indices of 
industrial production is 194e in each case. The value of the 
indices of industrial production is limited because of the short 
period which they cover, but they have to be used because there 
is no alternative. 
The industries which, on the basis of these indices, have 
shown a rate of growth above the average in the U.K. and in Scot- 
land are chemicals, engineering (including electrical engineering 
and shipbuilding). In the U.K. vehicles (including aircraft), 
food, paper and printing industries also tended to be above the 
average. In Scotland these industries have not done so well, but 
the textile industry was above the average. 
The distribution of firms among the different industries 
which were allocated factories òn the Scottish Industrial Estates 
was as follows, - (2) 
(1) Monthly Digest of Statistics, Digest of Scottish Statistics. 
(2) The percentages are based on figures in table 20. In it the 
Ministry of Labour industrial classification was used. Similar 






















f; of total 
51.E 
aorue of the firms on the Scottish Industrial Estates belonged 
to industries which have done better than the average in. the U.K. 
'.ihen the figures for firms associated directly with the shipbuild- 
ing ind.ustr_; are excluded the percentage is down to 4;::.5d. Taken 
b itself it does not sugKest that the tenancy pattern was such 
as would hold out prospects of a high rate of growth of the light 
industries v:hich ,..ould counterbalance the basic industries of 
the Scottish Development Area. There is on the estates a strik- 
ingly small number of firms in the chemical industry which shows 
plants 
the most rF id rate of growth in the U.K. Although many chemical 
could be classified as heavy industry and therefore not eligible 
for the S.I.L.Ltd. factories, this does not ap=oly to the whole 
of the industry. The allocation of factories to firms closely 
linked with the shipbuilding industry is somewhat puzzling in 
view of the objectives of the. industrial estates policy which aims 
at reducing dependence of the area on the heavy industries. The 
allocation of factories to a large number of firms in the cloth- 
ing industry is also surprising. The industry is already well 
represented in the area. many of the firms in the clothing in- 
dustry moved to the estates from premises in Glasgow. The alloc-- 
i21 
cation could perhaps be taken as an attempt to encourage the 
;rowth of the local light industry. The clothing industry which 
in the past has been subject to severe fluctuations does not 
a 
appear to behappy choice from the point of view of maximising 
the employment stability. 
CAA 
The Scottish Development Area is not unsuitable location 
for the chemical, light engineering, vehicles, food, paper and 
printing, and textile industries. Examples can be given of firms 
in X11 these industries which are operating satisfactorily in the 
area. Some have a long established connection with it. The 
Scottish Industrial Esta:tes,nevertheless, do not appear to have 
been successful in attracting a substantial percentage of its 
tenants from those industries which have done better than the 
average. This fact although of importance is not by itself of 
primary significance in estimating the measure of success achieved 
by the Scottish industrial Estates . ,:such depends on the _oarti- 
cule.r firms which have been allotted factories. The picture is 
much more satisfactory when the individual firms on the estates 
are considered. The majority of these firms have good past records 
of performance, or if new undertakings, good prospects. The rate 
of growth among them has. been considerable. The rate of failure 
:as been very low. A high percentage of the firms are branches 
of well- established firms. Although in some cases the original 
motives for cowing to the estates are no longer operative, the 
firms concerned have no intention of leaving. 
)c2 
The development of the Scottish Industrial Estates in the 
future is liTe1y to be slowed down. The important limiting factor 
is the sully of labour. The changed economic conditions and 
past growth of tile industrial estates have resulted. in the reduct- 
ion in unemployment to a level where a shortage of labour is al- 
ready beginning to be felt in the Scottish Development Area. It 
has never been,, overnment's policy that light industries should 
draw labour away from the basic industries a.nd supplant them. (1 ) 
This does not :_jean that no more firms in the light industries will 
be needed. :;yore mines are to be closed in the South West of Scot- 
land, and judging on the basis of past exerience, the encourage- 
ment to miners to transfer to the opening coalfields on the East 
coast is not likely to meet with any great success. Therefore, 
new industrial estates may be required to bring alternative work 
to the ex- mining communities. For this purpose no large influx 
of new firms should be required, but the need may be greater if 
the shipbuilding industry contracts. Difficulties in filling 
order books have already begun to be experienced. The high cost 
and uncertain delivery dates, have already led even some British 
shipowners to place orders in foreign ads.(2) If this policy 
continues the level of unemployment in the Scottish Development 
Area will probably rise. 
In the future however, it will be more difficult for the 
Scottish Industrial Estates to find tenants, unless restrictions 
(1) F,mployment Policy White Paper, ( 1 44 ) , Cmd.65 r ; , Ch .5 . 
(2)Investors 'Chronicle, Feb.1 1 ,1;56, 
on building outside the Development Areas are again tightened up 
by the government. In the past approximately X1;0 of the 
Ltd. tenants were English firms which came to Scotland largely 
because factories were available. This inducement has lost its 
power of attraction so that the growth of the Scottish Industrial 
Estates must now depend largely on the Scottish firms. A number 
of industries which may be regarded as the industries of the fu- 
ture, such as electronics, chemicals, synthetic fibres, industrial 
microbiology, plastics, mining machinery and high vacuum engin- 
eering have already establisl_ed their roots in Scotland.(1) It 
is among these industries that the Scottish Industrial Estates 
should look for tenants when a change in the economic conditions 
warrants further development. At present the scope of activity 
of the Scottish Industrial Estates Ltd. is confined to the De- 
velopment Area. Under the Distribution of Industry legislation 
there are no provisions which would enable the S.I.E.Ltd. to 
'ant 
aid, development of industry in newly growing industrial communities 
The importance of the 'developing areas' as contrasted with the 
Development Areas, has been emphasised in the Cairncross Report.(2) 
There it was suggested that the government should have powers to 
finance factories in the 'developing areas'. ( -) In communities 
o o 
which are showing spntaneus industrial growth government help in 
the form of factory building might accelerate the process but is 
not of vital importance. A stronger case can be made for assist- 
(1) i . . Cairncross t.L.Meier, New Industries and Economic Deve- 
lopment od Scotland, The Three Bank Review,no .1 4,1 52. 
(2) Report of the Committee on Local Development in Scotland, The 
Scottish Council (pevelopment of Industry)I52. 
(3) ibid. p.41. 
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assisting light industrial development in the newly opened 
coalfields, so as to lay the foundations for a balanced in- 
dustrial development from the start. 
Industrial estates could with government aid be established 
in parts of Scotland by 'private site' companies, local autho- 
rities, or alternatively by an agency of the central govern- 
ment such as the S.I.E.Ltd. The government offer of financial 
help to the site companies met with no response in the 1930's 
and there has been no interest in it since. Although local 
authorities might be willing to undertake the responsibility 
for the estates , it is doubtful whether they are well placed 
to fulfil the task, since they are unlikely to have at their 
disposal staff of a high caliber comparable to that of the 
central government. Furthermore there is the question of 
finance. Local authorities in the 'developing areas' would 
not have capital reserves and would probably find it difficult, 
even with government help to raise the funds required for the 
establishment of industrial estates. If the government were 
to provide all the capital needed, there would appear to be no 
advantages in delegating the responsibility for industrial es- 
tates to the local authorities. A more satisfactory course for the 
central government would be either to set up a new public body 
for the purpose of establishing industrial estates or to amend 
the legislation to permit the S.I.E.Ltd. to do so outside the 
Development Area. The existence of two similar companies for 
adjoining areas, which apart from introducing an element of com- 
petition that might or might not be conducive to greater ef- 
525 
ficiency, would not appear to have any obvious advantages. Con- 
siderations in favour of entrusting the responsibility for in- 
dustrial est tes outside the Development Area to the S.1 .E.Ltd. 
are the coj any T s know- how, and ability to co- orriihate industrial 
,evelopment over a wider area. Efore such a step could be re- 
commended it would be of valve to know what the cost of the Scott- 
ish Industrial Estates Ltd. has been in the .past and how efficient- 
ly the company has been managed. 
T1e cost of the Scottish Industrial Estates. To be meaning- 
ful the cost of the Scottish Industrial Estates would have to 
be examined in relation to other policies ';chic l could have been 
pursued wiVi the same objectives. Several ,Jolicies could have 
been adepteu víith the object of reducing unemployment and several 
were tried. The surplus labour could have been transferred. The 
Industrial Transference Board was established for that purpose, 
but its success was limited. Financial help could have been 
given to the heavy industries, as was done when with the govern- 
ment's aid the building of the T Queens T on the Clyde was resumed 
a.in. However, these could only be regarded as measures of re- 
lief. They did not offer a solution to the problem. New liht 
industries 
were needed. To attract them to the Scottish Development Area, 
the government could have offered tax concessions or subsidies in 
the shape of a direct payment on the basis of some such formula as 
a per capita grant for the number of workers employed.. Neither 
lends itself as a suitable basis for a long term fiscal policy. 
It would appear that in the circmmstances the establishment 
;26 
of the Scottish Industrial Estates for the purpose of creating 
employment and of diversifying industry was the best policy from 
the point of view of the Scottish Development Area. From the 
point of view of the national economy it was the best policy only 
at a price. All that can be said is that compared with the other 
measures it was likely to be initially more expensive. Since it 
held out prospects of becoming self- financing or even a profit - 
making project the higher price was justifiable. How much was 
paid and whether the scheme is breaking even, can not be ascer- 
tained from the published accounts. Although figures for .profits 
are available, figures of the amount of invested capital are not. 
The rate of return can not therefore be calculated. The inade- 
quacy of the information on this subject has already been discuss- 
ed in a preceeding chapter. 
Efficiency. The efficiency with which the Scottish Industrial 
Estates Ltd. operates is an important factor bearing on the cost 
of the project. Here again the information available is in- 
sufficient for an assessment of efficiency. It would appear 
however that efficiency was reduced as a result of the change in 
the status and the method of finance of the company after the 
war. Since the change in the status from a principal to that of 
an agent, decisions have to be referred to the Board of Trade for 
approval. This involves additional work and wastage of time. The 
sanction of funds against each ap,;roved project, instead of block 
allocations has been cumbersome. The combined effect of both 
these changes has been to reduce the scope for initiative and 
'2! 
responsibility on the part of the company's board of directors. 
When the present members retire, the chances of finding new men 
of ability to whom the directorship will appeal, are likely to 
be very much reduced. 
It is therefore suggested that in the interests of effi- 
ciency a reversion to the former status of the company is desi- 
rable. This would not require the abandonment of the planning of 
location on the national level. The policies of the separate 
industrial estate companies could be co- ordinated at meetings 
of their representatives under the chairmanship of an officer of 
the Board of Trade. To finance the activities of an industrial 
estate company a block grant on say a ,uinquennial basis or a 
loan of capital would appear to be the most suitable method of 
finance since it is likely to offer the strongest incentive to 
break even. Originally an element of subsidy was necessary if 
the estates were to achieve their objectives; since the war this 
has not been so. The economic conditions have changed and as 
a result, the availability of factories and of labour have been 
sufficient inducements in themselves. 
It was not difficult for the industrial estates to secure 
tenants, so long as building outside the Development Areas was 
restricted, but this is no longer the case. Since the restrict- 
ions have been relaxed, the efficiency with which the estates 
are operated has become a much more important factor in their 
development than it has been so far. 
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This study of the Scottish Industrial states Ltú_. 
su gists tae conclusion that the 'experiment' of estab- 
lishing the government sponsored industrial estates was 
worth making. It does not appear however that the 'ex- 
periment' was conducted by the government in such a way 
that the results could be ascertained in concrete terms. 
14.ore detailed information on labour and industrial would 
Nave been necessary. Igo information seems to have been 
collected on the rate of growth of the different indus- 
tries in the Development Areas and in the country as a 
whole. it docks not appear that an effort was made to 
obtain information on such subjects as the production 
or distribution costs in various locations. Some in- 
formation which has been gathered has not been released. 
In particular a comparison of the performance of the 
four industrial estates eo,r:.panies would have been interest- 
ing. The government attached ,neat importance to the 
policy of establishing of the estates. The public was 
led to expect much of it, but the public has been given 
insufficient information to judge whether its expectations 
have been fulfilled. This is all the more regretable 
because tt,.e information gathered in the course of this 
research points to the conclusion that the Scottish In- 
dustrial -estates have been well managed and successful. 
T ey represent a method b: which the ,c;ovez nment may control 
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Indices of Unemployment 
(3) of (6)I 
10.99 
Fernales 




18.21 153.03 263.92 170.49 
27.36 244.;5 265.74 
20).4ì 340.11 279.43 
26.30 267.04 276.34 254.13 
24.11 239.25 286.55 233.41 
21.41 230.11 265.27 222.93 
10.21 196.39 239.35 192.21 
15.37 172.52 256.23 175.60 
15.51 178.22 267.68 161.85 
























Source: Ministry of Labour 
7'ncluded r.c.1 labour with salarie,:, a,426 self-am.p14ed, 
-J +1- - 4 4.1able in 1946 on the olL, ane the new basis. The 
comparable but since the percentage of unemployed in the ne4group is unlikely to be :J4,J, figures from 1929-1,7)52 may be 
P33o 
1951 mien _ 1,378,530 10,579 3,933 2,645 404 445 1,041 19,047 436 19,483 10,216 29,699 
0.77 0.29 0.19 0.03 0.03 0.08 1.38 0.03 1.41. 0.74 2.15 
Women 726,060 3,005 2,182 1,856 368 360 475 8,246 359 8,605 4,008 12,613 
0.41 0.30 0.26 0.05 0.05 0.07 1.14 0.05 1.19 0.55 1.74 
Total 2,104,590 13,584 6,115 4,501 772 805 1,516 27,293 795 28,088 14,224 42,312 
0.65 0.29 0.21 0.04 0.04 0.07 1.30 0.04 1.33 0.68 2.01 
1952 Mien 1,380,460 12,595 3,675 3,134 389 700 4,482 24,973 675 25,648 12,580 38,228 
0.91 0.27 0.23 0.03 0.05 0.32 1.81 0.05 1.86 0.91 2.77 
Women 722,050 7,124 4,292 3,505 647 1,123 4,727 21,418 632 22,050 8,244 30,294 
0.99 0.59 0.49 0.09 0.16 0.65 2.97 0.09 3.06 1.14 4.20 
Total 2,102,510 19,717 7,967 6,639 1,036 1,23 9,209 46,391 1,307 47,698 20,824 68,522 
0.94 0.38 0.31 0.05 0.09 0.44 2.21 0.06 2.27 0.99 3.26 
Source: Ministry of Labour (unpublished) 
(1) In order to compare the past une--: ___: _:t trend in 1-.7sent Development l,re_.s unemployed persons are grouped together on a geographical basis as if the Development Areas 
(as c -- .ec _ -- :) _stec. in ,-e_._ for which . figureo are available. 
(2) "Rest of Development Areas" consists of - West Lothian, South and Calders, _ '_1_.__ ,.Land :,.::. are not accurate, as 
until 1949 there were no separate returns for Inverness D.A. and Inverness N.D.A. 
(3) As the National Insurance scheme was extended in 1948, the pre- and post -194ó figures3for the insured population are not strictly comparable. OB = old insurance basis in 1948. 
NB = new insurance basis. 
m Unemployment figures for the Rest of D.A. and Total D.A. in this table differ from those shown in the Ministry of Labour returns. The difference is due to regrouping. 
Inverness. and Linlithgow are included in the table under D.A. but not in the Ministry of Labour returns until 1949. The Ministry of Labour figures for D.A. are - 
1946: Ten ien 26,OI M1or-ien -17, 910, Total 43,925; 1947: ien 28,790, 'Women 13,005, Total 41,795; 1948: Dien 26,650, Women 9,306, Total 35,956. fp 
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Persons Glasgow & East 
D nbartonshire 
1929 Total 1,271,210 4,976 
1932 lien 968,980 
women 371,330 
Total 1,340,310 
1934 :Ten 9E4,510 
Women 367,770 
Total 1,352,280 
1936 1:en 1,051,560 
Women 722,710 
Total 1,474,270 






























Ret,ional Unemployment expressed as a Percentage of Insured Population(l) 
Development Areas - Unemployed Persons 
2 3 4 5 6 I 7 8 
+ 9 
Ayrshire Rest of(2) Total 
D nbartonshire i orth Total Col. Development Development 
Lanarkshire Renfrewshire West Central Dundee 1 -6 Areas Areas 
22,269 9,290 2,075 5,297 7,907 96,603 2,514 99,117 
1.75 0.73 0.16 0.42 0.62 7.60 0.20 7.80 
51,972 6,100 6,529 11,062 ; 18,672 22896 7,404 236,372 
5.36 2.69 0.67 1.14 1.93 23.63 0.76 24.39 
4,797 3,753 1,029 2, 593 19, 25 51, 036 682 51,718 
1.29 1.01 0.28 0.70 5.18 13.74 0.18 13.93 
56,769 29,853 7,558 13,655 Ì 37,922 20,004 8,086 288,090 
4.24 2.23 0.56 1.02 2.83 20.89 0.60 21.49 
41,961 19,731 4,::51 9,471 17,314 185,125 6,485 191,610 
4...o .c0 c,..:, 0.96 1.76 18.80 0. 66 19.46 
4,207 3,209 836 ;_, 0 4 15,549 42,756 646 43,402 
1.14 0.87 0.23 0.55 4.23 11.63 0.17 11.82 
46,168 22,940 5,287 11,465 32,863 227,881 7,131 235,012 
3.41 1.70 0.39 0.85 2.43 16.85 0.53 17.38 
, 
37,035 14, ,70 3, -49 7,316 8,984 148,091 5,073 153,164 
3.52 1.41 0.31 0.70 0.85 14.08 0.48 14.56 
5,261 3,318 844 1,497 6,811 34,336 1 559 34,895 
1.24 0.79 0.20 0.35 1.61 8.12 0.13 8.25 
42,296 18,194 4,093 8,813 15,795 182,427 5,632 166,059 
2.87 1.24 0.28 0.55 1.07 12.37 0.5 12.75 
37,014 12,718 2,302 5,782 8,701 128,287 5,007 133,294 
3.15 1.08 0.20 0.49 0.74. 10.90 0.43 11.33 
5,486 3,869 816 2,302 7,152 37,273 623 37,896 
1.19 0.84 0.10 0.50 1.55 8.07 0.13 8.20 
42,500 16,587 3,116 8,034 15,853 165,560 5,530 171,090 










19,818 ! 71,536 
5.33 ' 19.26 
102,245 390,335 
7.63 29.12 



















' 82,933 '254,023 
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Table 26. 331 
1946 
Scottish industrial Estates 
Glasgow and East 




Ayrshire North and Central 1 
Dundee 7 
Number of Projects 
1947 1948 
120 210 
1949 1950 1951 1952 
221 214 221 229 
56 50 55 73 
8 7 7 c , ç - - 81 , 
3, 5 2! 4 
77 78 
Employment - Position of Approved Projects 
Employment 
__ 
as at June 
- - 
1946 ì 1947 1D48 1949 1950 
I 
i 
14 372 7,775 8,505 11,446 
1,006 1,597 2,646 4,063, 6,191 
2 4 
9 12 
Total 98 198 288 
(a) Treasury financed and 
standard factories 









V 9 499 ^ 
1952 
potential Employment as Estimated in June 






19,068 18 707 16 , ,442 ; 18,454 17,962 
12,769 9,396 9,960 ' 10,824 10,827 
993 943 925. 850 633 
1,179 550 1,850 2,260 2,860 
7419 639 ' 1,108 1,408 1,395 
1 
1,482 1,714 2,255 2,058 
i 
; 3,666 4,168 4,187 
26,663 29,922 36,6C3 35; 293 33,951 37,964 42,754 
12,352 11,903 9,792 11,612 
7,302 6,555 13,614 13,363 
269 515 459 471 425 1,701 
222; 809 1,640 1,691! 950, 1,G04 
; 
201; 944 1,128`. 1,454! 500 528 
' 
15 15 -- - 92 1,044 1,959 2,i24 2,876 
336 350 1,120 2,468 10,594 14,3041 21,864 25,105. 24,950 
24 231 29 27 38 38. 1,404 1,842 3,693; 4,397 6,762 9,563 9,305 11,435 11,661 12,557 11,932i 10,871 20,213 16,168 
45 47 55 60 
a 15 ) 17 
841 8'7 
311 10,118 11,169 14,581 21,042 22,0781 24,532 
> > 
r ' 6,-nJ 7,3341 7,985 1 e`J ` 7v _ _ 19 41, 
103 108 125 132 11,344 ? 15,520 1 20,343 24, J43 
Total for Government 
financed premises in D.A. 47 7 358 358 410, 440 462 11,835 14,428 
Total for Govt. financed 






(1) D.A. H 220 261 383 317 355 2,390 : 4,028 
¡ 
7,101 10,6781 12,971 
i 
(2) Y.D..«. 85 162 199 ; 286 242 285 261 ; 550 ; 2,868 4,3831 5,256 
t 
. . , _ -L----- 
Total : 382 4601 669 559; 607 ; 640 2, 651 1{, 578 ' 9, 969 15,0611 18,227 
± 
. _ _I -----_ __.__f , - --i- 
- 
1 




771 727 782 ` 817 1[, 225 _8,456 32,557 43,960: 62,639 
TOTAL ìi . U.x. ; 177 216 ; 305 263! 286 : 303 890 4,110 8,349 10,048 
i-- . - : : _ . ..---_ _.__ _._ ----._- - --- 





l ; , 




20,295i 24,960 26,194 24,317 25,320 
2,440- _,  6,378 8,734 7,971- 7,228 




49,66 56, 746' 5)87V 581393 66,543 75,434 71,592' 70,142 89,709 







D.A. = Development Area 







79,563, 77,370 97,359 98,085 
24,119 ! 24,986 17,458 23,218 25,035 24,989 23,992 
11,842 11,687 12,578 12,902; 13,674 14,038 14,688 
22,170 20,948 29,300 34,905 37,613 37,891; 37,666 38,157 39,674 
71,412 71,712 75,851 
11,452 14,038. 16,008 14,282 
74, 091 86, 250 87, 720 90,133 .07, 826 121, 781 
89,761 100,469 96,581 94,134 113,828 113,845 
; 
18,065 21,312 20,873 20,902 21,688 
i 
23,914 
117, 454 115,036 135,516 137,759 
Source; i inistry of Labour (unpublished) 




Estates in - 






Emi)loyuient on a")..proved 
_Lae FeLlale hale 
Total 337 
a) Treasury financed 





Total (a) C[2;) 
Total for 
financed -.premises 





























1.622 . 3(: 
9 
19 
73 19 627 
4236 7C8 
611 2026 16C7 212 
9205 1129 
842 4194 12L7 421, 
2736 L433 




4.02 :1 11995 
L. 227 3074 
L - ,Torc 
- 
rifieE 1..evelo-,erit Area in ScotlanC 
sinifies the rest of Scotland 













- --f, ,-F--. 
-ri 
i :'-- 
r -. - 
i 1 --j. 





:-37 '.:1. 320 
:.22 i..1_(._, 1020; 671 
i 
1 71 1034 94 1--;31 123 
1006 1058 1166 170 1167 
0 12048 9C16 13914 11191 15157, 9793 
7 127u 3146 3616 4875 4682 4275 5026 
9, 32 [2 .: 100 4242 17343 4735 19324 5208 
1. -:,10 12C6 i 5L04 1530 6295 1690 
7 7006 
. 
2416 ' ;144 :22022 10953 29192 11924 
6 31164 17674 61--12 2014 3:::7;ZC 20027 
ij 
;1L966 41936 '")')-1 4.r 45055 21717 
! 
9 ill..r. 1.40C Liu likie ,.:303- . ..._ ... . , 
,... ,,... - 
,..... --_, - 
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Table 28. 333 
1929 Total 
- 1932 iTen 
Women 
Total 
Unem2ioymnt: oional ristribution 
17-al:._,r of -persons registered as unemployed in C._istricts expressed as. a percentaFe of the total unemployment in Scotland 
_ . 







35.63 15.94 0.65 
35.96 16.30 
27.42 0.71 7.65 1.44 
34.39 14.54 5.56 1.94 
.1 
1.49 





















15.75 0.78 1.52 
1938 'or 31.04 18.60 0.3 1.16 
, omen 32.08 9.97 7.03 1.48 
Total 31.26 16.73 6.53 1.23 
1946 
. 
en 26.56 12.53 1 7.56 1.17 
,o-en Ju,D,-, , ...,,.)_, 12.12 0.37 
-ot3L . `) 1T.r; ,-- 1.05 






Women 36.68 26.98 7.66 2.69 1 
Total 
1 
37.41 18.85 7.24 
1 
1948 Fen 1 38.16 15.00 7.39 
, 
Women 38.53 28.36 7.72 
Total 38.25 18.07 7.47 
12.48 7.71 1949 Lien 39.52 
Women 30.76 
Total 37.48 





































8.28 i 1.65 
. 
























3.79 5.66 69.16 1.80 70.96 29.04 100 
3.47 58 0 71.82 2.37 74.15 25.85 100 
3.02 9.72 71.34 0.95 72.30. 27.70 100 
3.50 3.27 71.73 2.07 73.81 20.19 100 
3.53 0.43 69.29 2.43 71.72 28.26 100 
3.44 26.41 72.61 1.10 73.70 2J.30 100 
3.52 10.08 69.89 2.19 72.08 27.92 100 
3.34 4.10 67.53 2.31 09.84, 30.16 100 
3.04 13.84 09.80 1.14 70.94 29.06 100 
3.28 5.08 67.94 2.10 70.04 29.96 100 
2.91 4.37 64.46 2.52 66.98 33.02 100 
3.18 13.CO 67.76 1.13 68.89 33.02 100 
3.35 6.24 65.18 2.18 67.35 32.05 100 
3.81 5.16 46.81 48.88 51.12 100 
4.03 /4L 4. , 78.10 1.96 80.06 19.94 100 
/.05 4.35 55.99 2.04 58.03 41.97 100 
3.27 nr 69.80 30.20 100 
1.87 t,O,C a.24 lo .76 100 






5.04 i c9.30 70.86 29.14 100 
1.56 2.99 80.60 82.34 17.66 100 
2.33 4.56 71.90 1.61 73.51 26.49 100 
2.01 5.46 68.67 1.29 69.96 30.04 100 
2.21 10.76 74.73 2.41 V 77.14 22.86 100 
2.06 6.69 70.07 1.56 28.37 100 
1.70 4.40 03.49 1.46 35.05 100 
2.00 4.62 
6664.939 
2.50 69.49 30.51 100 
1.77 4.45 1.73 66.12 33.88 100 
1.50 3.51 1.47 
6645.1338 
65.60 34.40 100 
2.85 3.77 2.85 
6 
31.78 100 
1.60 3.58 64.50 1.68 86: 33.62 100 - -- 
1.83 11.72 65.32 1.77 67.09 32.91 100 
3.71 15.60 70.70 2.09 72.79 27.21 100 
2.66 13.44 67.70 1.91 69.61 30.39 100 
Source: Ministry of Labour (unpublished) . - 
